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To identify the reason of Japan not complying with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendation 35 and suggesting a strategic solution to overcoming the barrier.

Through contextual, historical, and legal analysis of the anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Japan.

This paper implies that less flexible mindsets in stone of major players in the field of AML measures in Japan are the fundamental barrier for Japan not complying with the FATF Recommendation 35, while this paper suggests better realistic ways to address the barrier.

The novel point of this paper is that this paper illustriously uncovers the mindsets of the major players pertaining to the Japanese AML measures in a very illustrative way, points out the underlying true barrier, and describes a useful strategy desperately needed to address the barrier.

Due to their particular nature, virtual assets (VA) are vulnerable to financial crimes such as money laundering and if the appropriate legal mechanisms are not established, this may result in the financial collapse of various economies. To this effect, best practices and standards have been published by some international organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force and IMF which are now domesticated in the national laws of several countries. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the anti-money laundering (AML) legislative framework in the context of VA in three countries, namely, Mauritius, Japan and South Africa.

To achieve the research objective, the Mauritian AML laws in the context of VA were compared with the corresponding laws of some other countries, namely, Japan and South Africa. As such, a qualitative research method was adopted. In particular, the black letter approach was used to examine the relevant laws of these countries. A comparative analysis was conducted concerning the relevance of AML laws for each country when dealing with VA with the view of suggesting recommendations for Mauritian stakeholders to adopt to enhance the existing AML legal and regulatory framework.

The comparative study conducted has revealed that there are both similarities and divergences among the AML framework of the three countries further to which this research recommends that the Mauritian laws must be amended concerning the duration of information storage on VA, the definition of VA, advertisement by VA service providers and the electronic submission of annual reports. The Mauritian regulatory bodies also need to play a more active role in their joint collaboration to monitor suspicious VA transactions to combat money laundering.

At present, this study will be among the first academic writings on the efficiency of AML laws in the context of VA in Mauritius and also, because existing literature is quite scarce on assessing the adequacy of AML legislation in developing countries, this research aims at filling in the gap in literature. This study is carried out with the aim of combining a large amount of empirical, theoretical and factual information that can be of use to various stakeholders and not only to academics.

This paper uses a case study approach using the Permanent Sub Committee on Investigations (PSI) report on HBUS to determine where gaps in anti-money laundering (AML) regulation and compliance are within the banking sector.

The PSI highlighted five areas of serious weakness and fundamental flaws in the HBUS AML risk assessment. This paper examines the governance response that led to these weaknesses and applies a rationale decision-making theoretical framework to explain it.

The report found that corporate culture and attitude at the governance level were key factors in the difficulties that HBUS faced.

This paper focuses on one case, albeit one of the largest banks in the global banking sector. Although generalisations are limited, the report does highlight areas to consider with all banks.

The implications that are identified are aimed at banks and auditing firms that have to work alongside governance structure within banks. The role of internal audit is raised and has future implications for how risk assessment is undertaken and how AML compliance frameworks are devised and reported on.

A stronger social corporate responsibility attitude is suggested that considers the wider social impacts of supporting criminal transactions, even inadvertently, by inappropriate and under-resourced AML risk-assessment frameworks.

The detailed analysis of one case that considers the governance response to AML regulation is new in this paper, and the detailed recommendations for improving and developing stronger AML risk-assessment frameworks apply to the banking, financial services and auditing professions.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impact of the recent financial crisis and the need for prudential management and effective supervisory and regulatory measures in ensuring the stability and integrity of the financial sector, especially financial institutions, such as banks. The aim is to increase awareness about the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and the efforts at enforcing these standards.

The paper examines the impact of the global financial crisis of 2009 and relates it to inadequate enforcement of prudential and regulatory measures. The paper argues that effective implementation of the core and key FATF Recommendations would assure some modicum of stability, productivity, and integrity of the financial system. It also discusses briefly the monitoring process of the implementation of these standards. The paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing these standards in all jurisdictions. Thus, it covers the work of the anti‐money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) global network in promoting financial sector stability.

