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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players.

The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings.

A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the coordination mechanism of cost sharing for green food production and marketing between a food producer and a supplier who both contribute to the sales of green food.

This paper first develops demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on green degree of food and associated consumers’ acceptances. Then, cost-sharing contracts-based game models are proposed. At last, regarding to optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a real case.

When green cost is only shared by one side, the cost-sharing contracts cannot optimally coordinate the food supply chain, but it can improve profits for both the supplier and producer. When consumers’ sensitivity to the green degree of food increases, a mutual cost-sharing contract will bring more profits for both the supplier and producer than those under the non-coordination mode in a decentralized supply chain situation. A real case verifies the conclusions.

The models are in complete information, and the market demand is assumed to be linear to sales price. Mutual cost sharing is only for material processing and food production, which can be extended to include sharing for sales cost. Coordination ideas on the proposed contracts development and solutions for optimal decisions can be applied in the other industries.

The study shows that coordination between a supplier and a producer is needed to improve the food supply chain’s green performance.

This paper first extends the existing profit functions by considering the green efforts of both a supplier and a producer as well as their effects on green degree of products and consumers’ acceptances to the green degree.

The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote demand when considering consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This research investigates a dyadic green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Four Stackelberg game models with a cost-sharing contract or a wholesale-price contract are built in retailer-led and manufacturer-led scenarios, respectively. Using backward induction, the optimal green decision under each model is obtained. In addition, the optimal cooperative contract is proposed by comparing these four models.

It is found that under consumer reference price effect, a cost-sharing contract outperforms a wholesale-price contract in upgrading product greenness and promoting demand. Under any single contract, the retailer-led situation is more conducive to improving product greenness than the manufacturer-led situation. Moreover, consumer reference price effect would reduce the sharing ratio of a cost-sharing contract when the manufacturer dominates, but it could mitigate the problem of double marginalization by reducing wholesale and retail prices under both types of contracts, which would enhance consumer surplus.

It is a new attempt to incorporate consumer reference price effect and power structure into a green supply chain framework and proposes a novel demand function that simultaneously emphasizes consumer reference price effect, consumer environmental awareness and product green attribute. In addition, it provides managerial insights for business managers to choose green cooperative contracts with consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy.

With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members’ profits and social welfare.

CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency.

The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain.

The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.

This study explores how collaborative cost sharing between the buyer and the supplier in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising affects the performance of a fresh agricultural produce supply chain (FAP-SC).

We use a contingency approach to modeling different scenarios and analyzing how fairness perception, interplaying with corporative–retailer cost sharing., influences the performance of fresh agricultural produce cold chains.

The findings of the research highlight the crucial role of the retailer's fairness concern. When the retailer's fairness concern is absent, cost sharing (in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising) is found to help boost demand and enhance the profits of members of the supply chain; bilateral cost sharing is found to have a more significant impact than unilateral cost sharing. When the retailer's fairness concern is taken into account, however, cost sharing is found to reduce demand at a lower level of fairness coefficient but increases demand at a higher level of fairness coefficient; bilateral cost sharing boosts both demand and profit of the supply chain when the retailer is in a “high concern, high anger” state.

The findings of the research highlight the important role of the buyer's farness perception when supply chain partners adopt collaborative cost sharing programs. This study contributes significantly to research and practice in supply chain collaboration and agricultural cold chain performance.

The purpose of this paper is to find the optimal power structure that drives green practices in the supply chain and coordinate the costs and benefits of green practices in supply chain under different power structures.

This paper developed a supply chain of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which the supplier and the manufacturer are responsible for the “greening” of products. Then, the game theory modeling method is used to explore the influence of different power structures on green practices in the supply chain. Finally, the authors developed a green cost-sharing contract made by the leader; regarding optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a numerical simulation.

The increase of the green practice difficulty of any member in the supply chain will not only reduce the greenness of products at that stage but will also reduce the green investment of the supply chain partner. Becoming a channel leader does not necessarily mean being more profitable than being a follower, and when the green practice difficulty of the leader is less than a certain threshold, ceding dominant power to the follower may benefit both sides. A green cost-sharing contract made by the leader is not necessarily beneficial to all enterprises.

This paper helps to better understand the role of the power relation in realizing the industry's green goals and helps decision-makers to achieve win-win cooperation by adjusting power relations and optimizing green cost-sharing contracts.