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As a result of the Australian Government Productivity Commission's recommendation to mandate remuneration committee independence for ASX300 companies, this study aims to investigate whether voluntary remuneration committee independence aligns chief executive officer (CEO) total pay and bonuses with firm financial performance.

A series of hypotheses test the research question using multiple regressions for a sample of 143 ASX300 companies during 2001. This time was prior to strengthen corporate governance regulation, but after mandated executive remuneration disclosure, thus capturing varying levels of voluntary remuneration committee independence.

This study shows firm size is an influential factor in the relationship under investigation. ASX300 large firm remuneration committees link CEO total remuneration and bonuses to firm financial performance. Smaller ASX firm remuneration committees do not link either type of CEO remuneration to performance despite remuneration committee independence. Findings are mixed for medium-sized ASX300 firms.

Limitations include the necessary time restriction to 2001 for sampling the ASX300 firms. The implication of this study's findings is that the proposed public policy for mandatory remuneration committee independence is not universally effective in linking CEO remuneration to firm financial performance for ASX300 firms.

This study contributes to the limited research on voluntary remuneration committee independence in relation to CEO remuneration and firm financial performance in the Australian context.

This study aims to examine the role the structure of corporate boards plays in the failure of the firm. Specifically, it examines whether the remuneration committee is related to corporate failure in the UK.

The study uses 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 failed and 269 non-failed UK-listed non-financial firms between the periods of 1994 and 2011. This study used pooled cross-sectional, fixed and random effects LOGIT models to estimate whether corporate failure is related to remuneration committee in the UK.

The findings indicate that corporate failure is negatively related to the independence of the remuneration committee chairman and remuneration committee’s effectiveness but not remuneration committee’s presence, size and meetings. However, a positive and significant relationship was observed between corporate failure and remuneration committee independence.

The findings of the study provide support for the appropriateness of agency theory as analytical lens through which to study the efficacy of remuneration committee, especially the independence of the remuneration committee chairperson, as a board monitoring device, in the context of corporate failure.

The paper adds to existing literature on corporate governance by establishing the likely causes of corporate failure in the UK.

Indian Companies Act (2013) and revised clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) provides for a major overhaul of corporate governance norms to be adopted by firms in India. Some of the key provisions of the act pertain to board subcommittees. Given this background, the chapter seeks to analyze the role of overall board composition and board subcommittees (audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) on firm performance. In addition, the relationship between ownership and firm performance is analyzed. The study documents that large listed companies in India that have constituted a nomination and remuneration committee have had positive influence on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ). Board subcommittees’ (i.e., audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) independence is positively associated with firm performance as measured by TQ. Overall, the board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, in the presence of a nomination and remuneration committee, board size is negatively associated with firm performance. This study offers insights for policymakers interested in analyzing corporate governance practices in terms of board subcommittees as evidenced from a developing economy such as India.

This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.

Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.

The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.

These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.

This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of company performance, governance structure and ownership structure in determining the managerial remuneration for 134 listed companies in India over the years 2003-2012.

Remuneration paid to the board of directors of companies is taken to represent the managerial remuneration. Exogeneity among the company performance measures is verified with the endogtest suggested in Baum et al. (2007). A fixed effects panel regression with clustered standard errors is employed after checking for the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in the data.

The study reveals that managerial remuneration increases as the accounting performance of companies improves, whereas the market performance of companies has no significant association with managerial remuneration. The study also shows that foreign institutional shareholding is significantly and positively related with managerial remuneration in India.

This study highlights the various factors which affect the determination of managerial remuneration in India. These findings can be used as inputs by regulatory authorities in framing and improving governance norms regarding managerial remuneration. This study also suggests that factors other than the number, the independence and objectivity of independent directors are more important in determining managerial remuneration.

The present study proposes more reliable results, obtained through a fixed effects panel regression model with clustered standard error estimates and also checks endogeneity of performance measures with the endogtest, which is the appropriate test to use for verifying endogeneity in panel data.

This study investigates whether the proportion of proprietary directors (blockholders or their representatives) on the board's remuneration committee influences vertical pay inequality in Spanish listed companies and whether this relationship can be conditioned by the concentration of ownership.

The sample contains information on the individual compensation of 1048 directors of 57 Spanish listed firms during the period 2013–2018 making up an unbalanced panel with 3565 observations. Panel data regressions are used to study how the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee influences the remuneration of directors, focusing not on their absolute remuneration levels, but rather on their relationship to the average remuneration of the organization's employees (as a measure of vertical pay inequality within the company). The authors also investigate whether this relationship is conditioned by firm ownership concentration.

