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This paper suggests to combine different kind of “other-regarding” preferences as an approach to fair behavior which is observed in controlled experiments. We assert that participants in two-person experiments have a good will capital which may be described by altruistic preferences. These preferences guide a large fraction of participants when they have to make distributional choices in one-stage games. We further show that in games with more than one stage the previous action of the other person may cause reciprocal feelings in addition to the altruistic preferences. A friendly (unfriedly) act of the other person may increase (decrease) the good will capital of the participants. Upon these findings, we conclude that a combination of altruism and reciprocity is able to describe the variety of behavior in several experiments despite their differing strategic context.

Currently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.

This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.

This study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.

This study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.

The use of public procurement as a vehicle for implementing various socioeconomic preference policies has a long history. This article reviews the current state of affairs of procurement preference programs with regard to U.S. state and local governments and analyzes their impact on both the recipients and on the public procurement process. Opportunities for further research are noted, and the authors conclude that the ability to navigate the difficult waters of socioeconomic preferences should be a core competency of state and local public procurement officials.

The European Union's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) has existed for over 40 years and it aimed to promote the export growth in the developing countries. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the evolution and characteristics of the EU's GSP regime and examine the effectiveness of the EU's GSP in promoting the export growth of ten ASEAN beneficiary countries.

The authors analyse the trade flows between the EU and ASEAN beneficiary countries under the GSP scheme by referring to trade data (1990‐2007) at the aggregate level, the sectoral level and individual beneficiary country level.

The authors find that using the EU's GSP to promote the exports growth of the ASEAN countries has very limited effectiveness. Although the total EU imports from the ASEAN countries experienced a significant increase during the period 1990‐2007, the preferential imports under the GSP scheme remained stagnated at the same period. However, the least developed ASEAN members reported very high utilization rates and successfully exploited GSP preferences for pushing up their exports to the European market.

This work provides new evidence on whether the EU's GSP really works and to what extent the EU's GSP enhances the export growth of ASEAN beneficiary countries. The empirical findings may provide trade policymakers with some guidance in making EU trade policy.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of fairness psychology on the motivation and behavior that drives managerial entrenchment. The paper also provides a theoretical basis to set up an effective incentive and restraining mechanism for corporations.

This paper conducts an experiment to investigate the effect of fairness preference on managerial entrenchment in enterprises.

The results of the experiment show that managers are very concerned about fair payoffs, i.e. the comparison of the principals’ earnings with managers’ market average levels of pay. The worse managers’ fairness preference becomes, the greater are the degrees of managerial entrenchment exhibited. In addition, a large payoff gap between managers and principals produces a higher sensitivity in high-ability managers, while a large payoff gap between managers and managers elsewhere in a market leads to a higher sensitivity in low-ability managers.

This paper provides new insights into incentives and constraints affecting the behaviors of managers at the corporate board level. Maintaining equity between managers’ payoffs, principals’ earnings and managers’ market average pay levels can restrain both the entrenchment behavior of managers caused by unfair psychology and also the increasing costs of staff switching jobs, thus producing greater profits for companies.

The purpose of this article is to explore the effects of the interaction between team diversity and reciprocated relational preferences on task and relationship conflict in teams.

The paper reports the results of an empirical study conducted on 66 teams, of which 32 were randomly created, while 34 teams were formed through a pair matching strategy (team dating).

The results show that mutual positive preferences attenuated the positive impact of team diversity on relationship conflict within teams.

The results support the theoretical distinction between task and relationship conflict and show that close interpersonal relations within teams have a differential impact on the two types of conflict.

The results reported in the study support the use of the team dating strategy for team design in different organizational settings.

The paper introduces a new method for team formation based on reciprocated relational preferences.

We use a laboratory experiment to examine a multitask environment common to practice, in which managers have multiple responsibilities, including both managerial reporting, as in participative budgeting settings, and effort provision toward daily tasks. Consistent with typical contracting arrangements, we examine incomplete contracts where honesty and effort are not enforceable. In such a multitask environment, when employers choose to offer comparatively generous wages to managers, we predict that managers will elect to provide higher effort. Meanwhile, we remain agnostic ex ante about the degree of misreporting due to findings in studies on gift exchange, moral licensing, and moral wiggle room. Overall, we find evidence that reciprocity, consistent with the gift-exchange model, does extend across both tasks. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

The purpose of this study is to carry out the systematic literature review, bibliometric analysis and content analysis of extant literature of service supply chain (SSC).

Systematic literature review (SLR) technique was used for identifying the research papers. In the first step after reading titles, abstracts and keywords and, full-length articles wherever required, papers not related to SSC were removed. In second steps papers were read more critically and papers not related to SSC were removed. Finally on 502 papers bibliometric and content analysis was further carried out. Content analysis was based on the clusters formed by bibliographic coupling. Further, content analysis of the recent articles revealed the current research trends and research gaps.

This paper identified the six existing research diversifications in SSC as (1) logistics SSC, (2) model, framework and conceptual papers, (3) third-party logistics service providers, (4) articles from various perspective, (5) measurement of quality and performance on services and (6) impact of adoption of technology, cooperation and branding on logistics service providers. Further, six future research directions are also provided.

This research provides a clear view of the progression of publication, research diversification, research themes of six identified clusters, sub-themes of clusters and content analysis of each cluster. Content analysis of recent articles reveals the current research trend and future research directions.

This is a first of its kind of study which presents the diversification of research areas within SSC, bibliometric analysis, content analysis and provides actionable future research direction.

An optimal control model is built considering the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion and reciprocal effort improvement, while a numerical study is conducted to draw some managerial implications.

In infrastructure PPP projects, private sectors may opportunistically divert part of their effort from the current projects to other projects to allocate their limited human resources. Nevertheless, this effort diversion can be inhibited by dynamic incentives since the private sectors reciprocally exert greater effort into the current projects when receiving the dynamic incentives. This article investigates how the government specifies the output standard that the private sector should meet and offers dynamic incentives to mitigate the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion.

The output standard for the private sector to acquire the dynamic incentives should be specified as the output level corresponding to the private sector's optimal long-run stationary equilibrium (OLSE) effort level, which decreases with its reciprocal preference level but increases with its effort-diverting level. The optimal dynamic incentives comprise an initial incentive and a periodic OLSE incentive, which declines with the reciprocal preference level but improves with the effort-diverting level. Besides, the numerical study reveals that the government should distinguish whether the bidders have high effort-diverting levels and, if so, should focus on their reciprocal preference levels and decline the bidders with low reciprocal preference to avoid utility loss.

This article provides a theoretical model combining opportunistic behavior with reciprocal preference through an optimal control lens, thus embedding the problem of incentive design into a broader socioeconomic framework.