The mutual evaluation process is a demonstration of the commitment of member states to implement the FATF standards and remedy deficiencies in their systems. However, many countries, in particular low‐capacity countries, face challenges in the implementation of the FATF standards. These are: competing priorities for scarce government resources; severe lack of resources and skilled workforce to implement government programmes, including AML/CFT programmes; weaknesses in legal institutions; the dominance of the informal sector and a cash‐based economy; poor document and data‐retention systems; and in some cases, very small financial sector with limited exposure to the international financial system.

For the AML/CFT standards to be enforced more effectively, developing countries need more technical assistance, especially in preventing the flow of proceeds of corruption to developed countries' financial systems. The strategy to recover the proceeds of crime has proven to be problematic, but no better approach has yet been articulated. This should constitute an issue for further research.

The paper aims to increase awareness to the FATF standards and the work of all the global network organizations involved in the fight against ML/TF. It is useful particularly to financial institutions who wish to protect the integrity of their system and promote stability.

According to the last public statement of FATF (2018), Iran has some significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering (AML) regime, especially in suspicious transaction reporting. In this research, the author tries to empirically show that Iranian auditors do not a response to AML cases effectively and adopting an AML standard is required for Iranian auditors. Therefore, it helps to improve one of the deficiencies of Iran’s AML regime.

To collect data, the author designed and developed a questionnaire and the questionnaire sent to all partners of Iranian auditing firms, which have authorization from the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants on December 2018.

The finding shows most of the sample auditors’ claim that it is necessary to have an AML standard and it can be helpful for them. Furthermore, most of the Iranian auditors in money laundering cases, which companies are involved do nothing except filling the checklist of Anti-Money Laundering Implementing Regulations for Business and Non-business Companies (2012).

The results of the current research make clear the necessity of adopting an AML standard for Iranian auditors and recommend Iranian authorities to improve Iran’s AML regime.

The paper aims to explore the regulatory environment in less developed countries (LDCs) to evaluate their preparedness to harness normative anti-money laundering (AML) regimes. The global AML/CFT regimes are evolved at a global level but implemented within sovereign states – different regulatory environments and the possibility of regulatory disparities. The fundamental question this paper seeks to answer is whether the global AML framework can be as carefully designed as to afford a level playing field to all participating countries? Is this a possible prospect and if not what should be the way forward? The paper articulates the regulatory environment in LDCs to evaluate its implications on individual state's ability to harness normative AML regimes.

This paper was partly written by an empirical study based on the author's familiar experience in relation to financial markets regulation and the challenges in LDCs. The paper was also partly written drawing on the author's PhD thesis entitled: the Global The thrust of the thesis was to examine the intricacies of the global AML/CFT framework focusing largely on three jurisdictions – UK, Uganda and South Africa. The paper has been written based on these three jurisdictions. The contention of the paper is that while it is necessary for states or oversight institutions to adopt interstate regulatory initiatives on overlapping challenges such as money laundering, the flipside side is that global prohibition regimes often tend to overlook the practical realities in member countries where they are implemented. Finally, this paper proposes the need for a hybrid approach designed to accommodate both the needs of oversight institutions and respective individual countries where envisaged regimes are introduced.

The research findings of the study are that the global market system is fraught with dualities with the potential to resonate differently in each jurisdiction in harnessing desired AML/CFT regimes. The dynamics of development in DCs and LDCs are different and this has different implications for each country in harnessing the envisaged AML/CFT regimes.

The paper was written by internalising the practical experiences of LDCs in harnessing global AML/CFT regimes. While the author has benefited from the scholarly work of others, he has done it in a distinctive way to foster the objectives for writing this paper. This paper is original because it proffers approach that could potentially enhance the study of global prohibition regimes and how they are harnessed in individual jurisdictions.

The purpose of this paper is to present an empirical assessment and outline issues in criminal regulation relating to international anti‐money laundering (AML) programs.

In the first part, this paper outlines the serious threats posed by transnational laundering operations in the context of economic globalization, and calls for highly co‐ordinated international responses to such a crime. The second part of the paper centres on elements of international criminal regulation of ML.

