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Article
Publication date: 26 October 2012

Jing Chen

Contracting is an important issue in supply chain management. In this paper, the authors aim to discuss and compare the manufacturer's contracting options when the retailer faces…

Abstract

Purpose

Contracting is an important issue in supply chain management. In this paper, the authors aim to discuss and compare the manufacturer's contracting options when the retailer faces a traditional newsvendor problem with a fixed retail price: a wholesale price only contract, a wholesale price discount contract, a returns policy contract, and a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract. The paper also aims to examine how these contracting options affect decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, as well as the supply chain efficiency.

Design/methodology/approach

Models are developed based on the manufacturer's four contracting options. The manufacturer's optimal wholesale prices have been obtained. The ordering decisions of the retailer are discussed in each of the manufacturer's four contracting options. The paper also uses numerical examples to illustrate the author's managerial insights and results.

Findings

As compared to the wholesale price only contract, it is found that implementing a wholesale price discount policy effectively encourages the retailer to order more product and enhances the retailer's profit at the expense of lowering the manufacturer's profit. It is also found that when the manufacturer offers a returns policy and if this policy cannot enhance the retailer's profit, a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract can lead to a win‐win situation for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

Originality/value

The research provides managerial insights on how different contracts affect decisions and efficiency of the supply chain.

Article
Publication date: 31 March 2022

Gao Yuwei, Yuan Chen, Yangguang Zhu and Shaofu Du

The purpose of this paper is to examine how customers’ self-control affects their purchase decisions and to discuss the pricing decisions of the retailer under different forms of…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine how customers’ self-control affects their purchase decisions and to discuss the pricing decisions of the retailer under different forms of contract.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use the literature on hyperbolic discounting to model customers’ self-control problems. In this framework, the authors examine how the customers’ self-control affects the optimal pricing decision and the selection of the optimal contract form when there is a supplier and a retailer in the supply chain.

Findings

The study’s results show that when wholesale price contract is compared with buyback contract, buyback contract is better when customers’ self-control is weak; when quantity-discount contract is compared with wholesale price contract and buyback contract, although quantity discount can encourage customers to purchase more units of products, but both wholesale price contract and buyback contract can be better than quantity-discount contract in some cases. Additionally, the authors demonstrate that revenue sharing contract can increase the supply chain’s profit. The authors also find that sometimes customers’ preplan will lead to the result that the supplier produces more unhealthy products.

Originality/value

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the decision-making of the retailer by developing an analytical framework combining customer’s self-control and supply chain contract. These results have important implications for the supplier and the retailer that sell vice goods.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 18 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 15 December 2017

Zhenhong Li, Bo Li and Yanfei Lan

The advent of e-commerce has prompted the proliferation of digital platforms for virtual products. This reinforces the importance of the contract design problem between the…

Abstract

Purpose

The advent of e-commerce has prompted the proliferation of digital platforms for virtual products. This reinforces the importance of the contract design problem between the virtual product supplier (he) and the digital platform retailer (she). The purpose of this paper is to investigate a principal-agent problem in a virtual product supply chain, in which the retailer’s sales-effort investment level to sell the virtual product is unobservable to the supplier, and the market demand is unknown to both parties.

Design/methodology/approach

In this study, the supplier designs two kinds of contracts (wholesale price contract and two-part tariff contract) to maximize his profit, while the retailer determines her sales-effort investment level and the virtual product’s retail price. The results of two different types of contracts are compared to explore in depth the effect of contract choices on the participants’ profits.

Findings

The authors show that the comparative results of the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices and sales-effort investment levels between these two kinds of contracts all rely on the retailer’s risk-averse degree. Specifically, both the supplier and the whole supply chain prefer the two-part tariff contract rather than the wholesale price contract, the retailer should do opposite when she is low risk-averse, whereas there is no distinction for the retailer’s utilities between these two kinds of contracts when she is more risk-averse.

