Search results

In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.

The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).

The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.

In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).

The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.

First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.

This study aims to investigate the effects and implications of overconfidence in a competitive game involving multiple newsvendors. This study explores how overconfidence influences system coordination, optimal stocking strategies and competition among newsvendors in the context of the well-known newsvendor stocking problem.

The study applies robust optimization theory and the absolute regret minimization criterion to analyze the competitive game of overconfident newsvendors. This study considers the asymmetric information held by newsvendors regarding market demand and obtains a closed-form solution for the competing game. The effects of overconfidence on system coordination and optimal stocking strategies are examined.

The results of the study indicate that overconfidence can act as a positive force in reducing the effects of overstocking caused by competition and asymmetric information among newsvendors. The analysis reveals that there exists an optimal level of overconfidence that coordinates the ordering system of multiple overconfident newsvendors, leading to first-best outcomes under certain conditions. Additionally, numerical examples confirm the obtained results. Furthermore, considering newsvendors' expected profit, the study finds that a higher degree of overconfidence does not necessarily result in lower actual expected profit.

Despite the significant contributions of this study to theoretical and managerial insights, this study does have certain limitations. First, in the establishment of the belief demand function, the substitution ratio, which quantifies the transfer, is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However, in reality, this is often influenced by factors such as the price of goods and the distance between stores. Therefore, one direction worth studying in the future is to explore the uncertainty associated with the demand substitution ratio and integrate that as an endogenous variable into the optimization model. Second, this study does not address the type of product and solely focuses on quantitatively analyzing the effect of salvage value on the optimal stocking strategy. Future studies can explore the effect of degree of perishability and selling period of the product on the stocking. Third, the focus of uncertainty in this study revolves around market demand, and the implications of this uncertainty are significant. A recent study (Rahbari et al., 2023) addressed an innovative robust optimization problem related to canned foods during pandemic crises. The recent study's findings highlighted the effectiveness of expanding canned food exports to neighboring countries with economic justification as the best strategy for companies amidst the disruptions caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Incorporating the issue of disruptions into the authors' research would be interesting and challenging.

From a managerial perspective, the authors' study provides a research paradigm for game-theoretic inventory problems in scenarios where the market demand distribution is unknown. While most inventory problems are analyzed and solved based on expectation-based optimization criteria, which rely on an accurate distribution of market demand, obtaining this information in practice can often be challenging or expensive for decision-makers. Consequently, a discrepancy arises between real-world observations and theoretical identifications. This study aimed to complement previous research and address the inconsistency between observations and theoretical identification.

The authors' research contributes to the existing understanding of overconfidence and assists individuals in making appropriate stocking strategies based on the individuals' level of overconfidence. Diverging significantly from the traditional view of overconfidence as a negative bias, the authors' results show the view's potential positive impact within a competitive environment, resulting in greater actual expected profits for newsvendors.

This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of overconfidence in a competitive game of newsvendors. This study extends the analysis of the well-known newsvendor stocking problem by incorporating overconfidence and considering the implications for system coordination and competition. The application of robust optimization theory and the absolute regret minimization criterion provides a novel approach to studying overconfidence in this context.

This study considers a contracting problem between a fairness concerned entrepreneur (EN) and a fair-neutral venture capitalist (VC) to explore the effects of asymmetry, agency conflicts and fairness concerns.

The authors construct the model by assuming the EN's risk aversion degree is private information, which is more realistic but ignored in most studies. Under the principal–agent framework, the authors solve the VC's optimal contracting models by identifying the ranges of feasible solution, where the optimal solutions of these models are explicit and nicely reconcile the “private equity” puzzle. Moreover, validity of the optimal solutions is verified by numerical simulations.

In accordance with empirical evidence, information asymmetry lowers the optimal equity share that the VC provides to EN but raises EN's profit due to lower effort disutility and information rent. Moreover, the authors find that the fairness concerns is beneficial for the EN, where it not only increases the EN's optimal equity share, but also enhances the certainty equivalence of the EN's utility regarding its profit. Relative to the benchmark model where the EN's risk aversion degree is common knowledge, the EN's efforts recommended by the optimal contract is less sensitive to the EN's fairness concerns degree when the EN does not actually announce its risk aversion degree.

