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This study aims to formulate the implementation model of Ship and Port Facility Security Policy based on ISPS Code in PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch).

The location of the study was the port area of PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch). It was because the controlling policy became the duties and responsibilities of each region in which it was the responsibility of PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch). However, because of the problem of controlling, it became a common responsibility that could be divided into other institutions such as Navy, Police, Kodim, Satpol PP and leadership apparatus ranging from local to central authorities. Data collection in this study was done by some methods, namely: interview and direct observation. This was done to provide a real and detailed picture of the implementation of Ship and Port Facility Security that is based on ISPS Code to discipline gerandong in PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch). The researcher conducted the data collection activity by compiling the document on the field.

Ship and Port Facility Security Policy of ISPS Code throughout Indonesia, including PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch), has been enacted by Ministry of Transportation since 2004 by the Decree of Minister of Transportation Number 33/2003 on the application of Amendment of SOLAS 1974 on the Ship and Port Facility Security in Indonesian territory (ISPS Code) in top-down way for good port governance that is free from any safety, health and security threats, especially gerandong because of which the implementation of ISPS Code is not working properly. The Ship and Port Facility Security Policy that is based on ISPS Code is a mandate of UN convention and the mandate of the law and order of the Minister of Transportation to conduct the port security, especially in securing the ship and port facility based on ISPS Code so that Cirebon Branch will be a world-class port. The implementation process of ship and port facility security that is based on ISPS Code in PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch) does not run optimally, especially in disciplining gerandong because of the lack of the socialization that was done to the target community groups and related makeshift.

From the results of analysis of several journals that became a reference for this study, there are at least three problems that need special attention, namely, general implementation problems (especially in developing countries), implementations that do not work because of leadership and implementation that cannot run if there is no benchmarking. The researcher is interested in analyzing the problem that has lasted almost for 10 years and has never been resolved until now. Many of the problems behind the phenomenon of gerandong occurred because of the interaction of government (civil society), civil society, Community Empowerment Institutions (LSM), Market (PT Pelindo) and certain community groups as well as the involvement of the apparatus. The most important of all that has been explained above is that in accordance with the feasibility of study (FS), the environmental impacts of the Development Main Plan (RIP) of Cirebon Port and its social impact analysis on the community has not been discussed. Therefore, the FS is expected to be complete and to become plenary and be more feasible to be accepted with this gerandong study.

The Black Sea region has become as an important energy transit route for Caspian and Russian oil and natural gas to western markets. Since 1996 the quantity of oil exported from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits and the number of transiting tankers has doubled and will continue to expand. However, these are also two waterways where the risk of either an accidental or intentional disaster is significant bringing serious repercussions for energy supply security. This paper will analyze measures taken by Black Sea coastal States to provide for secure ports and shipping against accidental and intentional disasters. The paper will examine the role of technology, such as satellite based VTS providers in the Black Sea, implementation of the ISPS Code, the role of the relatively new BlackSeaFor in providing both port and navigational security. The paper will further make recommendations for further improvements for enhancement of security emergency response planning. In addition, the paper will examine current security measures taken by the Turkish Administration for oil transportation through the Turkish Straits.

At the substantive level, there exists a gap in knowledge about the position of security risk management (i.e. SRM) during the terminals’ operations and management; particularly when there is potential for deliberate anti-security acts. Correspondingly, the purpose of this paper is a need for more practical research to find out the justification for the existence of the SRM and different techniques for its appropriate execution on these logistics infrastructures principally with due regard to the potential requirements in the near future.

Both qualitative and quantitative techniques are used in this study incorporating fuzzy set theory and risk assessment matrix to achieve the research objective.

A designed SRM framework tailored for Qalhat liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) terminal in Sultanate of Oman was established to manage the security threats which can be resulted from any probable terrorist attacks.

The limited numbers of experts for the purpose of the addressed SRM are causing challenges in data collection.

The pressures for enhanced attention to critical infrastructure security have fostered new challenges for petrochemical seaports and terminals (PSTs). These tendencies dictate to maintain comprehensive security regimens that can be integrated with national and international strategies to support the country’s security against terrorism.

The development of the security risk factor table model in the case of Qalhat LNG Terminal.

