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The purpose of this paper is to address the interaction between intelligence activity and criminal investigation, in order to improve State capacity to deal with criminal organizations by controlling and identifying illegal money flows.

The analysis is based on the experience of the Prosecution Office of São Paulo, Brazil, which confirms how useful intelligence activity is in criminal cases, especially when it brings a consistent knowledge that provides not only criminal punishment, but also economic and administrative effects.

A knowledge produced by an intelligence activity can strengthen national regulation in order to make more transparent some financial operations, track illegal money, seize assets, improve mutual legal assistance and identify a wide range of criminals.

The paper shows that using intelligence activity in criminal investigations brings more effectiveness and a more strategic approach.

The OECD recently identified tax crime as one of the top three sources of money laundering. In the context of increased acknowledgement that tax evasion, capital flight and money laundering are key threats to the economic stability of developing countries, South Africa, like many other countries, has put information‐sharing agreements in place to enable better recovery of money hidden in the financial system. There is, however, a general ineffectiveness of anti‐money laundering regimes to stop revenue leakage and there is a high cost of enforcement and tax collection associated with money laundering investigations. South Africa has a low prosecution rate under its main anti‐money laundering legislation, which is a clear indication that money laundering and organised and related crime, are not effectively dealt with. Under South African law, tax evasion is a predicate offence to money laundering and it is proposed that it is possible to deal effectively with aspects of money laundering through tax legislation, treaties and by means of tax audits.

This paper explores the differences between money laundering and tax evasion whilst highlighting the linkages to each other. An analysis of court cases and statutes, tax policy, audit techniques and international agreements shows how tax tools can be used to address money laundering.

From the research it is evident that the success of both money laundering and tax evasion, though they are operationally quite distinct processes, depends on the ability to hide the financial trail of the income. In this context it is shown that tax tools can be used effectively to uncover money laundering and to pursue revenue due to the fiscus. The ability of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to detect financial crimes and to combat tax evasion may have a meaningful impact on reducing flows of laundered funds.

This paper serves to expand on the limited scholarship of the nexus between tax crime and money laundering and points out mechanisms that can be used where the anti‐money laundering regime is not functioning optimally.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the corporate social responsibility (CSR) law will help combat money laundering in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The paper will first focus on examining whether money laundering and CSR are compatible. Such an analysis will then inform decisions on whether to include anti-money laundering in CSR disclosure requirements.

Key findings from the analysis have shown that the UAE CSR law does not explicitly mention money laundering as part of CSR disclosure requirements. Anti-money laundering (AML) and CSR are compatible and convergence, but money laundering is not yet an integral element of CSR disclosure requirements.

There are no clear mechanisms or provisions under the UAE CSR law on how money laundering can be included in CSR disclosure requirements, whether voluntary or mandatory. A pressing challenge now is whether the UAE should regulate AML/combatting the financing of terrorism disclosures under the CSR law. The main concern is that such a move could make mandatory disclosure another technical and regulatory requirement that UAE business must comply, which will be inimical to fostering a strong CSR culture.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether Internet‐based services, used by those individuals or organisations seeking to launder monies derived from illegal sources, will pose a greater risk to financial institutions than more traditional financial services. The use of the financial services sector by criminals seeking to ‘launder’ money has become a business risk that financial institutions cannot ignore, with governments and regulators increasing the legislation and regulation designed to prevent money laundering. Financial institutions have both a moral and a legal obligation to assist in preventing criminals from obtaining benefits from their activities. Simultaneously, the development of Internet‐based financial services continues at a rapid pace, with new technologies such as Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)‐enabled telephones and interactive televisions empowering customers, allowing them the flexibility to carry out transactions without the direct involvement of the institution.

In accordance with the literature on money laundering, policymakers and researchers often use a model which distinguishes three successive stages: placement, layering and integration. But how well does this model compare to actual investigations of money laundering in relation to large-scale drug trafficking?

The basis is formed by data collected in 2012 for that year’s crime pattern analysis (CPA) for money laundering and cocaine trafficking. In all, 46 structured interviews were conducted. These interviews mostly centred around money laundering, involving the proceeds of drugs crime. As a result of the interviews, the dossiers from 16 criminal investigations were also obtained for further analysis.

Comparing the three-phase model with Dutch investigations on drug trafficking, three observations can be made. First of all, cash plays a larger role than the theoretical model would suggest. Second, the proceeds of crime are often moved abroad, circumventing the legal financial system. And third, money laundering often occurs in much simpler forms than the theory would lead one to suspect.

The sources mainly involve criminal investigations into organized drug trafficking. Investigations involving white collar crime and fraud will probably generate different outcomes. Another caveat is that the situation in other countries may differ from the picture that emerges from the Dutch data.

Combating money laundering is sometimes a job for specialists, but many forms (involving cash and moving money around) can easily be left to ordinary investigative officers with no financial background. Money laundering therefore needs to be demystified to broaden the opportunities for investigating analyzing and researching money laundering. Furthermore, it is not always practical to depend on Financial Intelligence Unit’s information to start an investigation or to evaluate anti-money laundering efficiency.

