Search results

1 – 10 of over 4000
To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 24 August 2021

Yueling Xu, Haijun Bao, Wenyu Zhang and Shuai Zhang

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a…

Abstract

Purpose

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a “win–win” situation between financial institutions' FinTech innovation and effective regulation has become a hot topic. This study purposes to explore the evolutionary game relationship between FinTech innovation and regulation by constructing both static and dynamic earmarking game models.

Design/methodology/approach

A simulation experiment was conducted using primary data obtained from a commercial bank in China.

Findings

The results of the theoretical analysis of evolutionary game models were consistent with the corresponding simulation results, proving the validity of the proposed evolutionary game models. It was also found that the dynamic earmarking game model was more stable and effective than the static earmarking game model in promoting FinTech innovation and regulation. Furthermore, when the regulators utilised a dynamic earmarking mechanism, the evolutionary path of financial institutions and regulators' behaviour strategies took the shape of a spiral and eventually converged to a central point, indicating the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy and Nash equilibrium. Finally, because the behaviour strategies of financial institutions were mainly influenced by the regulators' policies, the regulators were inspired to adjust the corresponding regulation policies on FinTech innovation.

Originality/value

This study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing literature on financial innovation and regulation, in particular by establishing evolutionary game models from the perspective of financial earmarking policies. Also, the case study for simulation experiments can gain a more intuitive insight into FinTech innovation and financial earmarking policies.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 121 no. 10
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 26 June 2019

Ruihan Zhang and Bing Sun

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to ascertain the effects of the three elements of competitive dynamics on the evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions and competitive results.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper describes the construction of an evolutionary game model and a multi-agent-based model of innovative behavior-based decisions by heterogeneous high-tech firms. The models are used to analyze the evolution path and evolutionarily stable strategy of innovative behavior-based decisions. In addition, multi-agent-based simulation is used to gain insight into the effects of competitive dynamics on the dynamic evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions.

Findings

This paper reveals four evolutionary equilibrium states of the innovation behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms. Based on the findings, these overall evolutionary trends are not affected by the timing of competitive market entry or the intensity of competition. In addition, simulated evidence is added that the timing of competitive market entry is an important factor affecting market-leading innovative strategies and dynamic competition results, and competition intensity is closely related to the evolutionary speed of innovation behavior-based decisions.

Originality/value

The key contribution of this paper is its new view of innovative behavior-based decisions from a competitive dynamics perspective. The new competitive dynamics-based framework for innovative behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms proposed in the paper can resolve the problem of obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage for high-tech firms in a competitive dynamics context.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 27 September 2011

Yuan Yi‐jun and Lv Cui‐jie

The equipment manufacturing industry, as a strategic industry of China, is experiencing a transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation. The achievements…

Downloads
1048

Abstract

Purpose

The equipment manufacturing industry, as a strategic industry of China, is experiencing a transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation. The achievements of independent innovation have not been as good as could have been expected. Based on evolutionary economics, the purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary path of the two innovation modes, respectively, and analyze the internal and external factors that hinder the mutation from imitative innovation routine to independent innovation routine. According to the results of the evolutionary game model, several policy suggestions are proposed to promote the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper is based on the concepts of evolutionary economics. Routine, mutation, path dependence and selection are included in the analysis of the evolutionary path of the two innovation modes. Especially, the evolutionary game model of innovation modes selection is established to explain how internal and external conditions work in the transition.

Findings

The paper explores the evolutionary path of the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation in the equipment manufacturing industry of China, and analyses the obstacles and factors (internal path dependence, and the lack of benefit incentive and external mutation conditions such as fiscal support and intellectual property protection) that hinder the mutation from imitative innovation routine to independent innovation routine. The results of the evolutionary game model show that the pursuit of the benefit (innovation return or the profit), as an internal mutation condition, is the most fundamental motivation for independent innovation, while policy incentives, as the external mutation conditions, have a significant impact on the evolutionary transition. According to the results, several policy suggestions are proposed to promote the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation.

