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The purpose of this paper is to explore the law relating to European Union (EU) Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directives and the effect of Brexit on money laundering regulation in the UK and the EU. The first part of the paper involves a review of AML Directives and how they are transposed into the UK. The question whether the fourth AML directive or other directives due to become law in the UK will be implemented or culled will largely depend on the relationship between the UK and the EU going forward. The UK will have the full autonomy in terms of making decisions as to which laws to implement or which laws to scrap or to cull, as it sees fit. The UK having relinquished its membership of the EU notwithstanding could still be bound by EU anti-money directives particularly if it chooses to remain in the EU single market. The UK could also forge alliances with EU member states and in which case it will be expected to apply the same EU market rules as its other EU counterparts. The fourth AML directive that was due to become law in all EU member countries in June 2017. This directive was introduced to streamline the third AML directive (2005/60/EC) largely with regard to beneficial ownership of nominee accounts and politically exposed persons (PEPs). The paper scoped current EU AML directives, and how they have been used in the fight against money laundering both in the UK and beyond. Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including in prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU. The fourth AML directive was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2017, and whether the UK Government will go ahead and implement it or bin remains to be seen.

The paper has evaluated the potential effect of BREXIT on EU AML Directives in the UK, drawing examples in non-EU countries. It articulates the raft of EU AML Directives to assess whether the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) will become law in the UK or be culled. It draws on experiences of non-EU countries like Switzerland and Norway, which despite not being members of the EU, have full access to the EU single market. The first part of the paper provides a review of AML Directives in Europe and how they are internalised into member countries. Data were evaluated often alluding to existing mechanisms for harnessing EU AML Directives in member countries. The last part of the paper proposes the measures that are ought to be done to minimise or forestall the threat of money laundering and its predicate offences in the post-Brexit regulatory environment.

The BREXIT has already unravelled markets both in the UK and in the EU with far-reaching implications on money laundering regulation in multiple ways. The paper has articulated the mechanisms for internalisation of EU AML directives in all Member countries and countries that want to exit the EU. It is now clear that, as the UK voted to relinquish its membership of the EU, it will not be under any obligations to apply EU AML regimes or any other EU laws for that matter. The findings of the paper were not conclusive, as the UK government has not yet triggered Article 50 of Treaty of Lisbon on the functioning of the EU. The fourth AML directive, which was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2016, could still be adopted or culled depending on the model the UK decides to adopt in its relationship with the EU going forward. There is a possibility for the UK to remain a member of the EU single market and to retain some of the regulatory rules it has operated in relation to money laundering regulation and its predicate offences. It could adopt the Norway, Switzerland or the Canadian model, each of which will have different implications for the UK and the EU in terms of their varied AML obligations. It will be in the commercial interests of the UK Government to not cull the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) but to transpose it into law.

There were not so many papers written on the issue of Brexit in the context of this topic. It was therefore not possible to carry out a comparative review of Brexit and its effect on money laundering regulation in the UK, drawing on experiences of other countries that have exited.

Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU.

The Brexit has elicited debates and policy discussions on many regulatory issues and not the least money laundering counter-measures in the post-Brexit environment. Brexit will have far-reaching implications for markets, people and national governments both in the EU and beyond. It has already unravelled social and economic life both in the UK and in the EU. The significance of paper is that it could enhance future research studies on money laundering regulation within countries delinking from regional market initiatives to address attendant changes.

This paper proffers insights into the Brexit and its implication on AML regulation in the UK and the EU during and post-Brexit era. To curtail the social-economic effect of Brexit on financial markets regulation, the UK should remain a member of the European single market not only to minimise the potential of losing more ground and leverage as a financial capital of the world but also to protect financial markets tumbling downhill!

On 24 July 2019, the European Commission adopted a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council towards better implementation of the European Union’s (EU) anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) framework. This Communication was accompanied by four reports. This papers aims to investigate these reports.

Review of EU developments and reports.

The European Commission continues to work on eliminating the vulnerabilities of the current AML and CFT system. As the reports show, there are still many issues regarding the EU’s AML and CFT framework. The reports offer useful insights into weaknesses and failures and provide a good basis for further discussions with relevant stakeholders, for certain amendments to the current rulebook and enforcement as well as for stronger mechanisms regarding supervision and supporting cross-border cooperation.

This article discusses important relevant EU developments.

By implementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20, 2015, the Polish legislator decided to pass the Act of 1 March 2018 on counteracting money laundering and financing of terrorism (AML). In connection with it, many interpretative doubts have arisen. The purpose of this paper is to explain one of them, namely, to indicate whether the provision by a company of a registered office for economic activity to another company from the same capital group means that the company granting its headquarters has achieved the status of an obligated institution pursuant to Article 2 section 1 point 16 letter c) of AML.

