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This paper aims to examine the relation between SEC regulations centered on board of director independence and financial reporting quality and investigates the different routes to board independence.

The sample includes 1,248 firm observations whose board composition is compared between 2001 and 2008. Each firm is categorized based on how they increase board independence. The authors test the hypotheses using ordinary least squares regression models.

Results show that firms choose between multiple routes when complying with the independence requirements, and how firms operationalize the SEC requirement impacts financial reporting quality. Specifically, firms that achieve increased board independence through increased board size are associated with higher financial reporting quality. However, there is no association between higher financial reporting quality and a subsequent increase in audit fees. Suggesting the reporting quality results from the board monitoring function and not from an increase in auditor effort.

No evidence exists on how a firm’s chosen route to increased board independence relates to financial reporting quality.

The imposition of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act and the NYSE/NASDAQ regulations boosted the proportion of independent directors serving on corporate boards. For certain firms, increasing the number of independent directors may impose costs that exceed the benefits. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of increased independence following SOX, relative to the pre-SOX board independence benchmark, on managerial authority and entrenchment within the firm.

Data are collected from COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics. Data are divided into two periods, pre-SOX (1996-2001) and post-SOX (2002-2006). The focus is on the sub-group of firms who were not complying with the board independence requirement prior to SOX and became compliant afterwards. Various regressions are employed to assess the implications of increased independence following SOX on managerial authority and entrenchment.

The appreciation in board independence post-SOX significantly inflates both managerial compensation and the likelihood of CEO duality. Also, there is a positive association between board independence and managerial entrenchment during both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Imposed board composition requirements diminished board monitoring efficiency and boosted the CEO dominance and control over the firm.

This research adds to the extant literature investigating the implications of SOX on internal monitoring and governance. The results are based on an off-equilibrium phenomenon in which companies were obliged to alter their endogenously determined board structure. Thus, regulations to improve governance could backfire as the CEO might abuse them to extract private benefits.

The purpose of this paper is to consider and evaluate judicial independence in China, through reviewing the value in its presence, assessing its current state in China and evaluating what the future holds for it.

The paper reviews the benefits of judicial independence in its support of the rule of law. Following this, an evaluation of the current independence of the judiciary in China is presented. The reforms of the judiciary in the Fourth Plenary Session and the outlook for judicial independence in China are assessed.

The paper finds that judicial independence in China cannot be said to exist, being vulnerable to influence from a variety of sources. There is, however, progress observed, and this is expected to continue.

This paper’s consideration of judicial independence in China and its outlook are framed with discussions of the relationships between judicial independence and the rule of law, and the Chinese state and the rule of law. The paper should thus contribute to discussion of the development trajectory of China in this important facet.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether firm-specific litigation risk affects independent director conservatism in the oversight of financial reporting.

This study considers the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the main US stock exchanges' corresponding corporate governance regulations in 2002–2003 as an exogenous shock event to increase board independence. OLS regressions with fixed effects are conducted to test the hypothesis.

Changes in discretionary accruals from the pre-event year (2001) to the post-event year (2004) are more negatively associated with an exogenous increase in board independence for firms with high litigation risk than for firms with low litigation risk.

The results suggest that independent directors are more conservative in overseeing financial reporting when they face higher litigation risk, consistent with the notion that they are still concerned about liability risk although they seldom have to pay damages or legal fees out of their own pockets.

As a result of the Australian Government Productivity Commission's recommendation to mandate remuneration committee independence for ASX300 companies, this study aims to investigate whether voluntary remuneration committee independence aligns chief executive officer (CEO) total pay and bonuses with firm financial performance.

A series of hypotheses test the research question using multiple regressions for a sample of 143 ASX300 companies during 2001. This time was prior to strengthen corporate governance regulation, but after mandated executive remuneration disclosure, thus capturing varying levels of voluntary remuneration committee independence.

This study shows firm size is an influential factor in the relationship under investigation. ASX300 large firm remuneration committees link CEO total remuneration and bonuses to firm financial performance. Smaller ASX firm remuneration committees do not link either type of CEO remuneration to performance despite remuneration committee independence. Findings are mixed for medium-sized ASX300 firms.

Limitations include the necessary time restriction to 2001 for sampling the ASX300 firms. The implication of this study's findings is that the proposed public policy for mandatory remuneration committee independence is not universally effective in linking CEO remuneration to firm financial performance for ASX300 firms.

This study contributes to the limited research on voluntary remuneration committee independence in relation to CEO remuneration and firm financial performance in the Australian context.

