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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of management earnings forecasts on the level of information asymmetry around subsequent earnings announcement.

Employing the adverse selection cost method suggested by George et al., the paper compares for each sample firm the adverse selection cost around earnings announcement in forecasting years with that in non‐forecasting years.

Consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia is the finding that the earnings announcement in non‐forecasting years decreases information asymmetry during a three‐day announcement period and increases in a post‐announcement period up to seven days. No significant change in information asymmetry between pre‐ and post‐announcement periods when firms released a “good” news forecast is found. The firms that previously released a “bad” news forecast experience a significantly lower information asymmetry than those that did not forecast during announcement or post‐announcement days, and experience a decrease in information asymmetry in a five to seven‐day post‐announcement period.

This paper provides the first empirical reports on the different information asymmetry changes around earnings announcements followed by a “good” news management forecast from those followed by a “bad” news forecast.

Financial analysts act as crucial conduits of information between firms and stakeholders. However, comparatively little is known about how these information intermediaries evaluate the believability and importance of corporate disclosures. We argue that a firm’s level of managerial discretion, or latitude of executive action, acts as a cue for financial analysts, which helps them interpret and respond to voluntary management earnings forecasts. Our study provides strong, robust evidence that financial analysts find management forecasts significantly less believable in low-discretion than in high-discretion environments, and therefore tend to be much less responsive to these forecasts. We also show that managerial discretion is especially impactful on analysts’ responses in those circumstances where analysts are typically most uncertain about how to interpret management forecasts.

Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to management voluntary forecasts of earnings. The authors further investigate whether the market reacts to such forecasts in respect of satisfaction.

The authors’ econometric models are constructed from previous work in accounting to specify the effect of ACSI on the issuance and optimism of management forecasts. Our model also specifies the impact of management optimism with respect to ACSI on stock returns. The data consisting of US firms in the 2001-2010 is collated from several databases and analyzed using multiple regression procedures.

Results indicate that ACSI is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing management forecasts and boosts management optimism. It is also found that investors react negatively to management optimism that is inherent in forecasts and results from satisfaction.

The authors’ research findings not only complement prior work on the linkage between customer satisfaction and firm value by incorporating a managerial perspective but also respond to the recent call for further work on how relevant marketing metrics drive organizational decisions and firms’ financial performance. It should be noted that findings are limited to firms that release both a voluntary issuance of management forecasts and ACSI.

The study results shed light on the justification of marketing expenditures and provide a response to the call for marketing accountability. The study results also enable managers to make better decisions about whether and when to issue a forecast. The authors’ research further calls stakeholders’ attention to the presence of management forecast optimism with respect to satisfaction.

Despite the importance of managers as primary information generators and disseminators in the capital markets, there appears to be little discussion on the satisfaction’s relevance to market participants, particularly in relation to the role of managers. Therefore, this investigation is the first to empirically show the relevance of ACSI to management earnings forecasts that have been ignored in the marketing literature.

The purpose of this paper is to assess management earnings forecasts in a continuous disclosure environment.

A large sample of hand checked Australian management earnings forecasts are examined. These data are analysed using a series of logistic regressions. Hypotheses are proposed and tested based on Skinner's litigation cost hypothesis. Increases in non‐routine management earnings forecasts post‐2000; and increases in the proportion of such forecasts that contain bad news are predicted. The relationship between forecast specificity and forecast news content is investigated.

It was found that, post‐2000, legislative changes and increased enforcement action by ASIC were followed by increased disclosure of non‐routine management earnings forecasts. For routine forecasts, no significant increase in forecast disclosure is observed. This result is consistent with Skinner as is the finding that the increased disclosure is only apparent for bad news non‐routine forecasts. For the second objective, evidence was found that the larger the gap between market expectations and actual performance the more specific the forecast, but only for bad news forecasts.

The study extends the small amount of research investigating the characteristics of management earnings forecasts. It also provides an assessment of the effectiveness of efforts by ASIC to ensure that management meet their continuous disclosure obligations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

Barton and Simko argue that the balance sheet information would serve as a constraint on accrual‐based earnings management. This paper aims to extend their argument by examining whether the balance sheet constraint increases managers' propensity to use either downward forecast guidance or real earnings management as a substitute mechanism to avoid earnings surprises.

