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This chapter discusses the regulatory challenges faced by financial institutions in emerging countries and it presents their specific features compared to financial institutions in developed countries. It offers a practical way of implementing regulatory changes while accounting for emerging countries’ specific features. Using a principle-based approach, this chapter builds on the recent regulatory developments in both developed and developing market economies. It relates these developments to industry best practices as well as the current state of the art in risk management and corporate governance. The findings show how the regulation of financial institutions in emerging countries differs from that in developed countries. Different approaches to mitigate the divergences and fill the gaps are discussed. Both regulators and financial institutions in emerging countries will find this chapter offers a practical point of view based on field and industry experience on how to interpret and apply regulations and adopt best practices in risk management in a way that accounts for emerging countries’ specific features.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss more efficient mechanisms of regulation in the financial system.

The authors developed a theoretical two-period model of financial flows (FFs) that considers households, banks, and a social planner.

It is important to highlight that different from other studies that do not distinguish between financial crisis and financial instability, the authors assume financial instability does not mean crisis, but represents a deviation in the behavior of the aggregate financial intermediation and in the financial operations of each bank from the equilibrium.

The practical implication of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on forward-looking financial regulations.

An important result is that bank failures occur when banks do not maintain sufficient resources to support the liquidity constraint from the interbank market. Another result is that the central bank reacts, via exchange of reserves with the market, to financial instability. This behavior on the part of the central bank is inefficient because the banks will assume that in the case of failure they will be “saved;” thus it creates an adverse incentive (moral hazard) that can amplify the risk over the entire financial system.

The originality of the model is the proposition of an efficient policy for financial stability based on a forward-looking financial regulation. In this strategy the regulator acts in advance (ex ante) to minimize the mismatch of FFs in relation to the flow balance. This manner of acting is a counterpoint to the financial regulation based on capital requirement.

The present study investigates the impact of financial soundness variables on bank performance in emerging countries.

This study uses macro-level panel data from 17 countries from 2011 to 2020. The analysis adopts six models. While four models include bank profitability, the dependent variable of the other models is Bank Z Scores. Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, Liquid Assets to Total Assets, Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans and Non-Interest Expenses to Gross Income are proxies of financial soundness variables.

The authors estimate fixed and random effects models with the Arellano, Froot and Rogers methods. Empirical results show that Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans harm ROA and ROE. Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets negatively affects ROE. Non-Interest Expenses to Gross Income on Bank Z Scores have a significant and negative effect. Moreover, Inflation, Foreign Direct Investment and GDP are macroeconomic variables that increase bank profitability.

This study contributes to the literature in different aspects. The first is the model of the study. The authors contribute to the literature regarding the variables used to measure financial soundness. Secondly, emerging countries are samples in the study. A significant part of the studies on financial soundness has focused on developed countries. Finally, the authors analyze the macro-level data. Bank soundness studies mainly investigate country-level variables. Macro-level analysis may provide an advantage in combating global financial crises.

The design of a macro-prudential framework and its interaction with monetary policy has been at the forefront of the policy agenda since the global financial crisis. However, most advanced economies (AEs) have little experience using macroprudential policies. As a result, relatively little is known empirically about macroprudential instruments’ effectiveness in mitigating systemic risks in these countries, about their channels of transmission, and about how these instruments would interact with monetary policy. This paper aims to fill in the gap.

The authors develop a new approach using the euro area bank lending survey to assess the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies in containing credit growth and house price appreciation in mortgage markets. Estimation is performed under the panel regressions (OLS, GLS) and panel VAR setup. Endogeneity issues arising from measures of macro-prudential policies are addressed by introducing GMM estimation and various instruments.

The authors find instruments targeting the cost of bank capital most effective in slowing down mortgage credit growth, and that the impact is transmitted mainly through price margins, the same banking channel as monetary policy. Limits on loan-to-value ratios are also effective, especially when monetary policy is excessively loose.

With limited data on macroprudential policy measures in the AEs, this paper proposed a new methodology of using answers from bank lending survey as proxies to assess the effectiveness of specific macroprudential measures and their transmission channels.

There has been much discussion over recent years of the likely impact of ‘financial globalisation’ on the financial services sector specifically and on the stability of national economies. This paper examines how and to what extent the ‘threats’ from financial globalisation manifest themselves in relation to the functions of regulation and supervision carried out by central banks. A theoretical perspective on these issues is put forward followed by an analysis of the specific case of a small island economy which is embracing financial liberalisation and competition, Mauritius.

Despite the sophisticated regulatory regime established in Solvency II, analysts should be able to consider other less complex indicators of the soundness of insurers. The Z-score measure, which has traditionally been used as a proxy of individual risk in the banking sector, may be a useful tool when applied in the insurance sector. However, different methods for calculating this indicator have been proposed in the literature. This paper compares six different Z-score approaches to examine which one best fits insurance companies. The authors use a final dataset of 183 firms (1,382 observations) operating in the Spanish insurance sector during the period 2010–2017.

In the first stage, the authors opt for a root mean squared error (RMSE) criterion to evaluate which of the various mean and SD estimates that are used to compute the Z-score best fits the data. In the second stage, the authors estimate and compare the explanatory power of the six Z-score measures that are considered by using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Finally, the authors report the results of the baseline equation using the system-GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data models.

