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To minimize customer churn, many service providers offer consumers the option of automatic contract renewal at the end of a contract period. Such agreements are known as rollover service contracts (RSCs). This research quantifies the effect of RSCs and other related factors, such as incentives, on consumers' service choice decisions.

The study adopts choice-based conjoint analysis to assess the effect of RSCs on consumers' choices and to determine whether effect size varies when selecting a cell phone network or gym/leisure club provider, which represent lower-priced utilitarian and higher-priced hedonic services.

It was found that RSCs produce negative perceptions and intended behaviors for the majority of consumers across different product types. Nevertheless, as explained by social exchange theory, many individuals may be persuaded to enter into a RSC on the basis of reciprocity if they are offered an incentive such as a price discount or free product add-on.

In the marketing domain, this is the first comprehensive study to quantify the role of contract type among a range of other factors in consumers' decision-making when selecting a service. The authors' results offer context-specific implications for service marketers. First, RSCs are perceived more negatively in high-priced hedonistic categories, especially among those with lower incomes. Second, price discounts are more effective than product add-ons for motivating hedonic purchases, while product add-ons work better with utilitarian services.

The increasing prevalence of a wide range of infectious diseases, as well as the underwhelming results of vaccination rates that may be traced back to problems with vaccine procurement and distribution, have brought to the fore the importance of vaccine supply chain (VSC) management in recent years. VSC is the cornerstone of effective vaccination; hence, it is crucial to enhance its performance, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where immunization rates are not satisfactory.

In this paper, the authors focus on VSC performance improvement of India by proposing supply contracts under demand uncertainty. The authors propose three contracts – wholesale price (WSP), cost sharing (CS) and incentive mechanism (IM) for the government-operated immunization program of India.

The authors' findings indicate that IM is capable of coordinating the supply chain, whereas the other two contracts are inefficient for the government. To validate the model, it is applied to a real-world scenario of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in India, and the findings show that an IM contract improves the overall efficiency of the system by 23.72%.

Previous studies focused mainly on the influenza VSC industry within developed nations. Nonetheless, there exists a dearth of literature pertaining to the examination of supply contracts and their feasibility for immunization programs that are administered by the government and aimed at optimizing societal benefits. The authors' findings can be beneficial to the immunization program of India to optimize their VSC cost.

In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.

The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).

The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.

In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).

The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.

First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.

An optimal control model is built considering the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion and reciprocal effort improvement, while a numerical study is conducted to draw some managerial implications.

In infrastructure PPP projects, private sectors may opportunistically divert part of their effort from the current projects to other projects to allocate their limited human resources. Nevertheless, this effort diversion can be inhibited by dynamic incentives since the private sectors reciprocally exert greater effort into the current projects when receiving the dynamic incentives. This article investigates how the government specifies the output standard that the private sector should meet and offers dynamic incentives to mitigate the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion.

The output standard for the private sector to acquire the dynamic incentives should be specified as the output level corresponding to the private sector's optimal long-run stationary equilibrium (OLSE) effort level, which decreases with its reciprocal preference level but increases with its effort-diverting level. The optimal dynamic incentives comprise an initial incentive and a periodic OLSE incentive, which declines with the reciprocal preference level but improves with the effort-diverting level. Besides, the numerical study reveals that the government should distinguish whether the bidders have high effort-diverting levels and, if so, should focus on their reciprocal preference levels and decline the bidders with low reciprocal preference to avoid utility loss.

This article provides a theoretical model combining opportunistic behavior with reciprocal preference through an optimal control lens, thus embedding the problem of incentive design into a broader socioeconomic framework.

Studies showed that digital technology applications in the construction industry are low, especially in many developing nations. Construction incentivisation (CI) is one of the long-standing principles adopted to enhance project performance. There is a paucity of studies concerning CI to improve digital technology applications. Thus, this research investigated the relevance and perceived hindrances that may hinder the implementation of CI from promoting digital technologies and proffer ways to improve digital technology applications in the construction sector.

In Nigeria’s context, this research is exploratory. Twenty-four semi-structured virtual interviews were conducted in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria, with knowledgeable participants that indicated interest and were interviewed. The engaged interviewees were drawn from government agencies, academicians in construction consultancy, Internet and communication technology experts, construction contracting firms and construction consulting firms. The collected data were coded and analysed through a thematic method.

Digitalisation of the industry via CI may face some hindrances. The perceived issues that may hinder CI implementation were classified into most severe, severe and fairly severe in Nigeria’s construction industry context. Findings proffer feasible policy solutions that can mitigate these issues and improve digital technology applications in the industry via the CI.

