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The purpose of this paper is to explore the law relating to European Union (EU) Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directives and the effect of Brexit on money laundering regulation in the UK and the EU. The first part of the paper involves a review of AML Directives and how they are transposed into the UK. The question whether the fourth AML directive or other directives due to become law in the UK will be implemented or culled will largely depend on the relationship between the UK and the EU going forward. The UK will have the full autonomy in terms of making decisions as to which laws to implement or which laws to scrap or to cull, as it sees fit. The UK having relinquished its membership of the EU notwithstanding could still be bound by EU anti-money directives particularly if it chooses to remain in the EU single market. The UK could also forge alliances with EU member states and in which case it will be expected to apply the same EU market rules as its other EU counterparts. The fourth AML directive that was due to become law in all EU member countries in June 2017. This directive was introduced to streamline the third AML directive (2005/60/EC) largely with regard to beneficial ownership of nominee accounts and politically exposed persons (PEPs). The paper scoped current EU AML directives, and how they have been used in the fight against money laundering both in the UK and beyond. Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including in prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU. The fourth AML directive was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2017, and whether the UK Government will go ahead and implement it or bin remains to be seen.

The paper has evaluated the potential effect of BREXIT on EU AML Directives in the UK, drawing examples in non-EU countries. It articulates the raft of EU AML Directives to assess whether the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) will become law in the UK or be culled. It draws on experiences of non-EU countries like Switzerland and Norway, which despite not being members of the EU, have full access to the EU single market. The first part of the paper provides a review of AML Directives in Europe and how they are internalised into member countries. Data were evaluated often alluding to existing mechanisms for harnessing EU AML Directives in member countries. The last part of the paper proposes the measures that are ought to be done to minimise or forestall the threat of money laundering and its predicate offences in the post-Brexit regulatory environment.

The BREXIT has already unravelled markets both in the UK and in the EU with far-reaching implications on money laundering regulation in multiple ways. The paper has articulated the mechanisms for internalisation of EU AML directives in all Member countries and countries that want to exit the EU. It is now clear that, as the UK voted to relinquish its membership of the EU, it will not be under any obligations to apply EU AML regimes or any other EU laws for that matter. The findings of the paper were not conclusive, as the UK government has not yet triggered Article 50 of Treaty of Lisbon on the functioning of the EU. The fourth AML directive, which was due to become law in the UK on 26 June 2016, could still be adopted or culled depending on the model the UK decides to adopt in its relationship with the EU going forward. There is a possibility for the UK to remain a member of the EU single market and to retain some of the regulatory rules it has operated in relation to money laundering regulation and its predicate offences. It could adopt the Norway, Switzerland or the Canadian model, each of which will have different implications for the UK and the EU in terms of their varied AML obligations. It will be in the commercial interests of the UK Government to not cull the fourth AML directive (which was due to become law in June 2017) but to transpose it into law.

There were not so many papers written on the issue of Brexit in the context of this topic. It was therefore not possible to carry out a comparative review of Brexit and its effect on money laundering regulation in the UK, drawing on experiences of other countries that have exited.

Brexit is likely to have far-reaching implications on many regulatory areas, including prevention of money laundering and its predicate offences in the UK and the EU.

The Brexit has elicited debates and policy discussions on many regulatory issues and not the least money laundering counter-measures in the post-Brexit environment. Brexit will have far-reaching implications for markets, people and national governments both in the EU and beyond. It has already unravelled social and economic life both in the UK and in the EU. The significance of paper is that it could enhance future research studies on money laundering regulation within countries delinking from regional market initiatives to address attendant changes.

This paper proffers insights into the Brexit and its implication on AML regulation in the UK and the EU during and post-Brexit era. To curtail the social-economic effect of Brexit on financial markets regulation, the UK should remain a member of the European single market not only to minimise the potential of losing more ground and leverage as a financial capital of the world but also to protect financial markets tumbling downhill!

This paper aims to articulate the complexities posed by tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) in the global fight against financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering. It suggests possible measures to mitigate the effect of tax avoidance on economic development of countries, especially less developed poor countries.