This research looked at the TATE [Through Assistive Technology to Employment] Project and its delivery of ICT/AT to people with learning disabilities. It tested whether the Project affected the independence, skills, choice and control exercised by people with learning disabilities, and if staff attitudes and skills were changed. A purposive sample of 29 people with learning disabilities were selected, and keyworkers were surveyed with a postal questionnaire at two time periods. Questionnaires covered AT/ICT received and any outcomes in: independence; skills; choice and control. Staff were asked about changes in their skills and attitudes. Questionnaires were transcribed and organised into common themes. Staff became supportive of assistive technology and developed ICT skills. Service users used ICT, and developed ‘life stories’ using Powerpoint. A variety of AT was also installed leading to increased independence, confidence and skills. AT/ICT can improve independence and services by putting people with a learning disability at the centre of a well planned and resourced strategy.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

The purpose of this paper is to study whether auditor independence reforms introduced in 2004 led to an enhancement in earnings quality in the post-reform era.

This study predicts that as the cost of compliance will vary based on a firm's existing corporate governance regime and the level of external scrutiny (monitoring) it faces, we compare the earnings quality of a sample of “established” (S&P/ASX 100) to a sample of “emerging” (S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index) firms. The paper examines the reporting behaviour of the two groups of listed entities, covering the regulatory change period 2003-2006. The paper uses regression modelling to test the associations between increased audit independence, earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms over the pre- and post-regulatory period.

The paper's results confirm that earnings quality for the established firms was enhanced in the post-reform period; while this was not the case for emerging firms. The evidence also suggests that corporate governance mechanisms of board independence and board financial skill are associated with higher earnings quality; while the higher the concentration of insider firm ownership is associated with lower earnings quality.

This study provides policy makers with evidence as to changes in reporting behaviour following law reform aimed at strengthening auditor independence.

The studies on earnings quality are informed by the US market practices. Australia provides a unique setting through its auditor independence reforms to examine the impact of reform choices. This study also investigates two specific subsets of the market: established firms and emerging firms.

This paper aims to examine the communicative value of assurance reports by investigating whether the impact on information asymmetries is contingent on the length of the contractual relationship between clients and assurance providers, which can compromise the provider’s independence.

Using a firm-level data set of publicly listed international firms from 2007 to 2016, the authors estimate several regression models for panel data by using the generalized method of moments estimator to address the endogeneity issue.

Results find that the greater the communicative value in assurance statements, the lower the information asymmetries. However, this effect is constrained when the assurance provider’s independence is compromised due to an excessively long-term contractual relationship. In other words, assurance statements with more informative value enhance the firm’s transparency and increase users’ confidence in the sustainability information provided. However, the loss of independence linked to longer tenure jeopardizes the communicative value of the assurance report and contributes to reducing information asymmetries.

The study makes at least three clear contributions to current literature. First, the authors contribute to the limited existing research about the communicative value attributed to assurance statements by stakeholders. Second, the authors indirectly contribute to the literature that analyses whether stakeholders understand the assurance report, a complex statement in a growing market. Addressing the communicative value of assurance is certainly a difficult task, as it is a novel and complex activity. Third, the main contribution is providing initial empirical evidence about the moderating effect that assurance provider tenure has in the relationship between the informational content of the assurance report and the level of information asymmetries. To date, there is no empirical evidence regarding the moderating effect of long assuror’s tenure as an important feature of the assurance market, and beyond that, regarding its impact on the communicative value assigned by stakeholders to assurance statements.

This paper aims to examine whether CEO/chair dual roles influence board monitoring-audit fees nexus. The impact of corporate governance on audit fees literature is lacking in the banking sector, which is subject to different regulations and reporting requirements to other sectors. The level and quality of external audit services are important not only to shareholders and customers but also for regulators’ reputations and public confidence.

Examining a sample of the US national commercial banks, this study fills the gap by empirically examining whether the attributes of internal corporate governance mechanisms, proxied by boards of directors and audit committee characteristics, are related to audit fees. We introduce two interaction variables to understand whether chief executive officer (CEO)/chair dual roles influence the relationships between board independence and audit fees on the one hand and between the audit committee and audit fees on the other hand.

We find that audit fees are positively associated with board independence, board size, CEO/chair dual role and audit committee financial experts. The results of the interaction variables indicate that boards with higher independence and more effective audit committees tend to demand higher audit quality, and consequently, pay higher audit fees to protect shareholders’ interests from potential power abuse by CEOs who also chair boards.

This study contributes to the literature by providing extensive understanding of the influence on audit fees of the independence of the board of directors and the effectiveness of the audit committees. The authors first examine the impact of each individual governance variable separately and then introduce two interaction variables. This study provides policymakers with insights into the existing relationships between audit fees and the banking sector governance structure.