First, the authors incorporate asymmetry to study a two-period contracting problem and explore how it affects the equity shares allocated to the contractual parties. Second, the authors incorporate fairness concerns and analyze its effect regarding the decision-makings and profits.

The purpose of this research is to examine how consumers form beliefs and evaluate derivatives (e.g. handheld computers) and branded derivatives (e.g. Palm handheld computers). The aim is to study how consumers combine two categories (e.g. “handheld products” and “computers”) to form beliefs, how the similarity between the categories influences beliefs, how the addition of a brand changes beliefs, and how the presence of brand associations impacts on evaluations.

Three laboratory experiments to test hypotheses were conducted.

Results of the studies show the modifier (e.g. “handheld” in handheld computer) dominates derivative beliefs, but the nature of its dominance changes with category similarity. Brand effects are surprisingly limited in belief formation due to modifier dominance. Brand beliefs only transfer to branded derivatives when the brand fits with the modifier category. The presence of brand associations induces more positive evaluations of branded derivatives when the brand fits with the modifier category and, under certain circumstances, when it fits with the header‐category.

The presence of multiple concepts (e.g. Palm handheld computer) is common in line and brand extensions, yet little research has examined such complex products. Their comprehension can be better predicted by utilizing conceptual combination theory.

Managers can better determine what kinds of line and brand extensions are best suited for their brands.

The originality and value lay in utilizing the conceptual combination approach to more deeply understand which extensions are best suited for which brands. This helps fill a gap in the literature on consumer perception of multiple‐concept extensions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the immediate impact of firm-specific announcements on the trading volume of individual and institutional investors on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), during a period when the market becomes fragmented.

This study uses intraday trading volume data in five-minute intervals prior to and after firm-specific announcements to measure individual and institutional abnormal volume. There are 70 such intervals per trading day and 254 trading days in the sample period. The first 10 minutes of trading (from 10.00 to 10.10 a.m.) is excluded to avoid the effect of opening auction and to ensure consistency in the “starting time” for all stocks. The volume transacted during five-minute intervals is aggregated and attributed to individual or institutional investors using Broker IDs.

Institutional investors exhibit abnormal trading volume before and after announcements. However, individual investors indicate abnormal trading volume only after announcements. Consistent with outcomes expected from a dividend washing strategy, abnormal trading volume around dividend announcements is statistically insignificant. Both individual and institutional investors’ buy volumes are higher than sell volumes before and after scheduled and unscheduled announcements.

The study is Australian focused, but the results are applicable to other limit order book markets of similar design.

The results add to the understanding of individual and institutional investors’ trading behaviour around firm-specific announcements in a securities market with continuous disclosure.

The results add to the understanding of individual and institutional investors’ trading behaviour around firm-specific announcements in a securities market with continuous disclosure.

These results will help regulators to design markets that are less predatory on individual investors.

This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ optimal contract negotiation strategies in buyer–supplier–supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing manufacturers.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which the retailer has the option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or share production cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, the authors derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios.

The authors find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit.

The modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial insights derived from the research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the interaction between sentiments and past prices can lead to higher abnormal profit in futures markets. Such examinations allow the authors to relate the paper to the debate that focuses on examining the behavior of different types of traders in futures market, and who among these traders destabilize the markets.

First, the authors develop new dynamic strategies in US futures market that combine sentiment by type of traders based on trader position provided by the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders with short-term contrarian signals. Next, the authors adjust the abnormal profits to the CAPM model and Miffre and Rallis’s (2007) model. Finally, the authors use the Du (2012) decomposition methodology.

The main findings are that the abnormal profit is more pronounced when the authors combine past returns with lagged high producer/merchant/processor/user or low managed money sentiment. The results from swap dealer or other reportable groups show that there is no pervasive directional relation between their sentiment and contrarian profit. A further investigation of the sources of abnormal profits demonstrates that these profits survive even after the adjustment of obtained return to risk. Instead, these profits are mainly due to the overreaction to the news by irrational traders.