Data were evaluated using examples and case studies drawn from tax havens and OFCs in newspaper reports to demonstrate how illicit proceeds of crime are spirited out of countries for safe custody in tax haven jurisdictions around the globe. The author also carried out a scoping review of the literature to delineate the correlation between tax havens, OFCs and the growth in financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering.

There is a close correlation that bank secrecy laws in OFCs fuel the growth of financial crimes such as tax avoidance and money laundering around the globe. The findings also suggest that while imposition of sanctions on countries which transgress international financial regulatory regimes is an essential component in the international efforts against financial crimes, they need to be enforced on all states so that they are not seen as politicized and subsequently undermined.

It is important that states work in tandem to initiate desired regimes to address financial crimes but enunciating regimes alone cannot generate a far reaching impact unless they are enforced against all transgressing states.

The paper has practical implications for states, people, governments, oversight institutions, markets and other stakeholders because it unravels varied issues relating to tax avoidance, money laundering and policies that need to be adopted to address these challenges.

The paper draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information and data generation capacity in some countries on tax avoidance and other financial crimes and the need for international harmonization of tax and AML regimes.

The issues explored in this paper help to highlight the challenges posed by tax havens and OFCs for economic development of countries. While the paper was undertaken by the review of primary and secondary data, it offers important contributions that could potentially enhance the fight against tax avoidance.

This article aims to consider the role of the European Union (EU) in the prevention of money laundering and to show that the EU has a lot more to win in this field of policy.

This article is based on a literature study and a thorough analysis of the EU Directives on the prevention of money laundering.

Whereas, the material norms for entities subject to regulation have been harmonised and adjusted to the risk‐based approach at European level, the norms regarding the enforcement instruments have mostly been left to the Member States' legislation. As a result, there exists a “patchwork” of enforcement mechanisms throughout the EU.

This article focuses on the prevention of money laundering on the level of the EU only; no connection is made to the international or to the national level.

This article does not provide a value judgment on the preventive rules at European level as such, but rather it offers an academic perspective on the role of the EU in the prevention of money laundering.

The purpose of this paper is to present an empirical assessment and outline issues in criminal regulation relating to international anti‐money laundering (AML) programs.

In the first part, this paper outlines the serious threats posed by transnational laundering operations in the context of economic globalization, and calls for highly co‐ordinated international responses to such a crime. The second part of the paper centres on elements of international criminal regulation of ML.

The focus is on the phenomenological aspect of ML and highlights that to a large extent it is an economic issue. Economic analysis calls for an accurate legal response, with typical trade‐offs: it should deter criminals from laundering by increasing the costs for such illicit operations, calling for enhanced regulatory and enforcement activities; however, stronger enforcement yields increased costs and reduces privacy. These features have lately inspired the recent paradigm shift from a rule‐based regulatory framework to a risk‐based approach which still represents an extremely delicate regulatory. Both at the international level and within the single domestic legal system, AML law is typically characterised by a multidisciplinary approach combining the repressive profile with preventive mechanisms: an empirical evaluation of the International Monetary Fund‐World Bank AML program is presented, where these two aspects are assessed. The non‐criminal measures recently implemented under the auspices of the main inter‐governmental public organisations with competence in these fields seem to be consistent with the insights of economic analysis. However, some key criminal issues need to be better addressed.

The paper offers insights into international AML programs, focusing on criminal regulation.

This article purports to show that an adequate anti-money laundering (AML) regime must be integrated into the carbon emissions market industry in order for it to function effectively, meet its intended goals, and prevent criminals from developing innovative methods to take advantage of particular vulnerabilities this unique market type has created.

This article discusses the formation of the international carbon emissions marketplace. It posits that critical to the formation and effective operation of any carbon emissions trading market is the simultaneous coexistence of an AML regime preventing criminals from taking advantage of legislative deficiencies. Lastly, the article formulates and analyzes emerging criminal typology threats to which current, developing, and future carbon emissions markets are and will be subject.