Following Barton and Simko, the paper uses the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to sales as a proxy for the balance sheet constraint. The argument is that because of the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, previous accounting choices that increase earnings will also increase net assets and therefore the level of net assets reflects the extent of previous accrual management. Models from Matsumoto and Bartov et al. are used to measure forecast guidance. Following Rochowdhury and Cohen et al., a firm's abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditures are used as proxies of real earnings management. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the 1996‐2006 annual data for a sample of nonfinancial, nonregulated firms.

The paper finds that firms with higher level of beginning net operating assets relative to sales are more likely to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward, and more likely to engage in real earnings management in terms of abnormal increases in production costs and abnormal reductions in discretionary expenditures.

Overall, the paper's evidence suggests that managers turn to real earnings management or downward forecast guidance as a substitute mechanism to avoid negative earnings surprises when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is constrained by the extent to which net assets are already overstated in the balance sheet.

This study adds to prior literature that examines how managers trade off different mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. It also contributes to the extant literature by providing further insights on the role of balance sheet information in the process of managing earnings and/or earnings surprises.

It has been widely documented that investors and analysts underreact to information in past earnings changes, a fundamental performance indicator. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers’ voluntary disclosure efficiently incorporates information in past earnings changes, whether analysts recognize and fully anticipate the potential inefficiency in management forecasts and whether managers’ potential forecasting inefficiency entirely results from intentional disclosure strategies or at least partly reflects managers’ unintentional information processing biases.

Archival data were used to empirically test the relation between management earnings forecast errors and past earnings changes.

Results show that managers underreact to past earnings changes when projecting future earnings and analysts recognize, but fail to fully anticipate, the predictable bias associated with past earnings changes in management forecasts. Moreover, analysts appear to underreact more to past earnings changes when management forecasts exhibit greater underestimation of earnings change persistence. Further analyses suggest that the underestimation of earnings change persistence is at least partly attributable to managers’ unintentional information processing bias.

This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by demonstrating the limitation in the informational value of management forecasts. The findings indicate that the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in mitigating market mispricing is inherently limited by the inefficiency in management forecasts. This study can help market participants to better use management forecasts to form more accurate earnings expectations. Moreover, our evidence suggests a managerial information processing bias with respect to past earnings changes, which may affect managers' operational, investment or financing decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit tenure and how clients manage the annual earnings surprise.

A sample of 5,029 firm‐year observations from 1996 to 2003 were employed to examine whether audit tenure is negatively related to the incidence of accrual‐based‐upward earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises; and whether audit tenure is positively related to the incidence of downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises.

Empirical results indicate a substitution of downward forecast guidance for upward earnings management as audit tenure lengthens.

The paper provides evidence that, as the auditor‐client relationship lengthens over time, firms turn to downward forecast guidance as a substitute for upward earnings management. One possible limitation of the sample period involves the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Because of the increased financial reporting scrutiny on both management and auditors that accompanies SOX, it is likely that constraints on earnings misstatements increase after SOX. Any decrease in upward earnings management resulting from SOX would thus work against finding a relation between audit tenure and the substitution of downward forecast guidance to prevent negative earnings surprises.

This paper supports the notion that audit tenure affects firms' choices among various tactics in their attempts to avoid negative earnings surprises. The results also contribute to the ongoing debate on mandatory audit firm rotation by showing that audit quality increases with audit tenure.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of management’s choice of forecast precision on the subsequent dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.

Using a sample of 3,584 yearly management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 10,287 quarterly management EPS forecasts made during the period of 2002-2007 and collected from the First Call database, the authors controlled for factors previously found to impact analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion and investigate the link between management forecast precision and attributes of the analysts’ forecasts.

Results provide empirical evidence that managements’ disclosure precision has a statistically significant impact on both the dispersion and the accuracy of subsequent analysts’ forecasts. It was found that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is negatively related to the management forecast precision. In other words, a precise management forecast is associated with a smaller dispersion in the subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Evidence consistent with accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts being positively associated with the precision in the management forecast was also found. When the present analysis focuses on range forecasts provided by management, it was found that lower precision (a larger range) is associated with a larger dispersion among analysts and larger forecast errors.

Evidence suggests a consistency in inferences across both annual and quarterly earnings forecasts by management. Accordingly, recent calls to eliminate earnings guidance through short-term quarterly management forecasts may have failed to consider the linkage between the attributes (precision) of those forecasts and the dispersion and accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts.

This study contributes to the literature on both management earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The results assist in policy deliberations related to calls to eliminate short-term management earnings guidance.