The results indicate that the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee acts as a mechanism to reduce vertical pay inequality, even in the context of high ownership concentration.

Unlike the majority of previous research dedicated to the independence of the remuneration committee, this study focuses on the role played by proprietary directors. The results help elucidate the importance of proprietary directors to properly monitor and restrain directors' compensation in contexts of high ownership concentration.

Following the subprime crisis and the detrimental role played by remuneration practices, an important reform concerned bank remuneration committees, especially in “significant financial institutions”. In light of this consideration, this paper aims to investigate the scope and format of this renewal in order to verify whether and how those bodies are conforming to the new regulatory framework while improving their efficiency and functionality.

The study was carried out on 30 top European banks through the elaboration of a qualitative analysis model that takes into account both the procedural and the compositional aspects of remuneration committees. The model was used as a benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of the remuneration committees operating within a sample. This assessment was carried out according to the content analysis approach.

The results show a high diffusion of these bodies within the banks and a gradual expansion, during the time under investigation (three years 2008-2010), of the information provided by them on their tasks and decision-making. In the same time, the study highlights some important criticalities concerning both the composition of the banks' remuneration committees, how they carry out their functions, and the level of disclosure addressed to shareholders and the market in order to formalize the results of their work.

The added value of the analysis is related to the implementation of an “effectiveness remuneration committee rating” applied to a sample of top European banks during the financial crisis.

The aim of the study is to examine the influence of remuneration committee (RC) characteristics, namely separation, size, independence, meetings, and female directors, on firm performance (FP) by using return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per shares (EPS). The study covers all firms being listed in Bahrain Bourse for two years which are 2020 and 2021. The results of the study show that having more directors in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROE and EPS.” Further, having more females in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROA.” In addition, having separate RC would significantly decrease firm performance “ROA and EPS.” Moreover, the independence of directors in RC and its frequent meetings has no significant impact on the firm’s performance. The results show that there is a need to re-evaluate the role of the RC and strengthen its effectiveness, as some of the variables examined by this study have an insignificant impact on a firm’s performance. Further, there is a need to allocate additional efforts and policies in developing corporate governance and RCs as well.

The present study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance factors and financial reporting transparency pre and post of ISIS.

A multivariate regression model was used to test the hypotheses for this purpose. The research hypotheses were tested on a sample of 35 companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2018 using a multivariate regression model based on panel data technique.

The results indicate a negative and significant correlation between the board independence, audit committee independence, management team stability and remuneration of the board of directors and financial reporting transparency. In contrast, there is a positive and significant correlation between the board expertise, audit committee expertise and managerial ownership, with financial reporting transparency. Moreover, ISIS has had a direct and significant impact on the correlation between the board of directors’ independence and remuneration with financial reporting transparency. The present study also tested research models using additional methods (such as feasible generalised least squares, ordinary least squares, random effects and T + 1) to obtain better results. The results of these different methods were entirely in line with the main results of the research.

The political and economic instability resulting from the entry of ISIS into Iraq has created severe problems for society’s economic, political, security and performance dimensions. Macroeconomic uncertainty driven by terrorist activities can negatively affect managers’ perceptions of firms’ future performance and result in poor judgments and estimations, significantly impacting business units' financial reporting transparency. Because no study has examined the relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting transparency on the Iraq stock exchange before and after the presence of ISIS, this study examines such a relationship. Although the economic and political situation in Iraq may not be identical to that in other nations, much of the experience in Iraq is anticipated to apply to other countries in the region.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of family directors and independent directors on executive remuneration of listed family firms in Malaysia, and their involvement in remuneration committee on executive remuneration.

Fixed effect estimation is employed to examine 1,395 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2014.

Family and independent directors do not have statistically significant influence on executive remuneration. Rather, family ownership exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration. This study also reveals that the interaction of family CEOs with the family directors on remuneration committee exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration.

The measurement of executive remuneration excludes the share options due to the non-disclosure of this information in the annual reports.

The findings would be useful to the policy-makers and regulators in appraising the governance measures of remuneration arrangement.

This study premises on the Type II agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Independent directors could not mitigate the Type II agency conflict via the governance of executive remuneration. They are not the effective governance mechanism that the minority shareholders can rely on. The additional analyses provide theoretical implication that the pervasive Type II agency conflict is ameliorated when the CEOs do not have family relationships with the controlling family shareholders.