Under the EU ETS, effective AML safeguards were not initially included in the implementation and formation of the EU's carbon emissions trading market, subjecting it to numerous threats and abuses from criminals. The lack of an effective AML regime has resulted in novel and unique criminal typology threats that are currently emerging and need to be addressed to prevent abuses in new and existing carbon emissions trading markets.

The EU has recently started addressing its lack of effective AML safeguards in its carbon emissions trading market. As such, the adequacy of legislative developments needs to be examined over time. Additionally, because many of the emerging criminal typologies identified are based on recent and limited data, further research on the extent of criminality that is actually occurring is recommended.

Because emerging criminal typology threats in carbon emissions trading markets has not been researched at the scholarly level, this article is unique and has substantial value to the AML community.

This study aims to discuss the growing use of RegTech solutions by financial institutions to comply more efficiently with regulation in terms of anti-money laundering compliance and more specifically its influence on the evolution of financial crime in the next ten years.

Based on two online Delphi surveys sent to a panel of international experts composed of eight specially recruited professionals and specialists of anti-financial crime compliance and RegTech, five main predictions have been developed.

It was found that artificial intelligence would become the most impactful technology for financial institutions to fight financial crime, and that there will be a strong positive correlation between ever-more elaborated compliance programs and the level of sophistication of methods used for money laundering. Furthermore, the panel designated regulators’ recommendations as likely to be less influential than RegTech solutions, and the time required to integrate RegTech solutions for AML compliance as the main future challenge.

These predictions are meant to provide financial institutions and regulators with useful outlooks. While the reviewed literature focused on the role of regulations on the evolution of money laundering, this study puts stress on RegTech solutions and their impact on both compliance and financial crime.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the current legal framework on money laundering control in the insurance sector. Essentially, this examination is premised on the interrogation of whether it is still appropriate for Mauritius to apply such stringent, opaque and unyielding Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism norms and rules on general insurance when developed nations such as the UK and Singapore have done away with them for a more effective combat against money laundering. It would also be assessed why the financial services commission (FSC) is not able to draw inspiration from its British and Singaporean counterparts in fighting money laundering more effectively.

This paper uses the doctrinal legal research methodology which is colloquially described as “black-letter law” approach. It is backed up by a contextual legal analysis that is based on an analysis of relevant legal provisions. It relies ground experience from the insurance industry through the experience of the authors. A comparative approach is used with Singapore and the UK as case studies given that there are significant commonalities to the Mauritian jurisdiction as well as useful differences.

It is observed that a move towards a de-regulation of the legal framework on money laundering in the insurance sector with a more relaxed approach is more effective for the Mauritian insurance sector. Evidence is drawn from the Singaporean and British models. A re-structuring of the FSC of Mauritius is also warranted for such an approach to be adopted.

This paper is among the first academic contribution that proposes a de-regulation and the adoption of a relaxed approach of and by the Mauritian Insurance Industry for a more effective combat against money laundering. It serves as a legal foundational basis for further research in this direction.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the anti‐money laundering (AML) legislation created by the Russian regulator for the financial institutions with the aim to test banks' compliance with it.

Comparative analyses based on the data, collected from in‐depth study of the regulator's legislation for financial institutions (banks), as well as interviews with practitioners and observation of banking practices. For this purpose, the activities of several banks were analyzed.

The main concluding remark is that practice so far has shown the failure of the financial institutions to comply with the AML regulation. The question arises if there is unwillingness or inability of the financial institutions to comply with the regulator's rules.

The analysis of the practical implementation of the AML legislations in the financial institutions focuses on the legislative base for the regulated, behavioral patterns of the banks in the AML prevention activity, and the conflicts and debates that have emerged within the domestic AML regime.

The paper tries to test the efficiency of the domestic preventive AML regime in Russia. The formal legislative compliance of the domestic regime with the international standards and norms does not characterize the efficiency of the existing regime. How the AML legislation is applied in practice is the main focus of the analysis.