This study is based on a grammatical, systemic and functional interpretation. It is enriched with national and supranational regulations, doctrinal considerations and current jurisprudence.

On the basis of the conducted analysis, the author concludes that providing a headquarters to another company from the same capital group may mean meeting the conditions of an obligated institution within the meaning of Article 2 section 1 point 16 letter c) of AML and obtaining by the company providing the registered office the status of an obliged entity.

This paper contributes to the clarification of the AML interpretation problem. Adopting a similar approach when analysing other obligated institutions may positively influence the consolidation of the correct interpretation path of AML regulations.

This paper aims to critically explore the challenges facing the UK in implementing registers of beneficial owners, a measure mandated by the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directive to enhance beneficial ownership transparency.

This study systematically reviews the literature surrounding beneficial ownership transparency to critically analyse the extent to which challenges facing the UK, impact upon its ability to successfully implement registers of beneficial owners.

This study demonstrates that a lack of beneficial ownership transparency facilitates money laundering by concealing corrupt wealth and frustrating authorities’ efforts to trace illicit finance. It demonstrates that implementing registers of beneficial owners may be a superficial approach to tackling the multifaceted problem of money laundering. Better intergovernmental cooperation is required to improve beneficial ownership transparency and to ensure measures to curb offshore money laundering are successful.

This research focuses on one aspect of AML control from the UK’s perspective. Further work is needed to investigate the concerns from the perspective of offshore jurisdictions and how global AML rule affects developing economies.

The study informs policymakers and other professionals implementing the UK’s registers of beneficial owners to enhance future strategies and better combat offshore money laundering.

This is the only study to explore the challenges facing the UK in implementing registers of beneficial owners, thus providing novel insight into the moral, legal and practical dilemmas to imposing AML control.

Money laundering has become a global concern in recent years, and many countries attempt to employ some preventive measures to cope with this phenomenon. Anti-money laundering (AML) controls vary in different countries, and consequently many studies, to date, have taken account of these differences along with the AML efforts. In this regard, financial institutions play an important role to tackle money laundering by involving in all three stages of money laundering (placement, layering and integration). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the AML situation of the Iranian banks and also study some related variables.

Using the Wolfsberg questionnaire, a survey consisting of 24 Iranian authorized banks in 2017 was conducted.

We conclude that Iranian banks have proper AML controls in place. Furthermore, it is concluded that banks with more staffs and more experienced employees are more likely to establish strong AML controls; conversely, banks with more branches are less likely to set up strong AML controls.

The present study is the first study conducted in Iran, and the outcomes of the study may be helpful to the Iranian and also International Banking System to establish stronger AML controls.

It has become customary for states or regulatory domains to come together and evolve normative regimes to deal with overlapping exigencies such as money laundering. Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of global AML laws designed to foster international cooperation against money laundering and its predicate crimes. In this same vein, some states have adopted domestic AML laws designed with an ethos of extra-territorial dimension as a caution against the threats posed by money laundering crimes. The paper aims to critically examine CDD to tease out the possibility of harnessing it as a global AML paradigm.

The paper was written by critically examining primary and secondary data sources. In terms of primary data, the author has studied the relevant provision of different AML legislation such as BSA (1970), MLCA (1986), and PATRIOT (2001) Act in the USA; and FSMA (2000) and POCA (2002) in the UK. The author then evaluated these data in the context of the challenges of harnessing CDD across countries. In terms of secondary data sources, the author utilised data in academic text books, journal papers, electronic sources (web sites of AML agencies), and policy and research papers from specialist institutions such as FATF.

The findings corroborate the thesis that much as CDD is an important AML measure, it needs to be streamlined and implemented with care to apply across the board.

The paper was written largely by way of library-based research. The author did not carry out interviews to corroborate some of the secondary data sources used in writing it. Carrying out interviews would have helped to minimise the potential for bias secondary data sources used was generated.

It is anticipated that this paper can be utilised to foster desired strategic and policy changes at a multiple institutional levels.

The paper is one of its kind to be written in its context. It will therefore make a viable contribution to the study of money counter-measures and how they are harnessed globally. It is therefore a must read!

This paper seeks to deconstruct the proposed risk‐based approach to anti‐money laundering (AML) and to relate it to the text of the European Union's 3rd Directive. The paper also aims to discuss a variety of risk‐related aspects and how they have come to be constructed on the sociological perspective of risk and subsequently to examine the relation of risk elements to AML.