The authors find that the best formula for calculating the Z-score of insurance firms is the one that combines the current value of the return on assets (ROA) and capitalization with the SD of the returns calculated over the full sample period.

The main limitation of the research is that it addresses only the Spanish insurance sector, and consequently, the implications of the findings must be framed in this institutional context. However, the authors think that the results could be extrapolated to other countries. Future research should consider including different countries and analyzing the usefulness of aggregated insurer-level Z-scores for macroprudential monitoring.

The Z-score may be a useful early warning indicator for microprudential supervision. In addition to being an indicator of the soundness of insurers simpler than those established in the current regulation, the information provided by this accounting-based measure may help analysts and investors obtain a better understanding of insurance firms' risk factors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine and compare different approaches to calculating Z-scores in the insurance sector. The few available results on the predictive power of the Z-score are mixed and focus on the banking sector.

雖然在償付能力標準II 內已建立了精密的監管制度，但分析人員應可以考慮以不太複雑的指標，來分析保險公司的穩健程度。Z-分數的估量在銀行業一向作為是個體風險的代理而使用，而Z-分數如應用於保險業，或許會成為有用的工具。唯在文獻裏，學者和研究人員提出了不同的方法來計算這個指標。本文比較六個不同的Z-分數估量方法，以研究出最適合保險公司的方法。我們使用一個最終數據集，包括在2010年至2017年期間在西班牙保險業界營運的183間公司（1382 個觀察）。

在首個階段，我們選擇使用一個方均根誤差(RMSE) 標準來衡量用來計算Z-分數的各個平均值和標準差估量中哪個最適合使用於有關的數據。在第二個階段， 我們以普通最小平方 (OLS) 迴歸模型，去估計並比較被考慮的六個Z-分數估量的解釋力。最後，我們以Arellano與Bover (1995), 以及Blundell與Bond (1998) 為動態追蹤資料模型而發展出來的系統-廣義動差估計推定量，來發表我們基線方程式的結果。

我們發現，計算保險公司Z-分數的最佳公式是把資產收益率及資本總額的現值，和在整個樣本期間計算出來的囘報的標準差結合起來的公式。

我們研究主要的局限為：研究只涉及西班牙的保險業；因此，研究結果的含意，必須在這個體制的背景框架下來闡釋。唯我們相信研究結果或許可外推至其它國家。未來的研究，應考慮納入不同國家作為研究對象，並分析保險公司層面的集成Z-分數的功用，以求達到宏觀審慎監控的目的。

Z-分數或許就微觀審慎監管而言是一個有用的早期警告器。這些以會計為基礎的估量而提供的資訊，除了較現時規例内已建立顯示保險公司穩健程度的各個指標更簡單外，還會幫助分析人員和投資者更了解保險公司的風險因素。

據我們所知，本研究為首個研究，去探討並比較保險業內的Z-分數的計算方法。以前關於Z-分數預測能力的，為數不多並可供取閱的研究結果均不統一；而且，這些研究都聚焦探討銀行業。

This study aims to analyze the impact of cooperation between banking supervisory entities on maintaining financial stability, using Single Supervisory Mechanism evolution and performance as instance. Then banking supervisory cooperation and financial stability in Egypt are reviewed.

The qualitative method is used to study and analyze the practices that contributed to financial instability and raised the need for supervisory cooperation. Descriptive qualitative method is used to study the interrelations between supervisory authorities on various levels and its impact on financial stability.

Findings show that maintaining financial stability through strong, consistent complete or semi unified supervisory framework faces challenges. Providing cooperation between different supervisory authorities, effective information sharing, gained experience in the long run contributes to financial stability.

The originality of this research paper arises from the fact that it encompasses the academic aspect through interpreting the developments that occurred to the cooperation in banking supervision in relation to the financial instability times in the Eurozone that led to the establishment of Single Supervisory mechanism, and the challenges it faced. The supervisory cooperation in Egypt is studied as well at international, regional levels and its role in contributing to financial stability. To the best of the authors' knowledge this is the first study that studies the banking supervisory cooperation between Egyptian supervisory authorities and other international and regional authorities.

Despite the extensive debate on the impact of bank competition on risk-taking, there is no evidence of its role in procyclicality of loan-loss provisions (LLPs). The purpose of this study is to find out what is the role of competition in the procyclicality of LLPs.

Using over 70,000 bank-level observations in 103 countries in 2004–2015 and the LLPs model, this study interacts competition with business cycle to check what is the effect of competition on procyclicality of LLPs.

This study finds that intense competition is associated with more procyclicality of LLPs. Increased procyclicality of LLPs in a more competitive environment is binding for high-income countries. The opposite effect is shown for low-income countries.

Future research can be extended by testing the role of additional factors – such as regulations, supervision or institutional protection of shareholders' rights, in the association between procyclicality and competition.

The main message of this paper is that the competitive environment changes the procyclicality of LLPs. The results are important from the point of view of the COVID-19 pandemic because government interventions during lockdowns will affect competition in the banking industry and in other industries of the economy.

This paper contributes to the extant research in three dimensions. First, it shows that competition is an important factor behind procyclicality of LLPs. Second, it adds to the research on the links between competition and financial stability. Third, it shows that the link between competition and procyclicality of LLPs depends on the economic development of the country in which the banks are located.

This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation.

The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises.

This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed.

The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.