Despite a hangover from the worldwide economic crisis, international trade rebounded nicely with a record-level growth in late 2010. A sharp rise in international trade has sparked the international traffic growth. A majority of this traffic growth originated from maritime logistics which could move cargoes in large volume and at cheaper freight costs. Due to its cost-efficiency and easy access, maritime logistics typically accounts for more than half of the worldwide freight volume. However, maritime logistics poses a greater supply chain risk, since ocean carriers used for maritime logistics are more vulnerable to unpredictable weather conditions, piracy attacks, terrorist hijacking, and cargo damages on the open sea than any other modes of transportation. Also, given the vast areas that maritime logistics covers, it is more difficult to protect maritime logistics activities from potential hazards and threats.

To better protect maritime logistics activities from potential security lapses, this chapter introduces and develops a variety of systematic security measures and tools that were successfully used by best-in-class companies and government entities across the world. Also, this chapter proposes a total maritime security management model as a way to formulate maritime risk mitigation strategies. To elaborate, this chapter sheds light on the roots of maritime security measures and tools, the ways that those measures and tools are best utilized, the roles of advanced information technology in maritime security from the global supply chain perspectives, the visualization and identification of potential maritime and its related supply chain risks, and policy guidelines that will help enhance maritime security.

The purpose of this paper is to show the link between human error and marine accidents.

The authors carried out field research and also used empirical evidence.

Until 1998, the human side has been neglected, for centuries, in favor of the technical side. Even after 1998 improper focus did not eliminate marine accidents.

Lack of data between human error and marine accidents.

The paper is addressed to the maritime community and its safety administration in the EU and IMO, to eliminate human error.

There is potential for reduction of human injuries, deaths and marine pollution.

The paper is of value as no prior research, in depth, has been done to see what is behind the standard etiquette “human error” in marine accidents.

The purpose of this paper is to inform readers comprehensively and sufficiently about the marine accident of MV Samina Express with 80+2 dead in the Aegean Sea in September 2000.

The paper uses analysis of court and experts as well as published papers on the accident using nonlinear management techniques.

When dialogue and communications in shipping companies fail then accidents to vessels result.

There was difficult access to court material and limited information on actual causes and the action of payers.

Open communications can aid in finding the cause of accidents.

The paper reveals the causes of accident due to human errors in a clear way; it outlines the responsibility of the captain as manager of the ship; and shows where and why the dialogue and communication fails.

Organizations, would they be individual companies or large multi-firm networks, face a wide variety of potential risks requiring dedicated keen management. It all the better applies to supply-chains as risk, related to both physical and information flows, pervades the whole logistics network and has acquired a new and growing security dimension since 9/11. More specifically, as they are now under the permanent threat of terrorism, and because offering sufficient security levels is bound to become a necessary condition for global supply-chain membership, seaports need to adjust their risk management strategy and processes accordingly. In such a context, this paper aims at describing the project of a decision-support system, dedicated to container transit security-wise decision making and which features an expert-system architecture.

Port performance and port choice have been treated as separate streams of research. This hampers the efforts of ports to anticipate on and respond to possible future changes in port choice by shippers, freight forwarders and carriers. The purpose of this paper is to develop and demonstrate a port performance measurement methodology, extended from the perspective of port choice, which includes hinterland performance and a weighting of attributes from a port choice perspective.

A review of literature is used to extend the scope of port performance indicators. Multi-criteria decision analysis is used to operationalize the context of port choice, presenting a weighted approach using the Best-Worst Method (BWM). An empirical model is built based on an extensive port stakeholder survey.

Transport costs and times along the transport chain are the dominant factors for port competitiveness. Satisfaction, reputation and flexibility criteria are the other important decision criteria. The results also show how the availability of different modal alternatives impact on the position of a port. A ranking of routes for hinterland regions is done.

The paper focuses on two extensions of port performance measurement. So far, not all factors that determine port choice have been included in port performance studies. Here, first, factors related to hinterland services are included. Second, a weighting of port performance measures is proposed. The importance of factors is assessed using BWM. The approach is demonstrated empirically for a case of the European contestable hinterland regions, which so far have lacked quantitative analysis.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.