The theoretical approach of the paper is based on the tradition of second‐order cybernetics and on many of the theoretical concepts discussed by Niklas Luhmann, as well as his work on the sociology of risk.

The implications for the risk‐based approach on AML are discussed on the basis of how risk can be represented and categorized, and the paradoxes behind various such risk‐classifications are analysed, thus offering a critique on the oversimplification with which risk has been appropriated within AML.

The practical implications of this paper relate to how risk should be considered within the domain of AML and how financial institutions and financial intelligence units should mostly focus on re‐constructing the aspects surrounding risk‐communication.

The originality of this paper lies in its unique treatment of risk within the context of AML, while clearly exposing the unavoidable observational paradoxes that the concept of risk induces, as well as examining the consequences on the risk‐based approach for dealing with AML.

This paper aims to articulate the complexities posed by tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) in the global fight against financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering. It suggests possible measures to mitigate the effect of tax avoidance on economic development of countries, especially less developed poor countries.

Data were evaluated using examples and case studies drawn from tax havens and OFCs in newspaper reports to demonstrate how illicit proceeds of crime are spirited out of countries for safe custody in tax haven jurisdictions around the globe. The author also carried out a scoping review of the literature to delineate the correlation between tax havens, OFCs and the growth in financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering.

There is a close correlation that bank secrecy laws in OFCs fuel the growth of financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering around the globe. The findings also suggest that while imposition of sanctions on countries which transgress international financial regulatory regimes is an essential component in the international efforts against financial crimes, they need to be enforced on all states so that they are not seen as politicized and subsequently undermined.

It is important that states work in tandem to initiate desired regimes to address financial crimes but enunciating regimes alone cannot generate a far reaching impact unless they are enforced against all transgressing states.

The paper has practical implications for states, people, governments, oversight institutions, markets and other stakeholders because it unravels varied issues relating to tax avoidance, money laundering and policies that need to be adopted to address these challenges.

The paper draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information and data generation capacity in some countries on tax avoidance and other financial crimes and the need for international harmonization of tax and AML regimes.

The issues explored in this paper help to highlight the challenges posed by tax havens and OFCs for economic development of countries. While the paper was undertaken by the review of primary and secondary data, it offers important contributions that could potentially enhance the fight against tax avoidance.

The purpose of this paper is to present an empirical assessment and outline issues in criminal regulation relating to international anti‐money laundering (AML) programs.

In the first part, this paper outlines the serious threats posed by transnational laundering operations in the context of economic globalization, and calls for highly co‐ordinated international responses to such a crime. The second part of the paper centres on elements of international criminal regulation of ML.

The focus is on the phenomenological aspect of ML and highlights that to a large extent it is an economic issue. Economic analysis calls for an accurate legal response, with typical trade‐offs: it should deter criminals from laundering by increasing the costs for such illicit operations, calling for enhanced regulatory and enforcement activities; however, stronger enforcement yields increased costs and reduces privacy. These features have lately inspired the recent paradigm shift from a rule‐based regulatory framework to a risk‐based approach which still represents an extremely delicate regulatory. Both at the international level and within the single domestic legal system, AML law is typically characterised by a multidisciplinary approach combining the repressive profile with preventive mechanisms: an empirical evaluation of the International Monetary Fund‐World Bank AML program is presented, where these two aspects are assessed. The non‐criminal measures recently implemented under the auspices of the main inter‐governmental public organisations with competence in these fields seem to be consistent with the insights of economic analysis. However, some key criminal issues need to be better addressed.

The paper offers insights into international AML programs, focusing on criminal regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the anti‐money laundering (AML) legislation created by the Russian regulator for the financial institutions with the aim to test banks' compliance with it.

Comparative analyses based on the data, collected from in‐depth study of the regulator's legislation for financial institutions (banks), as well as interviews with practitioners and observation of banking practices. For this purpose, the activities of several banks were analyzed.

The main concluding remark is that practice so far has shown the failure of the financial institutions to comply with the AML regulation. The question arises if there is unwillingness or inability of the financial institutions to comply with the regulator's rules.

The analysis of the practical implementation of the AML legislations in the financial institutions focuses on the legislative base for the regulated, behavioral patterns of the banks in the AML prevention activity, and the conflicts and debates that have emerged within the domestic AML regime.

The paper tries to test the efficiency of the domestic preventive AML regime in Russia. The formal legislative compliance of the domestic regime with the international standards and norms does not characterize the efficiency of the existing regime. How the AML legislation is applied in practice is the main focus of the analysis.

Studies of the peculiarities of the AML legislation implementation in different countries is one of the helpful tools to measure the efficiency of the global AML regime.