The focus is on the phenomenological aspect of ML and highlights that to a large extent it is an economic issue. Economic analysis calls for an accurate legal response, with typical trade‐offs: it should deter criminals from laundering by increasing the costs for such illicit operations, calling for enhanced regulatory and enforcement activities; however, stronger enforcement yields increased costs and reduces privacy. These features have lately inspired the recent paradigm shift from a rule‐based regulatory framework to a risk‐based approach which still represents an extremely delicate regulatory. Both at the international level and within the single domestic legal system, AML law is typically characterised by a multidisciplinary approach combining the repressive profile with preventive mechanisms: an empirical evaluation of the International Monetary Fund‐World Bank AML program is presented, where these two aspects are assessed. The non‐criminal measures recently implemented under the auspices of the main inter‐governmental public organisations with competence in these fields seem to be consistent with the insights of economic analysis. However, some key criminal issues need to be better addressed.

The paper offers insights into international AML programs, focusing on criminal regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the law relating to European Union (EU) Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directives and the effect of Brexit on money laundering regulation in the UK and the EU. The first part of the paper involves a review of AML Directives and how they are transposed into the UK. The question whether the fourth AML directive or other directives due to become law in the UK will be implemented or culled will largely depend on the relationship between the UK and the EU going forward. The UK will have the full autonomy in terms of making decisions as to which laws to implement or which laws to scrap or to cull, as it sees fit. The UK having relinquished its membership of the EU notwithstanding could still be bound by EU anti-money directives particularly if it chooses to remain in the EU single market. The UK could also forge alliances with EU member states and in which case it will be expected to apply the same EU market rules as its other EU counterparts. The fourth AML directive that was due to become law in all EU member countries in June 2017. This directive was introduced to streamline the third AML directive (2005/60/EC) largely with regard to beneficial ownership of nominee accounts and politically exposed persons (PEPs). The paper scoped current EU AML directives, and how they have been used in the fight against money laundering both in the UK and beyond. Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including in prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU. The fourth AML directive was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2017, and whether the UK Government will go ahead and implement it or bin remains to be seen.

The paper has evaluated the potential effect of BREXIT on EU AML Directives in the UK, drawing examples in non-EU countries. It articulates the raft of EU AML Directives to assess whether the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) will become law in the UK or be culled. It draws on experiences of non-EU countries like Switzerland and Norway, which despite not being members of the EU, have full access to the EU single market. The first part of the paper provides a review of AML Directives in Europe and how they are internalised into member countries. Data were evaluated often alluding to existing mechanisms for harnessing EU AML Directives in member countries. The last part of the paper proposes the measures that are ought to be done to minimise or forestall the threat of money laundering and its predicate offences in the post-Brexit regulatory environment.

The BREXIT has already unravelled markets both in the UK and in the EU with far-reaching implications on money laundering regulation in multiple ways. The paper has articulated the mechanisms for internalisation of EU AML directives in all Member countries and countries that want to exit the EU. It is now clear that, as the UK voted to relinquish its membership of the EU, it will not be under any obligations to apply EU AML regimes or any other EU laws for that matter. The findings of the paper were not conclusive, as the UK government has not yet triggered Article 50 of Treaty of Lisbon on the functioning of the EU. The fourth AML directive, which was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2016, could still be adopted or culled depending on the model the UK decides to adopt in its relationship with the EU going forward. There is a possibility for the UK to remain a member of the EU single market and to retain some of the regulatory rules it has operated in relation to money laundering regulation and its predicate offences. It could adopt the Norway, Switzerland or the Canadian model, each of which will have different implications for the UK and the EU in terms of their varied AML obligations. It will be in the commercial interests of the UK Government to not cull the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) but to transpose it into law.

There were not so many papers written on the issue of Brexit in the context of this topic. It was therefore not possible to carry out a comparative review of Brexit and its effect on money laundering regulation in the UK, drawing on experiences of other countries that have exited.

Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU.

