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The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly macroprudential supervisory framework designed to identify threats to financial stability use existing mechanisms to reduce the risk of these threats and to provide information to the authorities to more efficiently mitigate any instability that does arise.

This paper begins with an analysis of the limitations of microprudential regulation. It then develops a macroprudential surveillance framework focused on those financial markets that have the potential to undermine financial stability. It concludes with a discussion of how the surveillance results may be used to enhance financial stability.

The current supervisory focus on microprudential supervision of systemically important institutions is insufficient; an explicitly macroprudential focus is required.

Although this paper’s conceptual framework is applicable to all advanced financial systems the discussion of specific regulatory structures focuses on the USA.

An explicit supervisory focus on the threats posed by major financial markets is feasible and desirable.

The probability of a financial crisis and the economic damage caused by a crisis can be significantly reduced by redirecting some regulatory efforts toward in-depth analysis of major financial markets.

The paper emphasizes that macroprudential supervision must include both quantitative and detailed analysis of the qualitative aspects of key markets.

This chapter discusses the regulatory challenges faced by financial institutions in emerging countries and it presents their specific features compared to financial institutions in developed countries. It offers a practical way of implementing regulatory changes while accounting for emerging countries’ specific features. Using a principle-based approach, this chapter builds on the recent regulatory developments in both developed and developing market economies. It relates these developments to industry best practices as well as the current state of the art in risk management and corporate governance. The findings show how the regulation of financial institutions in emerging countries differs from that in developed countries. Different approaches to mitigate the divergences and fill the gaps are discussed. Both regulators and financial institutions in emerging countries will find this chapter offers a practical point of view based on field and industry experience on how to interpret and apply regulations and adopt best practices in risk management in a way that accounts for emerging countries’ specific features.

This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).

This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.

Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.

This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.

The global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot ensure both price and financial stability. According to the Tinbergen (1952) rule, there was a gap in the policymakers’ toolkit for safeguarding financial stability, as the number of available policy instruments was insufficient relative to the number of policy objectives. That gap is now being closed through the creation of new macroprudential policy instruments. Both monetary policy and macroprudential policy have the capacity to influence both price and financial stability objectives. This paper develops a framework for determining how best to assign instruments to objectives.

Using a simplified New-Keynesian model, the authors examine two sets of policy trade-offs, the first concerning the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policy instruments in achieving price and financial stability objectives and the second concerning trade-offs between macroprudential policy instruments themselves.

This model shows that regardless of whether the objective is to enhance financial system resilience or to moderate the financial cycle, macroprudential policies are more effective than monetary policy. Likewise, monetary policy is more effective than macroprudential policy in achieving price stability. According to the Mundell (1962) principle of effective market classification, this implies that macroprudential policy instruments should be paired with financial stability objectives, and monetary policy instruments should be paired with the price stability objective. The authors also find a trade-off between the two sets of macroprudential policy instruments, which indicates that failure to moderate the financial cycle would require greater financial system resilience.

The main contribution of the paper is to establish – with the help of a model framework – the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies in achieving price and financial stability objectives. By so doing, it provides a rationale for macroprudential policy and it shows how macroprudential policy can unburden monetary policy in leaning against the wind of financial imbalances.

This paper analyzes real and welfare effects of a permanent change in inflation rate, focusing on macroprudential policy’ role and its interaction with monetary policy.

While investigating disinflation costs, the authors simulate a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, credit frictions and macroprudential authority.

Providing discussions on different policy scenarios in a context where still it is expected high inflation, there are three key contributions. First, when macroprudential authority actively operates to improve financial stability, losses caused by disinflation are limited. Second, a Taylor rule directly responding to financial variables might entail a trade-off between price and financial stability objectives, by increasing disinflation costs. Third, disinflation is welfare improving for savers, while costly for borrowers and banks. Indeed, while savers benefit from policies reducing price stickiness distortion, borrowers are worried about credit frictions, coming from collateral constraint.

The paper suggests threefold policy implications: the macroprudential authority should actively intervene during a disinflation process to minimize costs and financial instability deriving from it; policymakers should implement a disinflationary policy stabilizing also output; the central bank and the macroprudential regulator should pursue financial and price stability goals, separately.

This paper is the first attempt to study effects of a permanent inflation target reduction in focusing on the macroprudential policy’ role.

The purpose of the paper is to study the relevance of macroprudential policies (MPPs) in influencing bank lending in small open economies with dual banking systems.

In the analysis, the author employed the dynamic panel data methodology as compared to alternate techniques since it is able to address potential endogeneity challenges.

Using quarterly data from the period 2002–2020, the author finds that MPPs are highly effective in containing the growth of public credit, whereas its impact on private credit is much less effective. The disaggregated findings reveal that macroprudential measures are less effective in containing the growth of private credit by Islamic banks.

The majority of studies on MPPs are focused on emerging and advanced economies, limiting their policy appeal from the standpoint of small open economies. In this connection, this paper contributes to the literature on the relevance of such policies for a small open economy with a dual banking system and significant hydrocarbon exports. The paper's analysis therefore holds relevance for similar economies, both in the region and elsewhere, on the role and relevance of MPPs with emphasis on Islamic banks.

The design of a macro-prudential framework and its interaction with monetary policy has been at the forefront of the policy agenda since the global financial crisis. However, most advanced economies (AEs) have little experience using macroprudential policies. As a result, relatively little is known empirically about macroprudential instruments’ effectiveness in mitigating systemic risks in these countries, about their channels of transmission, and about how these instruments would interact with monetary policy. This paper aims to fill in the gap.

The authors develop a new approach using the euro area bank lending survey to assess the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies in containing credit growth and house price appreciation in mortgage markets. Estimation is performed under the panel regressions (OLS, GLS) and panel VAR setup. Endogeneity issues arising from measures of macro-prudential policies are addressed by introducing GMM estimation and various instruments.

The authors find instruments targeting the cost of bank capital most effective in slowing down mortgage credit growth, and that the impact is transmitted mainly through price margins, the same banking channel as monetary policy. Limits on loan-to-value ratios are also effective, especially when monetary policy is excessively loose.

With limited data on macroprudential policy measures in the AEs, this paper proposed a new methodology of using answers from bank lending survey as proxies to assess the effectiveness of specific macroprudential measures and their transmission channels.