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To understand if certain board traits can contribute to attract CEO directors

Panel data model with firm fixed effects of individual and firm level attributes from 450 public firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru

Higher levels of masters abroad, board ties, government experience and foreign members are all negatively related to the appointment of CEO directors

The use of non-performance outcome variable such as CEO experience in the family led emergent environment of Latin America

Entender si hay características de un consejo que ayudan a atraer consejeros CEOs

Modelo con datos panel y efectos fijos usando información individual y de empresa de 450 empresas públicas en Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México y Perú

Mayores niveles de maestrías en el extranjero, lazos de consejo, experiencia de gobierno y presencia de extranjeros están relacionados negativamente con el nombramiento de nuevos consejeros CEOs

El uso de una variable que no es de desempeño como experiencia de CEOs en el contexto de empresa familiar en Latinoamérica

The US Federal Government awards contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Many firms that rely on these contracts have appointed former government officials to their corporate boards in the hopes of securing government contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between these government experienced directors (GEDs) on boards and firms being awarded government contracts.

The paper compiles a panel data set from 2017 to 2020 for S&P 500 firms. This includes hand-collected data for government-experienced directors on boards. This is tested using both regression and analysis of variance methodologies.

Results find that former government officials on corporate boards increase the amount of government contracts secured by the firm, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of firms’ revenue. There are significant industry level effects for the health care and financials sectors. Government-experienced directors on boards are also positively related to firms receiving COVID contracts. Lobbying was not found to be related to the securing of regular government contracts but was positively related to firms obtaining COVID contracts.

This paper contributes to the literature by using panel data, an expanded definition of GEDs and data on COVID contracts. The “revolving door” between government and firms is paying off for companies.

This paper aims to explore the association between firm subsidiary risk and the board composition attributes of international experience, government experience and independence (outsiders).

We sample the directors of the 104 largest European and US service and industrial firms by market capitalization as listed in the Financial Times (FT) Global index of 2008 using a cross-sectional design with data from 2009-2011.

International experience increases and government experience decreases firm subsidiary risk.

Our subsidiary data are limited to the number of subsidiaries per country and not to other potentially valuable information like size, number of employees or even board composition at the subsidiary levels. Additionally, the use of a diversified US and European firm could add unnecessary variance due to different contexts involved in 104 firms.

The desired level of firm subsidiary risk could be influenced by modifying the profile of board members.

This is one of the first studies to analyze the influence of board composition and risk at the firm level. Risk is a variable closely associated to internationalization.

This study examined the effect of different types of politically connected (PCON) Malaysian firms on analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion.

The study identified different types of PCON firms according to Wong and Hooy's (2018) classification, which divided political connections into government-linked companies (GLCs), boards of directors, business owners and family members of government leaders. The sample covered the period 2007–2016, for which earnings forecast data were obtained from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) database and financial data were extracted from Thomson Reuters Fundamentals. We deleted any market consensus estimates made by less than three analysts and/or firms with less than three years of analyst forecast information to control for the impact of individual analysts' personal attributes.

The study found that PCON firms were associated with lower analyst forecast accuracy and higher forecast dispersion. The effect was more salient in GLCs than in other PCON firms, either through families, business ties or boards of directors. Further analyses showed that PCON firms—in particular GLCs—were associated with more aggressive reporting of earnings and poorer quality of accruals, hence providing inadequate information for analysts to produce accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts. The results were robust even after addressing endogeneity issues.

This study found new evidence of the impact of different types of PCON firms in exacerbating information asymmetry, which was not addressed in prior studies.

This study has a significant practical implication for investors that they should be mindful of high information asymmetry in politically connected firms, particularly government-linked companies.

This is the first study to provide evidence of the impact of different types of PCON firms on analysts' earnings forecasts.

The effect of board intellectual capital on non-profit organizational performance in non-western, less developed economies has been an important yet under-researched area. Given that the institutional and business relationships of a board account for the majority of board intellectual capital, the purpose of this paper is to fill the previously mentioned research gap by addressing how the interactions of the two relationships of board directors influence Chinese philanthropic foundation performance.

Following Creswell's (2014) explanatory sequential mixed-methodology, a qualitative study (Study 1) was first conducted to pre-test the assumptions, and then a quantitative study (Study 2) was carried out based on a secondary database of 1,405 Chinese philanthropic foundations to further examine the hypotheses. Several regression models were built for analyzing the results.

Study 1 confirmed that Chinese philanthropic foundations gained greater revenues and hosted more public welfare activities by leveraging the reinforcing or complementary effects of board directors' intellectual capital to improve organizational performance. Study 2 further examined the hypotheses that the interactions of intellectual capital increased the total revenue and public welfare expenditure of the foundations; however, significant positive relationships were only identified in foundations at the local level, and no significant associations were found in those at the national level.

The research indicates that the intellectual capital of board directors may influence the performance of their philanthropic foundations. Thus, Chinese philanthropic foundations should be more aware of the importance of this influence when determining which candidates will join the board.

The study makes significant contributions to the existing knowledge of the development of non-governmental organizations; it incorporates the resource dependence theory and agency theory into understanding how the intricate interactions between the institutional and business relationships of board directors affect foundation performance and how the jurisdiction affiliations act as a boundary condition for such relationships in a non-western setting such as China.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey of recent studies on Korean firms’ financial policies and their interactions with financial markets, and suggest directions for future research.

The authors review the finance research on Korean firms and markets, focusing on the articles published in the last 20 years.

This survey of the recent Korean finance literature covers the research on the capital structure and the distinct financing behaviors of chaebol-affiliated firms and independent firms; the factors affecting the costs of capital and firms’ preferences for capital budgeting methods; raising capital through public and private equity issuance; corporate governance and the market for corporate control; payout policies; and bank-firm relationship. The authors suggest a number of future research directions that may lead to significant contributions to the literature.

This paper provides the first comprehensive review of the post-crisis corporate finance literature in Korea.

This study aims to examine how the prestige of audit committee (AC) chairpersons influences earnings management.

The sample contains 1,973 firm-year observations of French listed firms for the period 2007–2018. The authors examine the status of AC chairs and CEOs by focusing on the French business elite system. This study tests the association between AC chairs’ (relative) status and the level of earnings management using measures of accrual earnings management and real earnings management (REM).

The results of this study do not show that high-status AC chairs constrain accruals manipulation. However, the results provide evidence that they play a key role in constraining REM. High-status AC chairs are more likely to enhance the monitoring of this type of manipulation, given their thorough knowledge and understanding of the firm’s business environment and practices. This study also finds evidence that AC chairs with a status higher than CEOs are associated with lower levels of REM. The results suggest that prestigious AC chairs influence lower status CEOs’ strategic decisions.

This study demonstrates that high-status AC chairs play an important role in detecting and constraining deviations from normal business practices. The results have substantial implications for boards, which will benefit from an understanding of how the appointment of high-status chairs affects financial reporting quality.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

The following is an introductory profile of the fastest growing firms over the three-year period of the study listed by corporate reputation ranking order. The business activities in which the firms are engaged are outlined to provide background information for the reader.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).