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Purpose – The purpose of this study is to estimate the own- and cross-price elasticity of brand-name outpatient prescription drug cost-sharing for maintenance medications and to estimate the effects of changes in the price differential between generic and brand-name prescription drugs.

Methodology/approach – We first review the literature on the effects of an increase in brand-name drug patient cost-sharing. In addition, we analyze two examples of utilization patterns in filling behavior associated with an increase in brand-name cost-sharing for patients in employer-sponsored health plans with chronic illness.

Findings – We found that the own-price elasticity of demand for brand-name prescription drugs was inelastic. However, the cross-price elasticity was not consistent in sign, and utilization patterns for generic prescription fills did not always increase after a rise in brand-name cost-sharing.

Research limitations – The empirical examples are limited to the experience of patients with employer-sponsored health insurance.

Practical implications – The common practice of increasing brand-name prescription drug patient cost-sharing to increase consumption of generic drugs may not always result in higher generic medication use. Higher brand-name drug cost-sharing levels may result in discontinuation of chronic therapies, instead of therapeutic switching.

Originality/value of chapter – The value of this chapter is its singular focus on the effects of higher brand-name drug cost-sharing through a synthesis of the literature examining the own- and cross-price elasticity of demand for brand-name medications and two empirical examples of the effects of changes in brand-name cost-sharing.

Currently, digital technology has been proposed as a new archetype for developing an effective traceability system in the perishable food supply chain (FSC). Implementation of such a system needs significant investment and the burden lies with the members of the supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact on the profit of the supply chain members due to the implementation of an effective traceability system with such a large investment. The study also tries to explore the impact of the implementation of such a system by coordination among the members through a cost-sharing mechanism.

A two-level supply chain that comprises a supplier and retailer is analyzed using a game-theoretic approach. The mathematical models are developed considering the scenario for an individual, centralized and both members invest using a cost-sharing mechanism. For each of the models, the impact of product selling price, information sensing price and quality improvement level on profit is analyzed through numerical analysis.

The study reveals that consumer involvement can be a strong motivation for the supply chain members to initiate investment in the traceability system. Further, from an investment perspective cost-sharing model is beneficial compared to the individual investment-bearing model. This mechanism can coordinate as well as benefit the FSC members. However, the model is less beneficial to the centralized model from profit and quality improvement levels.

Food wastage can be less from supplier and retailer perspectives. Moreover, consumers can purchase food items only after verifying their shipping conditions. Consequently the food safety scandals can be reduced remarkably.

Digital technology adoption in the perishable FSC is still considered emerging. The present study helps organizations to implement a traceability system in the perishable FSC through consumer involvement and a cost-sharing mechanism.

This study explores how collaborative cost sharing between the buyer and the supplier in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising affects the performance of a fresh agricultural produce supply chain (FAP-SC).

We use a contingency approach to modeling different scenarios and analyzing how fairness perception, interplaying with corporative–retailer cost sharing., influences the performance of fresh agricultural produce cold chains.

The findings of the research highlight the crucial role of the retailer's fairness concern. When the retailer's fairness concern is absent, cost sharing (in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising) is found to help boost demand and enhance the profits of members of the supply chain; bilateral cost sharing is found to have a more significant impact than unilateral cost sharing. When the retailer's fairness concern is taken into account, however, cost sharing is found to reduce demand at a lower level of fairness coefficient but increases demand at a higher level of fairness coefficient; bilateral cost sharing boosts both demand and profit of the supply chain when the retailer is in a “high concern, high anger” state.

The findings of the research highlight the important role of the buyer's farness perception when supply chain partners adopt collaborative cost sharing programs. This study contributes significantly to research and practice in supply chain collaboration and agricultural cold chain performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether high-cost-sharing ambulatory care policies affect non-urgent emergency department (ED) care utilization differently among individuals with and without chronic conditions.

