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The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to management voluntary forecasts of earnings. The authors further investigate whether the market reacts to such forecasts in respect of satisfaction.

The authors’ econometric models are constructed from previous work in accounting to specify the effect of ACSI on the issuance and optimism of management forecasts. Our model also specifies the impact of management optimism with respect to ACSI on stock returns. The data consisting of US firms in the 2001-2010 is collated from several databases and analyzed using multiple regression procedures.

Results indicate that ACSI is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing management forecasts and boosts management optimism. It is also found that investors react negatively to management optimism that is inherent in forecasts and results from satisfaction.

The authors’ research findings not only complement prior work on the linkage between customer satisfaction and firm value by incorporating a managerial perspective but also respond to the recent call for further work on how relevant marketing metrics drive organizational decisions and firms’ financial performance. It should be noted that findings are limited to firms that release both a voluntary issuance of management forecasts and ACSI.

The study results shed light on the justification of marketing expenditures and provide a response to the call for marketing accountability. The study results also enable managers to make better decisions about whether and when to issue a forecast. The authors’ research further calls stakeholders’ attention to the presence of management forecast optimism with respect to satisfaction.

Despite the importance of managers as primary information generators and disseminators in the capital markets, there appears to be little discussion on the satisfaction’s relevance to market participants, particularly in relation to the role of managers. Therefore, this investigation is the first to empirically show the relevance of ACSI to management earnings forecasts that have been ignored in the marketing literature.

The authors study whether CEO beauty influences management guidance.

The authors calculate an attractiveness score based on facial symmetry and perform regression analyses to examine the relation between CEO beauty and management guidance.

The authors find that attractive CEOs are more likely to issue voluntary management earnings guidance. After controlling for this appearance-based self-selection, the authors document that management forecasts provided by attractive CEOs are more optimistic yet less precise. Consistent with this result, the authors find that analysts' consensus forecast error following management forecasts made by attractive CEOs is larger than such error following management forecasts made by unattractive CEOs. The authors further find that the perceived credibility of management forecasts by attractive CEOs is not different from that by unattractive CEOs.

These findings suggest that attractive CEOs are more active but less skillful in issuing management forecasts. This adds to the emerging accounting literature on the relation between facial appearance and information delivery.

The purpose of this study is to examine the usefulness of pre‐production cash expenditure forecasts issued by Australian mining explorers in their quarterly cash‐flow reports.

Usefulness is determined by examining compliance and the reliability of forecasts (accuracy and bias) for a sample of 1,760 forecasts issued by 481 explorers in 2005/2006. The cross‐sectional variation in reliability is examined using regression analysis.

The findings reveal a high level of compliance but significant inaccuracies (median forecast error of around 50 percent of actual expenditure for exploration and evaluation expenditure and 85 percent for development expenditure), and some evidence of forecast bias. Forecast inaccuracy is more prevalent in firms that have poorer performance, greater financial slack, greater cash‐flow volatility, no financial leverage, and for firms that are smaller, in the pre‐development stage, and in the mineral (non‐oil and gas) sub‐industry.

The analysis of forecast usefulness is confined to compliance and reliability. Further research could consider the value‐relevance and predictive ability of these forecasts.

The findings question the usefulness of mandatory forecasting by showing that the information role of forecasts in capital markets is impaired when firms have little discretion over the forecast decision, timing and specificity.

This is the first study to examine mandatory cash expenditure forecasts and makes a significant contribution to the small literature on mandatory financial forecasts.

