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In response to corporate scandals the USA issued the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act to promote corporate responsibility for financial reporting. Some see the impact of the US legislation crossing borders and influencing the nature of financial reporting in other countries. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not there have been increases in transparency in non‐US financial markets, specifically in South East Asia, suggesting a ripple effect as a result of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act.

The study examines the audited financial statements of 92 South East Asian companies issued before and after the Sarbanes‐Oxley legislation to note any significant increase in transparency. As a proxy for transparency, the study examines the number of footnotes included in audited financial statements.

The results indicate a statistically significant increase in the number of footnotes in the positive direction. Because of this increase, a changing trend of increased transparency is suggested in South East Asia.

In 2002 the USA passed the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act to promote corporate responsibility for financial reporting. Some see this US legislation creating a ripple effect on financial reporting in other countries. The findings of this study suggest a changing trend of increased transparency in financial reporting in South East Asia. Although this trend cannot be directly attributed to the effects of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, it appears to be related to a larger, more transcendent worldwide reform movement towards increased corporate responsibility and financial reporting to which the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act appears to have served as a catalyst.

We investigate how firms’ responses to misconduct change when the institutional environment becomes more stringent. Organizational theory offers conflicting perspectives on whether new legislation will increase or decrease pressure on firms to take remedial action following misconduct. The dominant perspective posits that new legislation increases expectations of firm behavior, amplifying pressure on them to take remedial action after misconduct. A more recent perspective, however, suggests that the mere necessity to meet more stringent regulatory requirements certifies firms as legitimate to relevant audiences. This certification effect buffers firms, reducing the pressure for them to take remedial action after misconduct. Using a temporary, largely arbitrary exemption from a key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we show that firms that were not required to meet all the regulatory standards of good governance it required became 45% more likely to replace their CEOs following the announcement of an earnings restatement after Sarbanes-Oxley. On the other hand, those that were required to meet all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions became 26% less likely to replace their CEOs following a restatement announcement. Ironically, CEOs at firms with a legislative mandate intended to increase accountability for corporate misconduct shoulder less blame than do CEOs at firms without such legislative demands.

The purpose of this article is to examine the potential of The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on financial accounting systems in publicly‐held companies.

This article examines the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 2002, commonly referred to as The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, enacted by the US Congress in the wake of a series of business scandals in the USA. The focus is on the records management implications of the act.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley clearly has the potential to elevate the records management function to a new and higher level than it has ever enjoyed in the life of US business corporations. Future developments must be watched to see whether this proves to be the case.

This article will be helpful to those with more than just a passing interest in the significant happenings affecting records management in the USA.

As a result of scandals concerning major financial crime in the early twenty‐first century, including accounting and auditing fraud and inappropriate behavior by directors on the boards of US corporations, Congress hurriedly enacted the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. SOX's major purpose was to restore investor confidence in America's securities markets. Small firms argued that their cost of compliance was very heavy and that their burden was greater than for larger firms, especially the costs related to section 404 of the Act, which dealt with new requirements to obtain independent audit opinions. The authors found no empirical research that supports or denies these claims. Subsequently, in 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission reduced the Act's new audit requirements for small companies. This paper aims to examine audit fees for large and small firms.

The study examines actual audit fee data to investigate the increased costs paid by publicly traded companies to independent audit firms for their services due to Sarbanes‐Oxley. The authors use univariate and multivariate statistical methods to compare increases in audit fees paid by samples of 150 large firms and 150 small firms.

The study finds that both small and large firms incurred increased audit fees due to compliance with Sarbanes‐Oxley, and that small companies did incur larger increases in their cost burden.

The study uses actual audit fee data reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission and controls for other factors that determine audit fees in reaching its conclusions.

Adopting the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has provided impetus to reforming corporate accounting and corporate governance. Implementation of this legislation is so broad as to move from mere statutory compliance, to provide authority for changes in the professions of accountants and corporate officers and corporate counsel. This paper describes effects of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (Public Law No. 107‐204, Sec. 1‐1107) on the principal management and control functions of the business environment.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate recent corporate failures and their effect on financial statements, as well as the measures being taken to rebuild trust in corporate America.

