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The purpose of this paper is to show the link between human error and marine accidents.

The authors carried out field research and also used empirical evidence.

Until 1998, the human side has been neglected, for centuries, in favor of the technical side. Even after 1998 improper focus did not eliminate marine accidents.

Lack of data between human error and marine accidents.

The paper is addressed to the maritime community and its safety administration in the EU and IMO, to eliminate human error.

There is potential for reduction of human injuries, deaths and marine pollution.

The paper is of value as no prior research, in depth, has been done to see what is behind the standard etiquette “human error” in marine accidents.

The scientific world has for a long time worked with linear tools to explain complex non‐linear phenomena. Also non‐linear relationships were transformed to linear in order to be handled. This was so despite the fact that nature has been giving us examples showing that the real world was complex, dynamic and non‐linear. This was so until developments in computer science provided the calculating means to the theory of complexity. Today, the theory of complexity is applied to many sciences and to disaster management as well. The application of complexity theory is attempted from a disaster management point of view. As the first attempt to incorporate management science into marine disaster prevention was the so‐called International Safety Management Code of the International Maritime Organization in 1998, we will attempt to connect the theory of complexity to the ISM code. The ISM code, being a safety standard, has been based on good management and organization rulesl. However, ISM code was accused of increasing the bureaucracy of the system with a result that no substance work could be done at the end. Moreover, a need has now emerged, i.e. to establish a “particular ISM code man” among the crewmen on board all ships. On the other hand, modern complexity management suggests more flat hierarchies where information travels faster, and this is something needed in a marine disaster.

Following the marine accident of Erika off the French coast in 1999 shipping administration (and especially the European Union) – in its familiar reactive way – is ready to legislate against tankers of more than 15 years of age, against negligent classification societies and against single‐hull tankers. The positive fact is the initiative of the European Parliament and the Council to set up a community framework for cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution. Moreover, the EU fears that all sub‐standard tankers will eventually be banned from the USA – due to the gradual enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 – and will come to European waters to continue their polluting habits. So, Europe is about to legislate its own Oil Pollution Act, on even stricter terms than the USA. Provides a survey of the issues involved by setting down the correct – in the author’s opinion – facts about marine accidents, the misunderstanding of which has negated the effectiveness of all measures taken so far against marine accidents.

This paper aims to investigate the marine vehicle accident characteristics in the inland waterways of Bangladesh, with particular emphasis on collision type accidents.

Accident data were collected from different sources such as the daily newspapers, reports of Department of Shipping (DOS) and Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA). The accidents are analysed according to different variables such as vehicle type, time distribution, spatial distribution, weather condition, nature of casualties, and others.

The study revealed that the leading causes of accidents were collision between ships, trawlers and country boats and loss of stability due to Nor'wester (a seasonal storm that appears from the north and western directions). Of the accidents, 80 per cent involve cargo vehicles hitting other vehicles. Collisions have increased dramatically over the last decade and the number of fatalities has increased significantly.

Many accidents in Bangladesh often remain under‐reported owing to limited exposure to the media, which is probably because the victims represent the poorer segment of society. This under‐reporting appears to be a major barrier for accident analysis and prevention.

The paper provides an explicit idea on the characteristics of accidents, so that the problem can be easily comprehended and necessary action can be taken by different stakeholders, such as operators, law enforcement agencies, designers, users and others concerned in order to come up with a coordinated action plan to stop these severe incidents.

The purpose of this paper is to inform readers comprehensively and sufficiently about the marine accident of MV Samina Express with 80+2 dead in the Aegean Sea in September 2000.

The paper uses analysis of court and experts as well as published papers on the accident using nonlinear management techniques.

When dialogue and communications in shipping companies fail then accidents to vessels result.

There was difficult access to court material and limited information on actual causes and the action of payers.

Open communications can aid in finding the cause of accidents.

The paper reveals the causes of accident due to human errors in a clear way; it outlines the responsibility of the captain as manager of the ship; and shows where and why the dialogue and communication fails.

A primitive form of marine insurance existed in very early times in what are known as contracts of bottomry or respondentia. This was an arrangement by which the owners of ships borrowed money at a high rate of interest and did not repay the loan if the ship was lost. This was also extended to other property, so that a rudimentary form of burglary insurance can be traced in the distant past. Loans of this kind were transacted in ancient Babylon, as is shown in the Code of Hammurabi, c. 2025 B.C. Contracts of bottomry were prohibited by a decree of Pope Gregory IX in 1234 on the grounds that they were usurious, and some authorities think that it was at this point that insurance in its true sense developed. In 1310 there existed at Bruges a ‘Chamber of Assurances’ for the insurance of merchandise against marine and other risks.

This research aims to deal with the analysis of the concept of balance scorecard (BSC) integrated maritime process management in a marine course.

Several research studies found that managers lacked a basic understanding of a BSC approach to evaluate a maritime course. This paper analyzes the theoretical and practical approach of strategic BSC tool, analyzing the risks and threats regarding marine accidents.

The conclusion is that the BSC can be applied as a maritime process management to course design. Students were assigned a BSC project in a foundational course and completed a survey to establish if the BSC enhanced their knowledge and understanding of maritime process within a maritime safety process.

Future research would be advised to include a more geographically and randomly selected maritime accident sample.

Based on the application of BSC, it was concluded that a better understanding of how maritime safety process management operates holistically was attained.

This research sheds light on a phase of the maritime safety process that has been neglected so far in the maritime education training and generates insights for maritime industry how they can formalize this process and how they can deal with it more systematically.

Examines measures taken within the European Union framework in order to keep high standards of safety in maritime and air transport. Looks first at maritime transport and ways in which vessels are monitored, minimum safety requirements, the carriage of dangerous goods, pollution, port control, inspectors and their rights, ferry safety and oil tankers. Considers also navigational equipment, transfer of ownership, safe sea policy and the training of seafarers. Addresses similar aviation control including a single aviation market, air traffic control, technical requirements, congestion, accident procedures and liabilities. Suggests that despite the many rules, there is a lack of compliance, detection and enoforcement.

In the USA, the cruise industry has generated more than $42bn in total economic activities, involving over 356,000 jobs. The largest and most aggressive operator is acknowledged as Carnival Cruise Line (CCL), with a 48.3 per cent market share including all subsidiary companies in 2013. CCL has had a strong track record of reliability and high quality; however, within the past decade, there have been several deviations from standard daily procedure that have altered the way CCL does business. When trying to interpret changes in company performance, it is important to include other factors that may have contributed to changes at the time of any given deviation.

The authors use time series empirical mode decomposition to visualize whether there are short- or long-term shocks to company performance in the wake of deviating events. Besides, a thorough analysis is carried out with multivariable linear regression to identify the factors that really impact CCL’s performance.

This case study shows the seasonal patterns of weather issues with the largest number of hurricanes and tropical storms taking place during the third quarter of each year.

Empirical results will enhance understanding of the industry with regard to such events. It will provide shareholders information and opinions to enhance their decision-making processes.