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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players.

The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings.

A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.

Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived.

To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end.

The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price.

This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic.

The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers.

Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the coordination mechanism of cost sharing for green food production and marketing between a food producer and a supplier who both contribute to the sales of green food.

This paper first develops demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on green degree of food and associated consumers’ acceptances. Then, cost-sharing contracts-based game models are proposed. At last, regarding to optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a real case.

When green cost is only shared by one side, the cost-sharing contracts cannot optimally coordinate the food supply chain, but it can improve profits for both the supplier and producer. When consumers’ sensitivity to the green degree of food increases, a mutual cost-sharing contract will bring more profits for both the supplier and producer than those under the non-coordination mode in a decentralized supply chain situation. A real case verifies the conclusions.

The models are in complete information, and the market demand is assumed to be linear to sales price. Mutual cost sharing is only for material processing and food production, which can be extended to include sharing for sales cost. Coordination ideas on the proposed contracts development and solutions for optimal decisions can be applied in the other industries.

The study shows that coordination between a supplier and a producer is needed to improve the food supply chain’s green performance.

This paper first extends the existing profit functions by considering the green efforts of both a supplier and a producer as well as their effects on green degree of products and consumers’ acceptances to the green degree.

The rapid development of e-commerce has caused not only explosive growth of the express delivery industry, but also ever-greater operational pressures. Models from the sharing economy may provide new ideas for operational improvement. The purpose of this paper is to consider an optimization method that reduces costs and increases efficiency. The proposed method enables a shared distribution system based on revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contracts.

The authors design a two-echelon supply chain (SC) of the shared distribution system with one shared distribution company and N express companies. In this SC, the express companies provide only inter-city transportation, and they outsource internal-city transportation to a shared distribution company. This distribution system differs from that of the traditional express delivery industry. The traditional system of delivery requires large numbers of empty trips (with no load to deliver), because the operating mode of urban distribution has been the franchise. To offer greater efficiency and performance, the authors introduce the sharing economy mode of express delivery. The authors examine the potential of a joint optimal decision-making strategy that involves revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contracts based on an order flow proportion (OFP) and a revenue-sharing factor (RSF). In this shared distribution system, the most important innovation is that all of the express companies jointly invest in and establish a shared distribution company based on OFP or RSF principles.

The profitability of an SC with revenue-sharing contracts based on an OFP system is much higher than that of a decentralized SC, and it is very close to the profitability of a centralized SC. In SCs with revenue-sharing contracts that are based on RSFs, there are many possible combinations of RSFs that can increase the overall profitability. The analyses indicate that the OFP system offers the best solution in designing revenue-sharing contracts based on RSFs.

This study indicates that revenue-sharing contracts based on both OFP and RSF principles can increase overall SC returns by 0.21 to 0.44 percent. In sum total, this improvement could mean a 0.84 to 1.76bn Yuan increase in revenues for the 400+ bn-Yuan express delivery industry.

The authors find that a combination of equity investment and SC coordination contracts makes the cooperation between SC members much more stable. Through this kind of shared distribution system, the scale of economy can further reduce the costs and increase the efficiency of the express delivery industry.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

The cluster supply chain is widely used in the professional towns in China, and improves the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises through integrating the supply chain with the industrial cluster. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

This paper studies a cluster supply chain under vendor managed inventory (VMI) system, which includes vendors, third-party logistics (TPL) enterprises and retail enterprises, and aims to study the replenishment decisions and coordination contracts in the supply chain. The economic order quantity model is applied to analyze the influence of marginal transportation cost factor under two replenishment modes – direct delivery and milk-run delivery, in order to find out the optimal replenishment decisions corresponding to different marginal transportation cost factors. And then, the revenue sharing contract is used to identify the change of profits of enterprises in the supply chain before and after the coordination contract.

It is concluded that the marginal transportation cost factor is an important factor influencing the replenishment decision especially in milk-run delivery, and the introduction of the revenue sharing contract can improve the revenue in the supply chain.

This is the first study that explores the relationship between a single transport cost and a single transport batch of cluster supply chain in centralized VMI & TPL system. The conclusions of the study have certain theoretical significance for the decision making and coordination of cluster supply chain.

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote demand when considering consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This research investigates a dyadic green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Four Stackelberg game models with a cost-sharing contract or a wholesale-price contract are built in retailer-led and manufacturer-led scenarios, respectively. Using backward induction, the optimal green decision under each model is obtained. In addition, the optimal cooperative contract is proposed by comparing these four models.

It is found that under consumer reference price effect, a cost-sharing contract outperforms a wholesale-price contract in upgrading product greenness and promoting demand. Under any single contract, the retailer-led situation is more conducive to improving product greenness than the manufacturer-led situation. Moreover, consumer reference price effect would reduce the sharing ratio of a cost-sharing contract when the manufacturer dominates, but it could mitigate the problem of double marginalization by reducing wholesale and retail prices under both types of contracts, which would enhance consumer surplus.

It is a new attempt to incorporate consumer reference price effect and power structure into a green supply chain framework and proposes a novel demand function that simultaneously emphasizes consumer reference price effect, consumer environmental awareness and product green attribute. In addition, it provides managerial insights for business managers to choose green cooperative contracts with consumer reference price effect under different power structures.