This retrospective cohort study used 2010–2011 US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data. Difference-in-difference methods, multivariate logit model and survey procedures were employed. Time lag effect was used to address endogeneity concerns.

The sample included 4,347 individuals. Difference in non-urgent ED visits log odds between high- and low-cost-sharing policies was not significantly different between chronically ill and non-chronically ill individuals (β=−0.48, p=0.42). Sensitivity analysis with 15 and 25 percent cost-sharing levels also generated consistent insignificant results (p=0.33 and p=0.31, respectively). Ambulatory care incidence rates were not significantly different between high- and low-cost-sharing groups among chronically ill people (incidence rate ratio=0.849, p=0.069).

High-cost-sharing ambulatory care policies were not associated with increased non-urgent ED care utilization among chronically ill and healthy people. The chronically ill patients may have retained sizable ambulatory care that was necessary to maintain their health. Health plans or employers may consider low-level cost-sharing policies for ambulatory care among chronically ill enrollees or employees.

Findings contribute to insurance benefit design; i.e., whether high-cost-sharing ambulatory care policies should be implemented among chronically ill enrollees to maintain their health and save costs for health plans.

This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy.

With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members’ profits and social welfare.

CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency.

The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain.

The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players.

The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings.

A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

For health services researchers and health services management educators, chronicling the unfolding of a country's implementation of national health insurance (NHI) is once in a lifetime opportunity. Rarely, do researchers have the opportunity to observe the macro and micro changes associated with turning a country's health care delivery system 180 degrees. Accordingly, we report on the first decade of Taiwan's changing delivery system and selected adaptations of health care management, providers and patients.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the coordination mechanism of cost sharing for green food production and marketing between a food producer and a supplier who both contribute to the sales of green food.

This paper first develops demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on green degree of food and associated consumers’ acceptances. Then, cost-sharing contracts-based game models are proposed. At last, regarding to optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a real case.

When green cost is only shared by one side, the cost-sharing contracts cannot optimally coordinate the food supply chain, but it can improve profits for both the supplier and producer. When consumers’ sensitivity to the green degree of food increases, a mutual cost-sharing contract will bring more profits for both the supplier and producer than those under the non-coordination mode in a decentralized supply chain situation. A real case verifies the conclusions.

The models are in complete information, and the market demand is assumed to be linear to sales price. Mutual cost sharing is only for material processing and food production, which can be extended to include sharing for sales cost. Coordination ideas on the proposed contracts development and solutions for optimal decisions can be applied in the other industries.

The study shows that coordination between a supplier and a producer is needed to improve the food supply chain’s green performance.

This paper first extends the existing profit functions by considering the green efforts of both a supplier and a producer as well as their effects on green degree of products and consumers’ acceptances to the green degree.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate perceptions of smallholder farmers toward the cost-sharing agricultural extension service provision.

The study used data from a cross-sectional survey, key informants interviews and focused group discussions conducted on 384 farm households from six Kebeles of Eastern Ethiopia.

The authors find that flexibility and credibility, ability of development agents to address neglected aspects in agricultural production, and reaching diversified groups of farmers as the perceived advantages of the cost-sharing approach. Furthermore, improved knowledge and attitude, enhanced research–extension–farmer linkages, and improved food security and poverty reduction are found to be the three most important impact areas associated with the approach. On the contrary, poor economic status of farmers, high cost of administration and absence of a clear guideline/legislation are found to be the most important constraints. The authors find that increasing farmers’ awareness about the cost-sharing approach and preparing a clear definition of the form, modalities and principles of the cost-sharing extension approach can be a part of the practical solutions to overcome the challenges.

The current research is limited to the investigation of farmers’ perceptions toward paid extension services. The willingness to pay for extension services – using discrete choice experiments – is dealt with in another paper.

The first of its kind in the country, the paper tried to assess farmers’ readiness to try a new extension service delivery. The findings have important implications for policy makers and local level implementers of extension programs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.