Prior literature has found that as uncertainty in a firms information environment increases, optimism increases in equity analysts’ earnings forecasts. The studies suggest an economic incentive explanation, commonly called the management‐relations hypothesis. However, there is conflicting evidence that managers would prefer pessimistic forecasts and encourage analysts to “walk‐down” their forecasts to prevent negative earnings surprises. To test these contradictory findings, this study uses an experimental setting to remove economic incentives from the analyst’s decision process and isolate the cause of observed bias in analysts’ reports. The results of the experiment show that an increase in the perceived uncertainty of the forecasting task results in significantly lower relative optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts. This finding is consistent with a negativity hypothesis and the managementrelations hypothesis extolled in the empirical research. The findings also show that relative forecast optimism bias is positively related to the level of analysts’ buy/sell recommendations consistent with more recent findings that suggest that analysts use motivated reasoning (the tendency to process information in a manner that supports one’s goal) in their judgments of forecasted earnings and recommendations. Together, these results suggest that analysts consider and use financial information differently depending on their decision goal.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether analysts’ optimism affects the stock crash risk.

The sample covers 49,246 firm-year observations for the period between 1995 and 2015. The authors use OLS regressions with firm and year fixed effects for analyses.

The study finds that there is a positive association between analysts’ optimism and stock crash risk. Such a positive impact is more pronounced for firms with opaque information environment and for analysts who are considered ex ante credible.

The results indicate that analysts’ optimism can be an important source of stock crash risk.

The findings can be useful for informational users of analyst reports. Given that information provided by analysts might have negative consequences, the empirical results can be useful in assessing future stock return behaviors.

This paper has the potential to shed light on the large literature of crash risk. Prior studies suggest that crash is driven by the agency tension between shareholders and managers. It remains possible that crashes could be caused by overpriced stocks in the absence of bad news hoarding. The paper investigates crash from a perspective, financial analysts, that is underexplored.

The study examines the effect of increased Economic Policy uncertainty on analyst optimism in the Indian market. The study also explores whether the SEBI Research Analyst Regulation, 2014, has effectively contained the optimistic nature of analysts.

The study is based on firms in the Indian market. The sample period is 2003–2020. It runs a linear panel regression to measure the impact of Economic Policy uncertainty on the optimism level of analysts' forecasts and recommendations, controlling for firm fixed effects. Further, the impact of the SEBI Research Analyst Regulation, 2014, has been assessed with the help of the difference-in-difference approach.

The Economic Policy uncertainty is significantly and positively related to the analyst optimism, reflected in the forecast bias and recommendation in the Indian context. The experience of analysts and the age of the firm positively drive optimism. However, introducing the Research Analyst Regulation by SEBI led to a decline in analyst optimism. The regulation decoupled the analysts' compensation from brokerage service transactions. Thus, the results suggest that the regulation has effectively curbed the incentive to produce optimistic output.

This is the first study in the Indian market to assess the impact of uncertainty on analyst output. It also investigates the effectiveness of the first analyst-specific regulation in India, i.e. The Research Analyst Regulation, 2014.

The literature suggests that management discretion to adjust resources in response to changes in sales can create asymmetric cost behavior and management incentives to move stock prices can influence its decision to release management earnings forecasts (MEF). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between a firm’s degree of cost stickiness and its propensity to release MEF. The authors propose that both MEF and cost stickiness are influenced by management strategic choices and provide two possible explanations along with supportive evidence. First, when management is optimistic about future performance, it tends to increase both cost stickiness and is willing to disclose the optimistic expectations through MEF. Second, cost stickiness increases information asymmetry between management and investors, thus management tends to issue earnings forecast to mitigate the perceived information asymmetry.

The authors collect firm-level fundamental data from the COMPUSTAT database, and market data from the CRSP database during 2005 and 2016. The data used to measure variables related to institutional ownership and financial analysts are, respectively, obtained from the Thomson Reuters and the I/B/E/S databases. The quarterly MEF data are from two databases. The authors obtain the data before 2012 the from Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance database and manually collect the data between 2012 and 2016 from the Bloomberg database for the largest 3,000 publicly traded US companies. The measurement of cost stickiness is based on the industry-level measurement developed by Anderson et al. (2003) and the firm-level measurements developed by Weiss (2010). The authors construct two measurements, management’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF, to capture management’s voluntary disclosure strategy.