Looks at how corporate governance in the USA is undergoing comprehensive reforms, particularly the significant Sarbanes‐Oxley Act.

Measures to rebuild trust in corporate America are being implemented.

The paper is of value by showing how the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act is by far is the most important legislative act governing business in the beginning of the twenty‐first century.

The purpose of the paper is to summarize and discuss selected investor‐protection and other related enhancements to federal securities regulation contained in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

The paper discusses the following investor protections and related enhancements: enhanced whistleblower incentives and protections; expanded SEC investor‐protection administrative functions including the establishment of an Office of the Investor Advocate, the appointment of an Ombudsman, and the establishment on a permanent basis of an Investor Advisory Committee; expanded enforcement authority against aiders and abettors of securities violations; evaluation of the existing standards of care employed by broker‐dealers and investment advisers; a narrowing of exemptions from registration under the Securities Act, including by directing the SEC to enact rules to disqualify “bad actors” from relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D and adjusting the definition of “accredited investor” for purposes of the SEC's rules under the Securities Act; an exemption for certain small companies from the auditor attestation requirements of Sarbanes‐Oxley; provisions to increase the oversight and accountability of credit rating agencies; and steps to bolster the regulatory oversight of the municipal securities market, including by creating a new class of regulated intermediaries – “municipal advisors”

The Dodd‐Frank Act leaves many critical issues to be fleshed out through further SEC rulemaking and in the implementation phase, including: procedures regarding whistleblower information submitted to the SEC; the actual role of the Office of the Investor Advocate; whether the SEC will adopt a broker‐dealer fiduciary‐duty standard of care; additional texture on rules disqualifying bad actors from relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D; adjustments to net worth requirements related to accredited investor status; rules on disclosure of credit ratings in registration statements; and qualification standards for municipal advisors.

Public companies and other persons affected by the Dodd‐Frank Act should: keep abreast of key developments in the rulemaking phase; possibly participate in the rulemaking process: develop realistic strategies to respond to the proposed rules; develop compliance action plans; and review whistleblower‐related compliance policies and procedures.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

This chapter explores the advantages (for large investors) of directly owning productive assets, compared with indirect ownership through stock in corporations. Significant factors are agency costs and recent changes in the tax and regulatory environment. Recent corporate scandals have led to legislative and regulatory responses that significantly increase the monitoring costs and other burdens of becoming or remaining a public corporation. As a result, there has been a substantial increase in going-private transactions, particularly among smaller public companies. Acquisitions and minority equity positions that allow large corporations to join with smaller companies have also increased. The pressures to go private are not entirely new, however. This chapter, reflecting collaboration by professors of finance and business law, traces the legal concept that the corporation is an entity separate and apart from its owners, showing how the legal status of corporations hinders resolution of conflicts among the parties to the enterprise. Thus, there have long been fundamental flaws inherent in the corporation as the form of organization for certain activities. The current wave of Sarbanes–Oxley restructuring via private equity firms is part of a significant increase in direct ownership of major assets by institutional investors. Direct ownership prevents management expropriation of resources, and is preferable to corporate ownership whenever other alternatives for indemnification or liability limitation are available (such as insurance, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, etc.). Finally, the renewal of direct ownership is not a radical shift, but a return to long-established tradition in the organization of business activities.

In this study we examine the oversight responsibilities of audit committees in the post Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) era. The results show that audit committee oversight responsibilities assigned and disclosed in proxy statements expanded post‐SOX compared to pre‐SOX. We design a survey instrument to measure the difference between the perceived oversight responsibilities of audit committee members and the oversight responsibilities actually assigned in the proxy. Our results indicate that although audit committees made a substantial commitment to increase their assigned responsibilities over the period of 2001 to 2004, they still need to do more to meet the many additional challenges facing them in a post‐SOX environment. Overall, our results suggest that the intent of SOX‐for audit committees to be more involved and active in the oversight role of an organization‐is becoming institutionalized. These results should be interesting to policy makers, a variety of interest groups, and accounting researchers.