The literature on money laundering often centres around judicial system, legal issues and theoretical solutions. Empirical data is hard to come by. This article uses information from actual investigations to illustrate aspects of money laundering that can be overlooked.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, the paper will map Belgian compliance officers' practices and challenges, and second, it makes an attempt to assess the effectiveness of their input in the anti‐money laundering (AML) chain in Belgium: what are actual results of the fight against money laundering?

The research starts from a criminological point of view, studying the preventive AML‐policy by focusing on the compliance function in banks. In order to study this preventive approach more concretely, a survey was sent to Belgian compliance officers, asking about their practices. Second, the available statistics on 13 years of AML in Belgium were studied.

The function of compliance officer implies a number of challenges or “growing pains”; problematic access to information, lack of feedback from the authorities, limited investigative means. Furthermore, although the investments of private organisations in AML have been substantial, the outcome of the AML chain seems modest.

This paper reflects the first phase of an on‐going research (2006‐2009). The results presented here are therefore preliminary.

Belgium implemented a regulatory framework in 2001, obliging the installment of a compliance function within banks. The value of this research lies in the fact that this booming professional group has never been subject of research before, even though they play a crucial role in AML in particular and crime fighting in general. It is therefore of great importance to study compliance officers' views, practices, and opinions in order to get a grip on this new type of “policing”.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent of anti-Money laundering (AML) disclosures in the annual reports and websites by differentiating between UAE Islamic and conventional banks, and examine the effect of AML disclosure on UAE bank’s performance.

This study uses content analysis to explore the extent of AML disclosure in the annual reports and the dynamic panel data two-step robust system to study the impact of the AML disclosures on banking performance.

The findings show that AML disclosure is at a low level for all UAE banks, conventional and Islamic banks. The results also show that the degree of AML disclosure on the websites of the banks is higher than that in the annual reports.

The sample for this study comes only from banks traded on UAE markets. Thus, the results may not be generalizable to banks traded on other financial markets.

Because of the cross-border character of the money laundry practices, our study suggests the UAE central bank to internationalize the AML regulations and develop an international AML regime as efforts to respond to the international development of the money laundry practices.

This is the first study that develops an index to measure the AML disclosure and contributes significantly in providing greater insight in respect to AML disclosure in banking industry within the emerging markets.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the broader characteristics of Pakistan’s public policies reflect Islamic law, how the financial crime rate has been affected by policy rules, and if the policies do indeed reflect Islamic law, how do they help the process?

It is a qualitative exploratory study where structured interviews have been conducted with experts and practitioners in Islamic Ideological Council and Parliament.

The findings constitute a threadbare discussion of financial crimes which policy takes into account under Islamic law; along with the relevant ramifications and recommendations.

It is suggested that the laws of Pakistan be studied taking Shariah density into consideration. Future research can focus on implementation of laws and policies as a factor improving governance.

This study is pertinent because financial crimes in light of Islamic law and public policy are not discussed in detail in previous research.

Conventional international business (IB) theories generally view multinational corporations (MNCs) as agents of economic exchange and as ethically benign or neutral. This article explores a darker side of IB, with numbers of IB firms involved in activities that could be considered unethical or illegal, or both. Drawing on a taxonomy of ‘black international business’ (black IB), and both historic and recent examples, this article outlines such MNC activities. It explores impacts of these activities on stakeholders, including nation-states, businesses and individuals. The authors call for academics within the field of organizational studies to create awareness and understanding of such activities.

The purpose of this paper, which is a part of a PhD thesis, is to detect problems associated with the risk‐based approach to anti‐money laundering (AML), as well as present ways to improve the risk‐based approach.

The method is law and economics. The PhD thesis itself is also based on a comparative analysis of the Danish and British AML regimes.

The main findings are: failure to develop adequate risk‐based AML systems, taking into account varying levels of money laundering risk, is not only to be considered in the context of legal risk but also and more importantly in the context of integrity risk; anti‐money laundering (AML) has to be made part of financial and non‐financial institutions' corporate social responsibility policies; the Risk Analysis Manual provided by the Central Bank of The Netherlands lists very specific and comprehensive assessment criteria for a broad range of risks facing financial institutions. This manual could be considered by international bodies and individual financial institutions in informing their risk control; due to their intelligence access, cross‐national agreements of cooperation and exchange of information and contacts to multiple stakeholders, financial intelligence units are better placed in educating financial institutions on AML matters by means of regular typology publications and other guidance based on SARs and other intelligence; and AML considerations should be incorporated in other areas of law, such as immigration law concerning wealthy individuals, if the AML regime is to achieve its intended impact.

The paper highlights how the AML regime in general and the risk‐based approach in particular could be improved so as to meet concerns of both regulatory authorities and regulated entities.