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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of demand information sharing on products’ greening levels with downstream competition. Specifically, this study examine two types of green products, “development-intensive” (DI) and “marginal-cost intensive” (MI), in a two-echelon supply chain where the manufacturer produces substitutable products, and competing retailers operate in a market with uncertain demand.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game-theoretic framework and consider a multistage game. This study consider how retailers receive private signals about uncertain demand and decide whether to share this information with the manufacturer, who then decides whether to acquire this information at a certain given cost. This paper considers backward induction and Bayesian Nash equilibrium to solve the model.

The authors find that in the absence of competition, information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under DI, whereas no-information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under MI, an increase in downstream competition drives higher investment in greening efforts by the manufacturer in both DI and MI and the manufacturer needs to offer a payment to the retailers to obtain demand information under both simultaneous and sequential contract schemes.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the nature of products (margin intensive green product or development intensive green product) influences green supply chain decisions under information asymmetry and downstream competition.

Despite the stimulation provided by market demand and green issues on business performance, the exact nature of the relationships among these aspects remains an issue of contention. This study sought to bridge this gap in the research by examining the effects of market demand on firm performance using green innovation and environmental performance as mediators. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The Taiwanese hybrid vehicle industry was targeted as the scope of research. Using random sampling method, survey questionnaires were distributed to retailers, wholesalers, and component sale firms in the industry through post and e-mails. AMOS 5.0 and the structural equation modeling (SEM) were used to test the hypotheses and the theoretical model.

Except for the impact of market demand on environmental performance, all relationships were found to be significant. The mediating effect of green innovation which was proven to be significant, while that of environmental performance remained insufficient.

This study has a number of limitations. The use of figures from a single industry partly restricts the generalizability of these findings.

These results suggest that firms should make greater efforts to understand customer needs and promote core competencies in the innovation of green products and processes to align green initiatives with consumer values in order to satisfy market demand and ensure sustainable performance.

This study has important implications for the hybrid vehicle industry in particular and all businesses in general. The results provide guidelines for the enhancement of business performance. Based on the significant impact of market demand on green innovation, this study strongly recommends that firms make greater efforts to understand customer needs and expectations.

This study was the first to establish a model for investigating the links among market demand, green innovation, environmental performance, and firm performance in the Taiwanese hybrid vehicle industry. The findings provide effective guidelines for the achievement of market leadership and sustainable performance.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote demand when considering consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This research investigates a dyadic green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Four Stackelberg game models with a cost-sharing contract or a wholesale-price contract are built in retailer-led and manufacturer-led scenarios, respectively. Using backward induction, the optimal green decision under each model is obtained. In addition, the optimal cooperative contract is proposed by comparing these four models.

It is found that under consumer reference price effect, a cost-sharing contract outperforms a wholesale-price contract in upgrading product greenness and promoting demand. Under any single contract, the retailer-led situation is more conducive to improving product greenness than the manufacturer-led situation. Moreover, consumer reference price effect would reduce the sharing ratio of a cost-sharing contract when the manufacturer dominates, but it could mitigate the problem of double marginalization by reducing wholesale and retail prices under both types of contracts, which would enhance consumer surplus.

It is a new attempt to incorporate consumer reference price effect and power structure into a green supply chain framework and proposes a novel demand function that simultaneously emphasizes consumer reference price effect, consumer environmental awareness and product green attribute. In addition, it provides managerial insights for business managers to choose green cooperative contracts with consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the information sharing of the dynamic demand on green technology innovation and profits in supply chain from a long-term perspective.

The authors consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer has access to the information of dynamic demand of the green product, whereas the manufacturer invests in green technology innovation. Differential game theory is adopted to establish three models under three different scenarios, namely (1) decentralized decision without information sharing of dynamic demand (Model N-D), (2) decentralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-D) and (3) centralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-C).

The optimal equilibrium results show that information sharing of dynamic demand can improve the green technology innovation level and increase the green technology stocks only in centralized supply chain. In the long term, the information sharing of dynamic demand can make the retailer more profitable. If the influence of green technology innovation on green technology stocks is great enough or the cost coefficient of green technology innovation is small enough, the manufacturer and decentralized supply chain can benefit from information sharing. In centralized supply chain, the value of demand information sharing is greater than that of decentralized supply chain.

The authors used game theory to investigate demand information sharing and the green technology innovation in a supply chain. Specially, the demand information is dynamic, which is a variable that changes over time. Moreover, our research is based on a long-term perspective. Thus, differential game is adopted in this paper.

It is necessary to implement green supply chains. But green development needs to be gradual and coexist with ordinary products in the market. This paper aims to study the green and ordinary product pricing and green decision-making under chain-to-chain competition.