Based on behavioral finance theories, the authors conclude that producer, merchant, processor and user behave like irrational traders, while managed money traders behave like rational ones. Given that current regulatory proposes the limitation of speculation, the policy implications of these results are important. Therefore, these findings suggest that policy distinctions on trading motives may be more challenging to construct than ever.

In social networking services gift giving, the decision to send a gift is often initiated by spontaneous news about others, who may have recently experienced fortune or misfortune. The purpose of this paper is to show that the valence of the other’s event can affect the empathy experienced by the giver and that the level of empathy affects gift selection behavior.

Study 1 investigated the relationship between empathy and valence of other’s event and the underlying mechanism of changes in self-esteem. Study 2 explored how different levels of empathies lead to different gift selection behavior. Study 3 replicated the results of Study 2 using a different measurement approach.

Across the three studies, findings consistently suggest that the empathy arising from unexpected news of the others’ fortune was lower compared to that of the others’ misfortune because of threats to self-esteem. In addition, greater empathy prompted gift givers to spend more time and effort in gift selection.

Understanding how valence of event experienced by others might motivate givers to engage in selecting a gift online can help retailers increase predictive insights for recommendations.

While past research focused on ritual gift giving, this research examined spontaneous gift giving. The study is also unique in that the empathy gap between the giver and the receiver is a result of the changes in the psychological state of the giver.

The authors probe the relationships between country institutional support for entrepreneurship and new venture survival. Specifically, the authors unpack the nuanced influences of entrepreneurs' perceived environmental uncertainty and their subsequent entrepreneurial behavioral profiles and how this particularly bolsters venture survival in contexts with underdeveloped institutions for entrepreneurship.

Coleman (1990) ‘bathtub’ framework is applied to develop a model and propositions surrounding how and when emerging market entrepreneur's perceptions of their countries institutional support toward entrepreneurship can ultimately enhance new venture survival.

Entrepreneurs' interpretations of regulatory, cognitive and normative institutional support for private enterprise helps them embrace uncertainties more accurately reflective of “on the ground” realities and stimulates constructive entrepreneurial behaviors. These are critical for increasing survival prospects in characteristically turbulent, emerging market contexts that typically lack reliable formal resources for cultivating nascent ventures.

This paper has implications for international policymakers seeking to stimulate and sustain entrepreneurial ventures in emerging markets. The authors shed light on the practical importance of understanding the social realities and interpretations of entrepreneurs in a given country relating to their actual perceptions of support for venturing—cautioning a tendency for outsiders to over-rely on aggregated econometric indices and various national ‘doing business' rankings.

This study is the first to create a conceptual framework on the mechanisms of how entrepreneurs in emerging economies affect new venture survival. Drawing on Coleman's bathtub (1990), the authors develop propositional arguments for a multilevel sequential framework that considers how developing economies' country institutional profiles (CIP) influence entrepreneurs' perceptions of environmental uncertainty. Subsequently, this cultivates associated entrepreneurial behavior profiles, which ultimately enhance (inhibit) venture survival rates. Further, the authors discuss the boundary conditions of this regarding how the national culture serves to moderate each of these key relationships in both positive and negative ways.

This study explores the impact of EN's (venture entrepreneurs, simplified as EN) jealousy fairness concerns coefficient on two-stage venture capital decision-making in cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical information. It discusses the equilibrium solution of two-stage venture.

The principal-agent model was established based on multiple periods, and differentiated contracts were established at different stages. The validity of the models and the contract was verified by numerical simulation.

The results suggest that with the increase in the EN fairness concerns coefficient, the effort level of EN decreases continuously and decreases faster in the second stage because this is the last stage. The level of VC's (venture capitalist, simplified as VC) effort declines first and then increases; that is, VC will increase the effort level when the fairness concerns coefficient increases to a certain threshold. To motivate EN to pay more effort, VC will increase the incentive to EN in the first stage. However, it will reduce the level of incentive to EN in the second stage. In the limited stage of venture investment, consider that the fairness concerns of EN do not make the profits of EN and VC achieve Pareto improvement simultaneously.

First, the authors implanted fairness concerns into multi-stage venture capital and discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the efforts and returns of both parties. Second, among the influencing factors of the project output, the authors consider the bilateral efforts of EN and VC, the working capacity of EN, the initial investment scale, and the external uncertain environment.