This study covered the relevance and perceived issues that may hinder the implementation of the CI to improve digital technology applications in the industry. Also, the study proffers policy solutions to enhance digital technology applications in the industry via the CI concept.

Findings from this research will support and offer a valuable understanding of the relevance of the “incentivisation concept” to improve digital technology applications in the Nigerian-built environment. Other developing countries with low applications of digital technology in construction may consider the suggested policy solutions from this research. Also, this study will stir policymakers and construction practitioners to support policies tailored towards improving digital technology applications in construction.

This research contributes by exploring the effectiveness of the CI concept and informing construction practitioners and policymakers on how to improve digital technology applications in the Nigerian construction industry.

This study aims to examine the value of the call option contract in hedging the risks in the supply chain. The decentralized supply chain without call option contract is first studied as the criterion model for evaluations. This paper addresses several questions: What will be the optimal manufacturer’s production quantity, retailer’s ordering and pricing policies in the presence of random demand and random yield by applying the downconversion approach? How will the call option contract influence the optimal decisions for the members of the supply chain? Can the risk from randomness be divided among the members in the supply chain through the call option contract?

This paper considers a two-level decentralized supply chain under random yield and random demand in which the manufacturer takes advantage of the downconversion approach with two scenarios, with and without option contract. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no article or study uses the downconversion approach in a supply chain regarding random yield and random demand. Furthermore, the paper considers pricing with option contract in the supply chain, which makes this article stands out significantly from other articles in the literature.

This study shows that the downconversion approach would reduce the risk caused by the random yield, which appears to be the appropriate method for the environmental goal of the supply chains. Moreover, adopting a call option contract can increase flexibility and mitigate risks, resulting in more expected members’ profits.

To simplify the model, the authors assume one manufacturer and one retailer, so extending the model to consider multiple retailers instead of one retailer and inventory sharing between them would be interesting. Considering the option and exercise prices as decision variables would be important future research topics. Put option and bidirectional option contracts could be investigated in the future. Another extension is modeling asymmetry of information in supply chain.

This paper provides managerial insights on dealing with both demand and yield risks in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain. The manufacturer has a random yield production and produces two types of vertical products: low-end and high-end. To reduce waste caused by the random yield, the manufacturer uses a downconversion approach in which low-end products are made by converting the defective high-end products. The manufacturer purchased a shortage of high-end products from the secondary market (i.e. emergency sourcing). High-end products are sold through the retailer, and low-end products are sold directly by the manufacturer. The customer demand for high-end products in the end market is random and depends on the selling price, and the customer demand for the low-end products in the secondary market is independent and random. The retailer contracts the manufacturer with the call option to obtain high-end products to meet a random demand; in fact, by using the call option contract, the authors try to balance the risks between two members. Two scenarios of with and without call option contract are proposed. After the high-end product demand is observed, the retailer would exercise the option order quantity in the call option contract scenario and then place an instant order with the manufacturer if necessary. In each scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions simultaneously (static game) to determine the retailer’s optimal ordering and pricing policies and the optimal production quantity of the manufacturer (Nash equilibrium) by maximizing their expected profits. Finally, the impact of the model parameters on the supply chain is expressed through numerical examples. The numerical analysis shows that the call option contract provides greater profit than the wholesale price contract.

Frontline workers (FLWs) constitute a critical part of the implementation cadre within public policies, serving a significant role in the last-mile delivery of public goods and services. FLWs under public programs in low and middle-income countries like India are offered different compensation structures that range from full-time salaries, piece rate honorariums, contractual engagements, to no remuneration. Whilst the rationale for offering different compensations vary, are certain structures more successful in encouraging FLWs to perform a prosocial task? Further, can certain structures encourage FLWs to perform beyond the incentivized policy mandate?

Investigating workers' prosocial effort within policy implementation, the authors conducted a randomized lab-in-the-field inquiry with 344 Anganwadi-based workers (workers under the nutrition policy) in western India. These FLWs were engaged to perform a novel real-effort task that was tied to different incentive structures and their performance was adjudged based on measurable quantity, effort and quality parameters.

Results demonstrate that uncompensated workers invest the greatest amount of effort whilst compromising on task quality, and vice-versa for subjects receiving pay-for-performance compensation. Programs must account for policy focus when offering compensations: volunteer engagement may be counterproductive for quality focus and to the adherence to ancillary task mandates like nature/quality of beneficiary interaction. On the other hand, the distribution of products (like health goods) can rely on volunteer effort.

The study brings together various compensation schemes operating at the field level, under one study using an LFE methodology within the context of policy implementation in India.

The aim of this study is to gain important insights on integration oriented servitization identifying essential dimensions of effective structures, coordination approaches and management controls adopted by manufacturing firms that integrate forward towards distribution, sales and services.

