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This chapter investigates the nature of the transformation of macroeconomics by focusing on the impact of the Great Depression on economic doctrines. There is no doubt that the Great Depression exerted an enormous influence on economic thought, but the exact nature of its impact should be examined more carefully. In this chapter, I examine the transformation from a perspective which emphasizes the interaction between economic ideas and economic events, and the interaction between theory and policy rather than the development of economic theory. More specifically, I examine the evolution of what became known as macroeconomics after the Depression in terms of an ongoing debate among the “stabilizers” and their critics. I further suggest using four perspectives, or schools of thought, as measures to locate the evolution and transformation; the gold standard mentality, liquidationism, the Treasury view, and the real-bills doctrine. By highlighting these four economic ideas, I argue that what happened during the Great Depression was the retreat of the gold standard mentality, the complete demise of liquidationism and the Treasury view, and the strange survival of the real-bills doctrine. Each of those transformations happened not in response to internal debates in the discipline, but in response to government policies and real-world events.

This paper sets out to explore three areas in which the experience of the great depression might be relevant today: monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the systemic stability of banks.

A critical review of the US data for the 1920s and 1930s is presented and stylised facts for monetary, fiscal and banking policies during the noughties are shown and compared with those of the great depression.

The authors confirm the consensus on monetary policy: deflation and massive bank failures must be avoided. With regard to fiscal policy it is impossible to confirm a widespread opinion according to which fiscal policy did not work because it was not tried. The paper finds that fiscal policy went to the limit of what was possible under the conditions as they existed then. Policy reaction after 1932 was no less bold than that of today if one accounts for sustainability issues. Lastly, the investigation of the US banking system shows a surprising resilience of commercial banks that remained profitable, at least on average, even during the worst years.

First, the paper presents a systematic comparison between the great depression and the great recession, highlighting similarities and differences. Second, it suggests a relevant policy implication. Findings on commercial bank sector resilience suggest that at present national authorities have little choice but to make up for the losses on “legacy” assets and wait for banks to earn back their capital. However, to prevent future crises, at least a partial separation of commercial and investment banking seems justified.

Previous studies have shown a link between mental health functioning and involvement in HIV risk practices. The present research examines how well one specific group of men who have sex with other men (MSM) fare in terms of their mental health functioning, and then focuses on how mental health functioning relates to HIV risk practices in this population. The study was based on a national random sample of 332 MSM who use the Internet to seek men with whom they can engage in unprotected sex. Data collection was conducted via telephone interviews between January 2008 and May 2009. Depression is more common among men in this population than in the adult male population-at-large. All other measures of mental health functioning that were examined (self-esteem, impulsivity, current life satisfaction, optimism about the future) indicated low rates of mental health problem. Contrary to expectations, in nearly all instances, mental health functioning was not related to HIV risk practices.

More work needs to be done to understand the causes of depression among these men, and to assess how, if at all, depression relates to risk practices in this population. These findings suggest that factors other than mental health problems must be considered if one wishes to understand HIV risk taking in this population.

