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Reports that, in 1943, Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg (1905‐1946) discussed with an informal group meeting in Freiburg (Breisgau ‐ Germany) “Limits and possibilities of economic planning”. Explains that the group called after its chairman “von Beckerath Circle” met to discuss problems of demobilization and the post‐Second World War economic order in Germany. States that Stackelberg’s lecture was found among his manuscripts and published after his death. Notes that Stackelberg is generally considered for his contributions to economic theory; little is known about his views on economic policy. Argues that his views on theory and policy were closely linked, however. Gives a concise statement of Stackelberg’s view on the post‐Second World War economic order in Germany. Points out that he argues strongly against (central) planning of the economic process, makes the important ORDO distinction between economic policy instruments compatible and incompatible with a market economy, but he is not a pro‐market economist of the anti‐state type. Explains that the state is assigned a wide range of policy options (in terms of policy instruments compatible with the market economy), ranging from specific forms of price intervention to income policies and extensive forms of taxation.

Discusses Heinrich von Stackelberg as a mathematical economist, referring to his book Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Presents the main theories of rivalrous interaction among business firms and the problems of oligopoly and monopoly. Notes how Stackelberg used indifference curves to map the intersecting interests of rival sellers or buyers. Discusses Stackelberg’s isoprofit diagrams and the pattern of market interactions now called Stackelberg leadership.

Assesses the place of Heinrich von Stackelberg in the history of ideas as reflected in the literature of economics. Uses evidence from three main sources: histories of economics, the periodical literature and doctoral dissertations to support the conclusion that Stackelberg already has an important and lasting place in the history of economic thought. Points out that the use of Stackelberg’s ideas and techniques is now as general and common as the use of those of Cournot, Walras, Pareto and Nash. Presents a short section devoted to his views on state control because these are so often misunderstood. Speculates on possible reasons why Stackelberg is not ranked more highly than he usually is.

States that the Stackelberg leadership model is rarely used to describe market price determination perhaps because of the lack of a theoretical basis for selecting the minimum size necessary for leadership. Provides structural sufficiency conditions for selecting a unique Stackelberg leader based on the concept of Pareto dominance, in which the structural criterion involves the relative capacity shares of the first and second largest market rivals. Suggests that the Stackelberg price game is a viable static equilibrium construct even though the fringe firms are not atomistic. Applies the Stackelberg model to antitrust merger analysis.

Goes back to thinking on the price theory of oligopoly in 1960. In particular, is concerned with Stackelberg’s oligopoly theory. Presents a careful description of the development of Stackelberg’s analysis. Takes into account his mathematical appendix. Confronts the theory with game theory and concludes that in a dynamic game a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium will emerge.

Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.

This English translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg’s Marktform und Gleichgewicht will be welcomed by economists working in the field of industrial organisation and beyond. It has been overdue for more than 80 years. This translation will allow matters to be set straight concerning a number of fundamental theoretical issues connected to Stackelberg’s work as well as allow to clarify a number of misunderstandings that go back to the first reviews of Stackelberg’s 1934 classic on competition theory.

Reviews the international response to Marktform und Gleichgewicht, and questions the reactions of astonishment by some critics, including Scherer, concerning Stackelberg’s explanation of disequilibrium of certain market structures. Defends Stackelberg’s standpoint by considering the specific historical context. Looks at Cournot’s continuity thesis and challenges the assumption of analogous market configurations. Suggests that Stackelberg’s theoretical derivations may have been intended to provoke further scientific study.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the work of earlier researches relating to insider trading issues in the stock market under a Cournot‐Stackelberg duopoly.

This paper models that the competition among the insiders in the real market be Stackelberg, which reflects that for all outside and inside reasons, the position and influence of a firm may become the leader or the follower as time goes by.

The paper demonstrates that when the listed company with insiders becomes the leader in the industry, the reaction functions of insiders will change as well as the parameters of the market, to signal from real and financial sides, but the amount traded by insiders remains the same; so does the degree of information revelation. In addition, for the information revealed to the public, the stock price reveals more information with Stackelberg real‐leader model than that of the Stackelberg financial‐leader model.

The main contribution of this paper is that market makers can very well observe signals from the real side, and bringing a signal from the real side can help the stock market reveal more information, but once the signal is introduced, it may not further enhance market efficiency.

Compares Stackelberg’s Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre with a standard modern micro‐economic textbook. Reveals some confusing shortcomings in the English translation. Focuses on unique peculiarities of Stackelberg’s analysis of the price formation on imperfect markets. Suggests that it might be an effective approach in a course on micro‐economics to combine a modern textbook with Grundlagen since they would complement each other in a number of aspects: at least, but very important, in the different emphasis of the time aspect. Finds that in general the English translation of Grundlagen by A.T. Peacock is of an outstanding quality. Mistakes are rare and hardly ever confusing, with the exceptions related to the perfect market and pure competition concepts. So, if one uses the English translation of Grundlagen as a supplement in a course on micro‐economics one may devote some attention to these concepts. It is quite possible that Stackelberg, at least in Grundlagen, is not convinced of the potential compatibility of Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition and the Edgeworth‐Bertrand oligopoly theory with the method he proposes to derive at “peculiarities of price formation in the imperfect market”. Hence the absence of any reference in Grundlagen to these theories may not be at all accidental.