The study adopts a theory-guided qualitative abductive methodology to conduct a comparative case-study of two manufacturing firms in the same industry integrating forward to enhance servitization but with significantly different performance outcomes. The findings are uncovered from a broad spectrum of primary and secondary data spanning two decades.

The consistently high-performing firm puts equal emphasis on production and downstream distribution, sales and services and motivate individuals to engage in entrepreneurial efforts to develop combined product-services offerings that are valued by customers. The underperforming firm prioritizes operating efficiency driven by engineering prowess and managed through planning, standardization, authority and central controls.

The study is based on two representative firms operating in a specific industry context, which has ramifications for the generalizability of results and calls for replication studies to substantiate and extend findings.

Forward integration from manufacturing into distribution, sales and services represents a specific servitization strategy that needs structure and particular coordination approaches to be effective in complex dynamic product-markets. The characteristics of the outperforming case company provide useful insights on effective integrated servitization efforts.

Forward integration is a commonly adopted strategy among manufacturing firms that constitute the backbone of modern economies and effective governance of these integration oriented servitization efforts has important implications for societal value creation.

This study builds on rationales from management science including economic theory, corporate strategy and different micro-foundational lenses and thereby hone recent calls for broader theoretical foundations to enlighten studies of the servitization puzzle.

This paper addresses the emergence of strategic agility as adaptive capability to face the need to adapt to a constantly changing environment. Special emphasis is paid to governance mechanisms as a microfoundation of dynamic capabilities, investigating the dynamics and outcome in regards to the digitalization of supply chains and its socio-economic relations of its members.

A multiple-case study method is applied to explain the impact of a digitalization initiative in the form of an I4.0 implementation in a supply chain context. Building on qualitative in-depth interviews of experts in managerial positions, 16 cases from the manufacturing industry involving an I4.0 implementation across the supply chain were analyzed. Based on a conceptual design science approach, the CIMO logic (context, intervention, mechanisms and outcome) framework is used to investigate the interplay between agility as a dynamic capability and governance mechanisms.

The studied cases demonstrate an intensification of synergistic combinations of inter-firm resources to manage digitalization across the supply chain (SC). With the implementation of I4.0, competitive advantage along the SC takes higher priority over the competitive advantage in the individual or dyadic perspective. Strategic agility as a dynamic capability to cope with and adapt to the changing environment is hereby crucial emphasizing relational SC governance (SCG) as essential as a microfoundation to adjust the structure and management of SCs. Relationships, which allow competitive advantage as a SC balance out traditional power mechanisms within the SC hierarchy. Trust, collaboration and flexibility, aligned with common incentives in generating competitive advantages enable the SCs to mitigate uncertainty and risk while preventing opportunistic behavior.

The study offers SCM managers in-depth insights into strategic agility and how to address the recent challenge of digitalization successfully. Identifying crucial dynamics within SCG mechanisms based on first-hand use cases, practical success factors for implementing I4.0 to optimize effectiveness and efficiency can be derived how to structure and manage future SCs.

This paper contributes to the first insights examining the implications of digitalization and the role of strategic agility as a capability to adapt. Investigating the microfoundation of governance within this capability, this research provides insights on the socio-economic level, while discussing specific mechanisms how relationships of SCs evolve proposing relevant insights for future research.

Currently, digital technology has been proposed as a new archetype for developing an effective traceability system in the perishable food supply chain (FSC). Implementation of such a system needs significant investment and the burden lies with the members of the supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact on the profit of the supply chain members due to the implementation of an effective traceability system with such a large investment. The study also tries to explore the impact of the implementation of such a system by coordination among the members through a cost-sharing mechanism.

A two-level supply chain that comprises a supplier and retailer is analyzed using a game-theoretic approach. The mathematical models are developed considering the scenario for an individual, centralized and both members invest using a cost-sharing mechanism. For each of the models, the impact of product selling price, information sensing price and quality improvement level on profit is analyzed through numerical analysis.

The study reveals that consumer involvement can be a strong motivation for the supply chain members to initiate investment in the traceability system. Further, from an investment perspective cost-sharing model is beneficial compared to the individual investment-bearing model. This mechanism can coordinate as well as benefit the FSC members. However, the model is less beneficial to the centralized model from profit and quality improvement levels.

Food wastage can be less from supplier and retailer perspectives. Moreover, consumers can purchase food items only after verifying their shipping conditions. Consequently the food safety scandals can be reduced remarkably.

Digital technology adoption in the perishable FSC is still considered emerging. The present study helps organizations to implement a traceability system in the perishable FSC through consumer involvement and a cost-sharing mechanism.