This paper considers consumers' multiple preferences and takes two competitive supply chains with asymmetric channels as the research object. Through the construction of the game models involving different competitive situations, this paper studies the pricing, green decision-making and the supply chains' profits, and discusses the impact of consumer green preference, channel preference, green investment and competition on the decision-making and performance. Finally, this paper further studies the impact of the decision structure on the environmental and economic benefits of supply chains.

The results show that consumer green preference has an incentive effect on the green supply chain and also provides an opportunity for the regular supply chain to increase revenue. Specifically, consumers' preference for green online channels improves the product greenness, but its impact on the green retailer and regular supply chain depends on the green investment cost. Moreover, competition not only fosters product sustainability, but also improves supply chain performance. This paper also points out that the decentralization of the regular supply chain is conducive to the environmental attributes of the green product, while the environment-friendly structure of the green supply chain is different under different conditions. In addition, the profit of a supply chain under centralized decision is not always higher than that under decentralized decision.

The novelty of this paper is that it investigates the pricing of two heterogeneous alternative products and green decision-making for the green product under the competition between two supply chains with asymmetric channels, in which the green supply chain adopts dual channels and the regular supply chain adopts a single retail channel.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

The aim of this study is to examine the influence of consumer preferences for overseas green products and the implementation of blockchain technology on the performance of a supply chain, which comprises an overseas manufacturer and a domestic e-commerce platform. This research endeavors to identify the optimal pricing decisions and strategies for both the manufacturer and the platform in the context of the expanding e-commerce and globalization of the economy.

The authors propose and analyze four distinct models based on the selection of selling contracts by the manufacturer and the adoption strategy of blockchain by the platform, using game theory to obtain the optimal solutions for these models.

The authors show that consumer migration promotes the manufacturer's green inputs, while the expansion of green consumer proportion is not conducive to it. They also show that blockchain technology has the potential to effectively limit manufacturer cannibalization. Interestingly, the study reveals a cascading effect of advantage where the manufacturer's profit variation trend changes only with the integration of pricing power advantage and blockchain technology inputs. This effect suggests that the equilibrium strategy is achievable under the agency contract with blockchain adoption, while Pareto improvement can be obtained with blockchain technology under both selling contracts.

This research could be extended in several possible directions. First, future work could explore outsourcing strategies for overseas manufacturers. Second, more types of consumer heterogeneity and different risk preferences could be considered. Third, this study can be extended by further exploring the design of mechanisms under asymmetric demand information to make the model more realistic.

The authors examine the impact of market segmentation and consumer preferences on green supply chain decisions, and analyze supply chain members' strategic choices for selling contracts and blockchain adoptions. The research also sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of green supply chain development and blockchain applications.

This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different government subsidy policies.

The authors establish a model consisting of a government, a set of heterogeneous consumers and a manufacturer. Three government subsidy policies are investigated without government subsidy (NS), government subsidy to consumer (CS) and government subsidy to the manufacturer (MS).

The results show that the government subsidy can increase both the green product’s demand and the manufacturer’s profit. The subsidy level and government’s utility under the CS policy are equal to those under the MS policy. Furthermore, if the government’s subsidy level is exogenous, there exists a Pareto improvement region when social welfare for unit greenness level is high. That is, if the government’s subsidy level under the CS policy is higher than that under the MS policy, both government and manufacturer prefer the CS policy; otherwise, they prefer the MS policy.

This paper considers the market where there is a monopoly green manufacturer and a government that only provides subsidy policy. In fact, competition from traditional manufacturers and carbon taxes are also worth exploring in future research.

This study provides some suggestions for government subsidy and provides guidance for the manufacturer’s pricing decisions under different government subsidy policies.

This paper is the first to compare government subsidy to consumer with a government subsidy to the manufacturer and investigate the pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously by considering an endogenous subsidy level of government.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the operation strategies of a manufacturer who produces brown and green product simultaneously.

The authors establish three models to examine the joint decisions of pricing and advertising. Three advertising strategies are: non-advertising investment (NA), advertising investment for brown product (BA) and advertising investment for green product (GA).

The theoretical analysis shows that advertising investment can substantially increase the product greening level and manufacturer's profit. More importantly, we find that the GA strategy is more likely to be the best strategy as the advertising investment efficiency increases. The BA strategy is more likely to be preferred as the R&D cost increases. Finally, the modeling results are verified by numerical experiments, and more insights are obtained.

This paper considers the case in which a single manufacturer produces the brown and green product simultaneously. In fact, many manufacturers in the market produce brown and green product at the same time. Furthermore, in addition to advertising investment for brown product and green product, manufacturers can also invest in advertising for brands.

The paper contributes to the investigations on green production and advertising decisions of a manufacturer who produces brown and green products simultaneously.