Originality/value

The value of the research rests on the use of principal-agent theory in the contracts of virtual products considering the retailer’s sales-effort and risk-aversion degree. The research will serve as a guide for the virtual products’ supplier and the platform retailer in decision-making processes.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 47 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 28 May 2021

Zhenning Zhu, Lingcheng Kong, Gulizhaer Aisaiti, Mingzhen Song and Zefeng Mi

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power…

Abstract

Purpose

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Findings

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

Originality/value

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 121 no. 7
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 30 October 2019

Zhenning Zhu, Lingcheng Kong, Jiaping Xie, Jing Li and Bing Cao

In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In…

Abstract

Purpose

In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In order to improve the grid-connected quantity of green power, the purpose of this paper is to design the pricing mechanism for renewable energy power generator with revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage “multi-single” electricity supply chain which contains a single dominant power retailer and two kinds of power suppliers providing different power energy species.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering the dual uncertainties of renewable energy power output and power market demand, the authors design the full-cooperative contract decision-making model, wholesale price contract decision-making model and revenue-sharing contract decision-making model to compare and optimize grid-connected pricing in order to maximize profit of different parties in power supply chain. Then, this paper performs a numerical simulation, discusses the existence of the equilibrium analytical solutions to satisfy the supply chain coordination conditions and analyzes the optimal contract parameters’ variation characteristics and their interaction relationship.

Findings

The authors find that the expected profits of the parties in the hybrid power supply chain are concave about their decision variables in each decision-making mode. The revenue-sharing contract can realize the Pareto improvement for all parties’ interest of the supply chain, and promote the grid-connected quantity of green power effectively. The grid-connected price will reduce with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and this impact will be greater on the renewable energy power. The greater the competition intensity in power supply side, the smaller the revenue-sharing ratio from power purchaser. And for the same rangeability of competition intensity, the revenue-sharing ratio reduction of thermal power is less than that of the green power. The more the government subsidizing green power supplier, the smaller the retailer sharing revenue to it.

Practical implications

Facing with the dual uncertainties of green power output and market demand and the competition of thermal power in hybrid electricity market, this study can provide a path to solve the problem of renewable energy power grid-connecting. The results can help green power become competitive in hybrid power market under loose regulations. And this paper suggests that the government subsidy policy should be more tactical in order to implement a revenue-sharing contract of the power supply chain.

Originality/value

This paper studies the renewable energy electricity grid-connected pricing under the uncertainty of power supply and market demand, and compares different contract decision-making strategies in order to achieve the power supply chain coordination. The paper also analyzes the competition between thermal power and renewable energy power in hybrid electricity market.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 119 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

Book part
Publication date: 12 April 2012

Chanaka Edirisinghe, Bogdan Bichescu and Xinjie Shi

In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, a properly designed contract can lead to supply chain coordination. In this chapter, we model the selection of…

Abstract

In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, a properly designed contract can lead to supply chain coordination. In this chapter, we model the selection of an appropriate coordinating contract from a menu of contracts including wholesale price, buyback, and markdown money, while allowing both the supplier and the retailer to assume the roles of Stackelberg leader and/or supply chain captain. This work extends previous literature that assumes that the supplier is both the Stackelberg leader and the supply chain captain. In our models, either agent can make stocking and pricing decisions. Our findings suggest that the feasibility of a coordinating contract depends on the addition of Pareto-improving, profit-sharing conditions that motivate agents to take part in the contract. Further, the selection of an optimal contract is based not only on which agent holds the overstock liquidation advantage, but also on the decision structure of the supply chain. For instance, when the supplier is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the supply chain captain, as well as holds the inventory liquidation advantage, and controls the stocking level, then a wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain under the proposed Pareto-improving profit sharing, termed Pareto-improving coordination. Additional results and managerial implications are presented in the chapter.

Details

Applications of Management Science
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78052-100-8

Article
Publication date: 1 July 2020

Tianzhuo Liu, WangBo Liu and Feng Yang

Based on the traditional buyback model, this paper aims to propose a new buyback method – the variable buyback contract – to solve the serious inventory backlog in the current…

Abstract

Purpose

Based on the traditional buyback model, this paper aims to propose a new buyback method – the variable buyback contract – to solve the serious inventory backlog in the current economic situation.

Design/methodology/approach

In this paper, the authors further study the buyback problem in a two-level supply chain with uncertain demand. Such a problem can be found in many research papers, which also use the Stackelberg game model. They put forward many factors that affect the buyback price, including risk preference, random arrival of consumers, etc. Different from the existing research, the authors propose another factor that may affect supply chain buyback – the retailer's remaining inventory to study the buyback contract.

Findings

First, the authors found that under the variable buyback contract, there is an optimal retail price, wholesale price and an optimal range of parameter settings for the buyback price. Second, the proposed Pareto-optimal solution for system improvement can achieve supply chain coordination. Third, under some conditions, the variable buyback contract is better than the wholesale price contract and fixed-price buyback contract.