Studies of the peculiarities of the AML legislation implementation in different countries is one of the helpful tools to measure the efficiency of the global AML regime.

This paper aims to compare the prepaid card laws/regulations in Nigeria, the UK, the USA and India with the aim of determining the best approach to regulating prepaid cards, that is the approach that promotes financial inclusion and also makes the product less attractive for money laundering.

This paper relies mainly on primary and secondary data drawn from the public domain. It also relies on documentary research.

This paper makes the following findings and recommendations: Nigeria has the best approach to regulating providers of prepaid cards. Nigeria’s approach could foster financial inclusion and at the same time mitigate the money laundering risks associated with prepaid cards. Nigeria’s approach is not too strict like the Indian approach and it is not too relaxed like the UK and the USA approach. Operators, including mobile/telecommunications operators, wishing to operate money transfer schemes in Nigeria are allowed to do so with approval from the Central Bank of Nigeria and in strict conjunction with licensed deposit-taking banks or financial institutions. The UK, the USA and India are recommended to adopt Nigeria’s approach. The UK and the USA have the best approach to regulating agents of prepaid cards. Both countries require prepaid card providers to maintain a current list of agents and make it available to the relevant authorities upon request. The approach allows regulatory agencies to effectively monitor and supervise prepaid card agents. India and Nigeria are advised to clarify their approach regarding the regulation of prepaid card agents. The prepaid card laws/regulations of those countries should be modified to specify if the agent of a prepaid card provider is required to be licensed or registered by a competent authority or if the prepaid card provider (the principal) is required to maintain an updated list of agents which must be made accessible to a designated competent authority, when requested. The new changes will afford regulatory authorities the opportunity to effectively monitor and supervise prepaid card agents. India’s approach to thresholds would preclude most individuals in the intended target market from accessing basic financial products, as most people typically do not have residential addresses that could be confirmed by reference to formal documentation. India should adopt the “risk-based approach” and not the “wholesale de-risking approach”.

Given their low-risk characteristics, closed-loop cards, specifically cards which do not allow reloads or withdrawals, remain outside the scope of this paper.

Although there have been researchers who adopted the comparative approach like Jean J Luyat and Will Cain, the comparative approach adopted by those researchers was not detailed enough and also was not aimed at seeking to answer the research question in Section 1 of this paper. Both writers focused on only the aspect of financial inclusion making the whole research a one-sided approach. Jean J Luyat focused on “how regulation had an impact on the development of prepaid cards in Japan and Europe”. He was able to discover that prepaid cards were growing rapidly in Japan but not gaining acceptance as a payment method in the European Union (EU) and France. He aligned such growth in Japan to different factors including regulation. He stated that Japan had a simple and flexible regulatory framework compared to the EU and France which have a complex regulatory system with strict prudential requirements. Nothing was said about the money laundering aspect of such regulation and neither was anything said about thresholds and other optional recommendations canvased by the Financial Action Task Force. The Electronic Money Directive referred to by Jean J Luyat has already been repealed and a second Electronic Money Directive is in place. A comparative approach is adopted in this research seeking to compare the approach in Nigeria with that of the UK, the USA and India. Each of these countries adopted different approaches. The results are to help answer the research question in Section 1 of this paper. The countries were selected on the basis of how strict their regulatory regime is. India’s regulatory regime is the strictest while the UK and the USA are the most lenient. Nigeria is caught in between strict/lenient.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss recent trends in anti‐money laundering enforcement by UK regulatory authorities and the UK's response to recent EU anti‐money laundering regulatory reform proposals.

The paper describes HM Treasury's review of the UK's “Money Laundering Regulations 2007,” recent enforcement actions taken by the Financial Services Authority and the Office of Fair Trading, and the UK Government's response to recent proposed revisions to the EU's Third Money Laundering Directive.

The paper finds that taking action for breaches of anti‐money laundering regulations remains high on the financial crime agenda of UK supervisory authorities. The UK argues against greater harmonization between anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorism financial measures employed by the member states, believing enforcement powers should remain within member states.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.