Originality/value

Taking the equipment manufacturing industry as a particular object, this paper tries to explain the evolutionary path and the obstacle factors of the transition from imitative innovation to independent innovation from the perspective of evolutionary economics, involving routine, mutation, path dependence, selection, and so on. The evolutionary game model of innovation modes selection is established to investigate the influence of these factors.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 27 April 2020

Mengjie Liao, Jian Zhang and Ruimei Wang

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.

Design/methodology/approach

Theoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.

Findings

Evolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.

Originality/value

The study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

Details

Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, vol. 33 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1355-5855

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 13 August 2019

Jing Peng, Guoping Tu, Yanhong Liu, Hao Zhang and Bibing Leng

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the…

Downloads
235

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check.

Design/methodology/approach

Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium.

Findings

The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform.

Practical implications

The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement.

Originality/value

Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 21 September 2012

Ratul Lahkar

This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

Downloads
1712

Abstract

Purpose

This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

Design/methodology/approach

The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.

Findings

The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.

Originality/value

The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.

Details

Indian Growth and Development Review, vol. 5 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1753-8254

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 28 October 2020

Danrong Song, Jinbo Song, Hehui Yuan and Yu Fan

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the…

Abstract

Purpose

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.

Design/methodology/approach

An evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.

Findings

First, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.

Originality/value

In this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

Details

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, vol. 28 no. 7
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0969-9988

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 17 November 2021

Yudan Dou, Xiliang Sun, Ankang Ji, Yuna Wang and Xiaolong Xue

Owing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects…

Abstract

Purpose

Owing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects reflects the effects of both policy supervision and PC practice, which aids the government in reasonably identifying the key issues of PC's promotion and rationally improving the policy deployment. However, existing studies fail to address this aspect, especially lacking quantitative exploration. This study explores the micro mechanism of PC's promotion, from the perspective of developing PC projects.

Design/methodology/approach

A tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory of the government, developers and contractors is constructed. After rigorous theoretical deduction, this study adopts Changchun in China as a case city and collects the data using the Delphi technique, policy documents and literature analysis.

Findings

Results indicate that contractors are generally willing to implement PC projects and the government chooses to actively supervise PC's promotion. The negative investment behavior of developers is the main obstacle to promote PC in Changchun currently.

Practical implications

The conclusions are applicable to other comparable regions. This study is of value to promote PC with high efficiency and effect.

Originality/value

The tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory proposed in this study is conducive to reveal the essence of PC's promotion. This is an important breakthrough in extant studies, with a broad applicability in the PC domain beyond China.

Details

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0969-9988

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 13 October 2021

Guangsheng Zhang, Xiao Wang, Zhiqing Meng, Qirui Zhang and Kexin Wu

To remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary

Downloads
23

Abstract

Purpose

To remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.

Design/methodology/approach

Regarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.

Findings

The results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.

Originality/value

First, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 30 April 2021

Lei Song, Ping Lyu and Yingui Cao

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interest conflicts and strategy evolution process of various stakeholders in the process of homestead withdrawal, to reveal…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interest conflicts and strategy evolution process of various stakeholders in the process of homestead withdrawal, to reveal which key factors can balance the interests of all parties.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors developed an evolutionary game theoretical framework for homestead withdrawal in Yujiang District, Jiangxi Province, China. The authors compared the dynamic process of strategy change in different situations based on system dynamics.

Findings

Compared with indirect external factors, direct economic factors, such as increasing compensation standards or increasing fines, are more likely to encourage peasants to withdraw from their homesteads. The dynamic subsidy strategy can increase the probability of peasants withdrawing from their homestead. Additionally, awarding officials with promotions can effectively encourage local governments during the process.

Originality/value

Previous studies have conceptualized farmers' willingness to withdraw from their homestead as a static process, ignoring the underlying dynamism. This paper analyzes the game mechanism among the stakeholders of the homestead withdrawal process from a dynamic perspective, to provide efficient suggestions regarding policymaking for homestead withdrawal.

Details

China Agricultural Economic Review, vol. 13 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1756-137X

Keywords

1 – 10 of over 4000