The Brexit has elicited debates and policy discussions on many regulatory issues and not the least money laundering counter-measures in the post-Brexit environment. Brexit will have far-reaching implications for markets, people and national governments both in the EU and beyond. It has already unravelled social and economic life both in the UK and in the EU. The significance of paper is that it could enhance future research studies on money laundering regulation within countries delinking from regional market initiatives to address attendant changes.

This paper proffers insights into the Brexit and its implication on AML regulation in the UK and the EU during and post-Brexit era. To curtail the social-economic effect of Brexit on financial markets regulation, the UK should remain a member of the European single market not only to minimise the potential of losing more ground and leverage as a financial capital of the world but also to protect financial markets tumbling downhill!

Concerns on money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing increased, as ML accounted 2%–5% of the global GDP, with Switzerland, the USA, Canada, India and Russia having high laundering rates. Banks were fined over US$320bn in 2008, but money laundering still accounted for 3.6% of global GDP in 2009, thereby indicating the need for effective regimes. Therefore, this study aims to critically analyze the antimoney laundering (AML)/CFT regime of Somalia, identify loopholes in the regime, raise awareness and propose recommendations for regime improvement.

The qualitative research approach is used to compare Somalia’s AML/CFT regime with the corresponding regime of Malaysia through the black letter method combined with document analysis. Malaysia is selected as a benchmark for two reasons: firstly, it is an Islamic country like Somalia, and secondly, Malaysia has complied with integrity-related standards.

This study revealed that an impactful AML/CTF regime is reached by closing loopholes in the law, reevaluating and improving regulatory agencies and measures, facilitating formal financial services and collaborating with regional and international standard setters. According to the results, Somalia AML/CFT regime is counterproductive in criminalizing offenses; regulating digital currencies and mobile money, disclosures and nonfinancial business and provisions; and governing training requirements for regulatory agencies and financial institutions.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first of its kind in the study of Somalia’s regime building. Also, this study incorporates rich scholarly discourse on effective regime building.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a high-level analysis of the intersection emerging cryptocurrency sector with anti-money laundering (AML) regulations and risk-based AML diligence systems maintained by financial institutions.

The analysis begins with a description of cryptocurrencies, focusing specifically on how the supporting technologies and applications increase vulnerabilities. The information will lay the foundation for examining the vulnerabilities existing in the architecture of cryptocurrency technology, as well as potential targets for regulations. The second part of the analysis will then shift focus to defining the scope of the money laundering problem associated with cryptocurrencies. An in-depth understanding of the problem is necessary to inform tailored AML legislation and regulations. The third part of the analysis will explore emerging AML regulations that govern cryptocurrencies, focusing specifically on those being developed and implemented in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE regulations will then be compared to those of the USA and European Union (EU) for comparative analysis and best practices.

The UAE has a robust legal system aimed at bolstering AML efforts while supporting widespread integration of crypto assets into business and government operations. A review of the UAE’s legislative framework reveals critical issues. First, the current regulations do not cover decentralized finance (DeFi) and non-fungible tokens (NFTs). The absence of clear regulations for DeFi and NFT protocols has created a leeway for money laundering and related criminal activities. Second, there is a high level of fragmentation in the UAE’s legislative landscape. The UAE does not have uniform, national laws that apply to all the Emirates. Fragmentation is not unique to the UAE but a major global problem that affects the USA and EU. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a tailored approach where standard rules and regulations are responsive to the diverse aspects of cryptocurrencies. The strategy is vital, as it will be impractical to create a single legislation or law that will cover all the crypto assets, including their diverse applications. Furthermore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) should develop a global standard that will support a unified/harmonized application of AML/counter-terrorist financing (CTF) laws and regulations related to cryptocurrencies and the blockchain technology.

The borderless nature of digital currency and exchanges means that the existing laws and regulations are inadequate to address cross-border money laundering activities. Thus, there is an urgent need of harmonizing global regulations to ensure uniformity in applications. The quest for harmonization should be a priority as the FATF works towards developing a global standard. The global standard will support a uniform application of AML/CTF laws and regulations related to cryptocurrencies and the blockchain technology.