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This chapter examines the role of phrónēsis in the context of research ethics, noting how it is often contrasted with the proceduralist approach associated with ethical regulation. The meaning of the term in the writings of Aristotle is outlined. This is followed by an examination of some of the ways in which the concept has been applied more recently, for example in relation to professionalism and professional ethics. Here, it is often combined with similar ideas, such as Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowing. These more recent applications of the concept involve some deviation from the original sense of the term, but it is argued that there are good reasons for this, arising from changes in prevailing values and social conditions since the time of Aristotle. Furthermore, there are complexities with which he did not deal, notably the Machiavellian idea that in some circumstances unethical actions may be necessary to achieve desirable goals. The chapter ends by considering whether phrónēsis always leads to good ethical judgements. This seems to be true by definition on Aristotle’s formulation, but he assumes a greater degree of harmony amongst virtues or values than seems to be the case. And this is a particular problem in the case of social research, since its goal is in dispute.

This paper aims to propose to rehabilitate prâxis and revive possibilities of practical wisdom (phrónêsis) and a reinterpret excellence as an ethically committed way for responsible and sustainable form of living, while operating in the midst of a systematically constrained world of neoliberal regimes.

Based on a literature review, this essay first presents some basic understandings of prâxis, practices and its architecture as well as phrónêsis and its interconnection. Further, possibilities for integrating excellence in prâxis and success in poiêtic practice are suggested in form of a critical poiêtic phrónêsis, and some implications are outlined in conclusions.

Considering the systemic constrains of contemporary neoliberal regimes, this paper has shown the significance of a reviving the inter-relational nexus between prâxis, embodied practices, phrónêsis and sustainable action. An integral holonic approach of constrained prâxis was discussed, by which the macro-level is holonically connected to meso-level of likewise constrained practices to micro-level of action and vice versa. In particular, constrained excellence-oriented practical wisdom was connected with constraining result- and success- poiesis in a critical poietic phrónêsis and creative actions in inter-practices as part of inter-prâxis discussed.

The paper is a meta-reflective paper and view point, but links to “prâxis-related research” are offered.

Some practical and political implications are provided.

Some links to social and societal implications are discussed.

The proposed integration of prâxis, embodied practices, sustainable actions and practical wisdom for organisation and in relation to society is genuine and critical. It is orginal in that it provides possibilities to re-assess, re-vive and further investigate the relevance of embodied forms of an integral prâxis, practicing, phronesis and action in and through organizations as well as stakeholder towards a flourishing unfoldment.

The aim of this paper is to explore how virtue ethics might inform our understanding about what constitutes “good” practice in forensic accounting. In particular, the paper explores the concept of phronesis (or practical wisdom) as a basis for guiding the application of professional judgement in forensic accounting practice.

The paper draws on a review of relevant literature.

Prior literature has identified a number of technical and personal characteristics and attributes that are desirable in forensic accounting practitioners. Although being ethical is identified as an important characteristic, the question of what constitutes a “good” forensic accountant has not hitherto been investigated. Because of the profession’s multi-disciplinary and highly technical nature, forensic accountants are significantly at risk of conflating ethics with compliance with the law. The paper suggests that an understanding of virtue ethics and especially the virtue of “phronesis” or practical wisdom will help forensic accountants maintain public confidence and quality in their services and provide practical guidance on the exercise of professional judgement.

The paper suggests that the primacy currently given in forensic accounting literature and practice to a commercial logic, technical competencies and legal compliance risks damaging the professional standing of forensic accountants and, over time, reduces the ability of forensic accountants to exercise professional judgement in complex unstructured situations. Virtue ethics can act as a useful counter point to these threats.

A recognition of the need for the forensic accounting profession to collectively develop phronesis would re-establish the primacy of the profession’s public interest logic and maintain public trust and quality in forensic accounting services.

There appears to be no prior literature in forensic accounting which explores the application of virtue ethics in this field. In addition, although virtue ethics has been the subject of some prior papers in accounting per se, the importance of phronesis as a basis for understanding the nature and application of professional judgement has not been addressed.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how discursive practices are involved in organizational change.

This research scrutinizes organizational change by combining discourse and practice approaches. A case study at a public university hospital is conducted with a narrative analysis method.

The key finding of this research is that discursive practices are involved in organizational change through discourse phronesis. Discourse phronesis is a socially and contextually developed phenomenon, and hence discursive practices are particular within context. The case study revealed four particular discursive practices as examples of discourse phronesis: field practices, mandate practices, priority practices and word practices.

The results of this research advance awareness of the concealed power within discursive practices and, more importantly, invite practitioners to pursue the intellectual virtue of discourse phronesis while implementing organizational change. Discourse phronesis may be utilized as a gateway to advance change goals and to translate various discourses and actions that otherwise might remain unexplained.

Although extensively studied, organizational change has not previously been directly approached through discourse phronesis, and by doing so this empirical research provides novelty value to both organizational change research and discourse analysis. By introducing the concept of discourse phronesis, this research offers scholars an alternative lens, the intellectual practicality lens, through which to approach organizational change and perhaps to develop new understandings of the great challenges that organizational change complexities usually generate.

This paper aims to stress the importance of practical wisdom (phronesis) for the knowledge management field. It is a relevant intellectual and ethical resource for responding to recent changes in the business environment and for responsibly and sustainably aligning organizations for the future. Organizations must find ways to reconcile social, environmental and economic goals and meet different and conflicting stakeholder needs. To this end, the authors challenge knowledge management researchers to feature practical wisdom as an enabler for responsible knowledge management built on solid ethical foundations.