There have been times in recent years when it has seemed that the US economy, in particular, has defied economic gravity. This was certainly the case in the late nineties of the twentieth century. Many heaved a sigh of relief when the Nasdaq and the Dow responded to the pull of economic gravity and fell to earth in the early part of the twenty first century. The Earth at the time, in 2002, appeared to be indices of around 8,000 for the Dow and 1,250 for the Nasdaq. These measures still indicated huge wealth in terms of saleable bits of paper as well, indicating the underlying huge capacity of the real economy for creating surpluses. Both indices climbed back, though the Nasdaq was a long way from its astronomic former heights before the next (2007) crisis hit. True to the cyclical record of modern capitalism, however, by 2006 the US and the world stock markets were booming again. The nominal value of shares traded worldwide in 2006 by some estimates was nearly $70 trillion (Bogle, 2005). In 2007, another crisis appeared, ushered in supposedly by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States; subsequent events took their toll in economic and financial terms not only in the United States but worldwide in most of the major economies. The terms “credit crunch” and “sub-prime” had become so pervasive within a few weeks of the onset of the latest economic crisis that by July 2008, the Concise Oxford Dictionary provided definitions for them. While these terms are now embedded in the language of economics and everyday speech, inevitably the affected economies will recover from the crises and continue to grow. While there is no shortage of reasons posited for the latest crisis and those preceding it, far fewer explanations have been forwarded to tell us why economies survive economic shocks and, despite dire predictions and expressions of gloom, recent crises have not been as disastrous as was once the case, notably as in the Depression years of the 1930s. During the Depression of the Thirties, production fell by a third between 1929 and 1933, unemployment reached 13 million and even by 1938 one person in five were unemployed. No economist has predicted these dire consequences even for the crisis of 2007–2009. In 1999, Paul Krugman published his short book: The Return of Depression Economics in which he not only reminded us of the 1930s Depression but suggested that the then economic crises bore an “eerie resemblance to the Great Depression.”¹ He retreats within a few pages and describes the events as the Great Recession because the global damage has been “well short of Depression levels” (Krugman, 1999). A decade later, Krugman, by then a Nobel laureate for economics in 2008, began his 2009 revised edition of Return of Depression Economics thus: “The world economy is not in depression: it probably won't fall into depression (though I wish I could be completely sure about that)” (Krugman, 2009). By early January 2009, he surprised other economic commentators by using the term “depression” in his New York Times column.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) generated a crisis; however, it also gave us an opportunity to imagine the future and build a better world. Moreover, as we are convinced of the importance of understanding the lessons of history when facing both current and future challenges, this chapter seeks to present a concise overview of global crises since the end of the nineteenth century and to show crises for which we ignored the warning signs and wakeup calls, the consequences of said crises and how we managed to recover and thrive in several cases. Ultimately, we seek to justify the capacity of humanity to build a sustainable future – ideally, a regenerative future.

The article provides a comparative critique of the financial underpinnings of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent wave of financial crises. The collapse of the financial systems in many developing nations, the bankruptcies in the Anglo-Saxon corporate sectors and a threat of more sovereign defaults on behalf of emerging markets suggest that the current wave of global financial fragility and recession rivals that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper examines key elements that account for the crisis-prone nature of global capitalism: the political discipline of neo-liberalism, debt-driven expansion of the privatised financial markets, and the profound disarticulation of the financial and real economies. These factors suggests that the risk of a global depression is by no means hypothetical, and unless effective and collaborative efforts are made to tame the inherently unstable regime of global finance, even major world economies are faced with a prolonged period of financial turbulence and economic stagnation. The paper concludes by pondering the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in the transnational political consensus that can prevent a global repetition of the 1930s. While the increased awareness of financial instability and crisis may indeed prompt some ad hoc adjustments in national and foreign economic policies of major capitalist powers, in the long run these measures will be insufficient to prevent a major financial and economic disaster.

We document how inflation expectations evolved in the United States during the fall of 1933 using narrative evidence from historical news accounts and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts. We find that inflation expectations, after rising substantially during the spring of 1933, moderated in the fall in response to mixed messages from the Roosevelt Administration. The narrative accounts and our econometric model connect the dramatic swings in output growth in 1933 – the rapid recovery in the spring and the setback in the fall – to these sudden movements in inflation expectations.

This paper aims to examine whether the behavior of brands during the Great Depression held lessons for the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic.

A review of brand marketing and advertising from the 1920s and 1930s.

There are many learnings from the Great Depression that are instructive for today’s brand marketers dealing with COVID-19.

The review of the literature is not comprehensive and the findings are subjective.

Today’s brands can learn a great deal from the 1930s such as to take advantage of opportunities and avoid mistakes in today’s difficult environment.

By handling today’s challenges skillfully, brands can refresh relationships with consumers overwhelmed with choices.

Though there was some commentary on this subject following the Great Recession of 2009, there has been little written about the lessons in brand marketing in the current situation.