The analyses of a sample between year 2005 and 2016, indicate that the firm-level cost stickiness is positively associated with the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, the authors find that the level of cost stickiness is associated with more favorable earnings news forecasted by management. Additional tests suggest that both information asymmetry and managerial optimism may explain the relationship between cost stickiness and MEF. Finally, the authors find that the association between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the resource adjustment cost is high and when the firm efficiency is high. The results are robust after using alternative measurements of cost stickiness and MEF.

First, this paper attempts to build a bridge between managerial accounting and financial accounting by providing evidence of managerial incentives and discretions that affect both cost structure and earnings. The authors contribute to, and complement, prior studies that primarily disentangle the complicated accounting information system by focusing on either the internal information system or the external information system. Second, the paper complements prior studies that examine cost stickiness and its determinants of asymmetric cost behavior by providing additional evidence for the value-relevance of cost stickiness strategy and its link to MEF releases in mitigating information asymmetry. Third, the findings are also relevant to current debates among policymakers, academia and practitioners regarding modernization of mandatory and voluntary disclosures through discussing the managerial incentive behind the managerial disclosure strategies as reflected in MEF releases (SEC, 2013). Fourth, the authors provide evidence regarding management’s role in influencing cost asymmetry and MEF releases, which support the theoretical argument that management discretions affect the firms’ cost structure and MEF disclosures.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how family firms affect analyst forecast dispersion, accuracy and optimism and how earnings smoothness as the moderating factor, affects these relationships in an emerging market context.

This paper uses the population sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2010 as the research sample, which includes 963 firm-year observations.

The findings show that analysts following family firms are more likely to have more dispersed, less accurate and more optimism biased forecasts than those following nonfamily firms. Earning smoothness is mainly used by nonfamily firms as a signaling strategy to improve analyst forecast quality. In contrast, earnings smoothness is mainly used by families as a garbling strategy, stimulating forecast optimism. Only earnings smoothness in family firms with a high level of family ownership concentration is likely to be signaling-oriented to improve analyst forecast accuracy and mitigate analyst optimism biases.

Emerging markets are not only featured by prevailing principal-principal conflicts but also have multiple levels of agency conflicts among large shareholders, minority shareholders and professionally hired managers. This research reveals the multiple governance roles of family owners in affecting analyst forecast quality, including their entrenchment role in extracting private benefits of control through opaque environments and market discipline distortion role in aligning interests between managers and families without prioritizing meeting or beating analyst forecasts, both at the cost of minority shareholders. This research further disentangles the intertwined signaling oriented and garbiling oriented incentives associated with earnings smoothness under family governance.

One of the major challenges for any project is to prepare and develop an achievable baseline schedule and thus set the project up for success, rather than failure. The purpose of this paper is to explore and investigate research outputs in one of the major causes, optimism bias, to identify problems with developing baseline schedules and analyse mitigation techniques and their effectiveness recommended by research to minimise the impact of this bias.

A systematic quantitative literature review was followed, examining Project Management Journals, documenting the mitigation approaches recommended and then reviewing whether these approaches were validated by research.

Optimism bias proved to be widely accepted as a major cause of unrealistic scheduling for projects, and there is a common understanding as to what it is and the effects that it has on original baseline schedules. Based upon this review, the most recommended mitigation method is Flyvbjerg’s “Reference class,” which has been developed based upon Kahneman’s “Outside View”. Both of these mitigation techniques are based upon using an independent third party to review the estimate. However, within the papers reviewed, apart from the engineering projects, there has been no experimental and statistically validated research into the effectiveness of this method. The majority of authors who have published on this topic are based in Europe.

The short-listed papers for this review referred mainly to non-engineering projects which included information technology focussed ones. Thus, on one hand, empirical research is needed for engineering projects, while on the other hand, the lack of tangible evidence for the effectiveness of methods related to the alleviation of optimism bias issues calls for greater research into the effectiveness of mitigation techniques for not only engineering projects, but for all projects.

This paper documents the growth within the project management research literature over time on the topic of optimism bias. Specifically, it documents the various methods recommended to mitigate the phenomenon and highlights quantitatively the research undertaken on the subject. Moreover, it introduces paths for further research.