The authors introduce the concept of phronesis, reaching from Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s The Wise Company. Based on a systematic review of the literature, the authors performed a bibliometric analysis. Moreover, the authors discuss the findings and offer avenues for future research.

The results provide an overview of the research on phronesis in the knowledge management field. It points out the leading articles and journals (e.g. Journal of Business Ethics and Journal of Knowledge Management). Likewise, it identifies thematic areas, i.e. knowledge management field, knowledge dynamics, organizational wisdom, leadership and followership, corporate social responsibility and red flags.

In this essay, the authors advise practical wisdom as a promising candidate for advancing the field of knowledge management towards responsible knowledge management. To pursue this, the authors propose to address instability and continuous change through practical wisdom and outline a research agenda to guide further research.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the Student Transitions and Experiences (STEP) project, in which visual and creative research methodologies were used to enhance student engagement.

The article provides an overview of three main strands within the field of student engagement practice, and explores the STEP project as an instance of the “critical‐transformative” strand. The article draws on recent theorizations by Kemmis et al. of practice architectures and ecologies of practice to propose an understanding of the STEP project as a practice “niche”.

In thinking through some implications of student engagement as a practice architecture, the article sheds analytical light on student engagement as a specific and complex form of contemporary education practice. The later part of the article focuses on a consideration of phronesis and praxis in specific instances from the STEP project. Working with concepts from Barad, the article develops a conceptualization of the STEP project as an intra‐active, entangled situated and particularistic practice of phronesis‐praxis.

This article aims to contribute to the development of theoretical and empirical understandings of the field of student engagement. It does so by providing insights into a recent empirical study; by developing some new theorisations of student engagement; and by a detailed exploration of specific instances of student engagement practice.

This chapter questions the way virtue ethics is being drawn into debates about the ethics of social research. In particular, it suggests that discussion of virtue may be motivated by a desire to counter existing, largely principlist, approaches to the ethics of research and its associated administrative structures; virtue ethics has a prima facie appeal for those who are seemingly in need of an alternative moral philosophy. In addition, I argue that, as it stands, the complexity of virtue theory is not fully reflected in, or acknowledged by, debates about the ethics of social research. In the light of these remarks I suggest that the resources of social research can be drawn upon to generate critical theoretical insights into the ethics of social research. I discuss how a normative understanding of practices, and the concept of synderesis understood in a broadly Bourdieuan framework, could provide a starting point for such critical insights. I conclude that this perspective might be taken to suggest that the ethical stance most appropriate to the culture of social research is one of ongoing critical engagement.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an example of how applied phronesis can be used as a methodological approach in social research. The example consists of an exploration of the discourse of productivism in elderly care policy in Australia.

The research interrogates arrangements of objective facts within recent representations of the aged which render particular policy discourses rational. An analysis of selected secondary data and texts is offered to demonstrate how applied phronesis may be used to discern when objective facts are presented in particular ways to sustain useful discourses, such as productivism.

The paper demonstrates that, rather than being rational discourse, productivism employs suitable arrangements of objective facts leading to particular rationalisations, including that the elderly should be viewed as a separate “category”, that they are a burden on society and that they contribute to increasing health care costs. Alternative interpretations and arrangements of the same objective facts indicate that what is rendered as rational within the discourse of productivism may also be seen as a construct of power rather than an unavoidable and logical outcome.

Because it is intended mainly as a demonstration, this paper offers a limited application of applied phronesis.

The research is employed as a practical demonstration of the efficacy of applied phronesis in social research. At the same time, this is the first phronetic exploration of productivism in aged care policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of marketing’s philosophical conversation over the past 120 years, focusing on the emergent meaning of the notion that marketing should become more “scientific”.

This paper focuses on the US academic marketing literature, primarily journal articles and books published in the first half of the 20th century.

The Aristotelian distinction between techné, epistemé and phronesis provides a rich basis for framing philosophical discussion in marketing, and should supplant the art-science debate and Anderson’s distinction between science₁ and science₂. Prior to 1959, the marketing journals provided a forum for phronesis, though this diminished as the academic marketing community largely abandoned the inductive, contextual approach in favour of a deductive, “scientific” methodology. The Ford Foundation played an important role in effecting this change.

The paper highlights the importance of forums where practitioners can reflect on the ethical and social implications of their practices and then work to enhance these practices for the greater social good.

Questions the value of distinctions between marketing theorists and practitioners and the consequential focus of marketing journals.

Advances the concept of phronesis in the marketing literature and distinguishes it from epistemé, which has dominated academic marketing discourse over the past 60 years.

This chapter argues that there is conflict between the requirements laid down by the regimes of ethical regulation that have been introduced in many countries over the past few decades and what is required if social research is to be done well, not least in ethical terms. The reasons for the rise of ethical regulation are outlined along with the criticisms that have been made of it by social scientists. One aspect of this criticism has been an emphasis on the necessarily situational character of ethical judgement, the potential conflicts amongst values, and the ways in which ethical considerations are entwined with methodological and prudential ones. These points have often been formulated via the concept of phrónēsis (wise judgement). The meaning of this is outlined, as well as how the need for such judgement conflicts with the assumptions built into the operation of ethical regulation. It is suggested that these assumptions, as embedded in many official statements, amount to a form of moralism that is counterproductive if good research that is ethically acceptable is to be encouraged. It is argued that ethics committees should not exercise control over what research is done but ought rather to serve as forums in which researchers are forced to justify the design of proposed research studies, and to address any ethical issues arising from research that they have already carried out.