Originality/value

First, this is the first paper to discuss to measure the buyback price with the retailer's remaining inventory. Second, the proposed buyback contract can help decision-makers to choose the optimal improvement strategies. Third, this contract has a certain practical significance, which can effectively alleviate the current inventory backlog problem.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 16 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 14 August 2023

Sani Majumder, Izabela Nielsen, Susanta Maity and Subrata Saha

This paper aims to analyze the potentials of dynamic, commitment and revenue-sharing contracts; that a nonrebate offering manufacturer can use to safeguard his profit while his…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to analyze the potentials of dynamic, commitment and revenue-sharing contracts; that a nonrebate offering manufacturer can use to safeguard his profit while his competitor offers customer rebates in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a common retailer.

Design/methodology/approach

We consider a two-period supply chain model to explore optimal decisions under eight possible scenarios based on the contract and rebate offering decisions. Because the manufacturers are selling substitutable products, therefore, a customer rebate on one of the products negatively impacts the selling quantity of other. Optimal price, rebate, and quantities are examined and compared to explore the strategic choice for both the rebate offering and non-rebate offering manufacturer. Comparative evaluation is conducted to pinpoint how the parameters such as contract parameters and its nature affect the members.

Findings

The results demonstrate that all these contracts instigate the rebate offering manufacturer to provide a higher rebate, but do not ensure a higher profit. If the revenue sharing contract is offered to the common retailer, the effectiveness of the rebate program might reduce significantly, and the rebate offering manufacturer might receives lower profits. A non-rebate offering manufacturer might use a commitment contract to ensure higher profits for all the members and make sure the common retailer continues the product.

Originality/value

The effect of customer rebate vs. supply chain contract under competition has not yet been explored comprehensively. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature regarding interplay among pricing decision, contract choice and rebate promotion in a two-period setting. The conceptual and managerial insights contribute to a better understanding of strategic decision-making for both competing manufacturers under consumer rebates.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 19 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 10 December 2020

Ayad Hendalianpour, Mohammad Hamzehlou, Mohammad Reza Feylizadeh, Naiming Xie and Mohammad Hossein Shakerizadeh

This study examines the potential of contracts as one of the supply chain coordination mechanisms under competitive conditions. It also investigates a two-echelon supply chain…

Abstract

Purpose

This study examines the potential of contracts as one of the supply chain coordination mechanisms under competitive conditions. It also investigates a two-echelon supply chain model with two manufacturers and two retailers to develop a competitive structure in grey stochastic demand.

Design/methodology/approach

Supply chain demand is considered as a stochastic phenomenon depending on the selling price of the product. Also, products can be replaced by market manufacturers. Each retailer faces the pricing of products from two manufacturers, leading to competition between downstream retailers. In the present study, the duopoly supply chain model was presented based on the wholesale price contract, revenue-sharing contract and quantity discount contract separately.

Findings

Grey optimization and analysis of their coordination were presented. The results showed the high performance of revenue-sharing contracts in the supply chain. Thus, manufacturers will give the next priority to quantity discount contracts.

Originality/value

Ordering is the main factor contributing to competitive decision-making. Meanwhile, decision-making along with ordering and pricing will be required due to the nature of the demand.

Details

Grey Systems: Theory and Application, vol. 11 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2043-9377

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 1 February 2022

Ranran Zhang, Jinjin Liu and Yu Qian

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote…

Abstract

Purpose

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote demand when considering consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

Design/methodology/approach

This research investigates a dyadic green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Four Stackelberg game models with a cost-sharing contract or a wholesale-price contract are built in retailer-led and manufacturer-led scenarios, respectively. Using backward induction, the optimal green decision under each model is obtained. In addition, the optimal cooperative contract is proposed by comparing these four models.

Findings

It is found that under consumer reference price effect, a cost-sharing contract outperforms a wholesale-price contract in upgrading product greenness and promoting demand. Under any single contract, the retailer-led situation is more conducive to improving product greenness than the manufacturer-led situation. Moreover, consumer reference price effect would reduce the sharing ratio of a cost-sharing contract when the manufacturer dominates, but it could mitigate the problem of double marginalization by reducing wholesale and retail prices under both types of contracts, which would enhance consumer surplus.

Originality/value

It is a new attempt to incorporate consumer reference price effect and power structure into a green supply chain framework and proposes a novel demand function that simultaneously emphasizes consumer reference price effect, consumer environmental awareness and product green attribute. In addition, it provides managerial insights for business managers to choose green cooperative contracts with consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 52 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

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