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Much analysis considering the putative political challenges of the European Union (EU) has focussed on the (lack of) participation and identifications of European citizens. But what about the bureaucrats working on their behalf? This contribution will address the issue of representative bureaucracy and identification in the EU, specifically in the European Commission. While the literature on representativeness of public administration has focussed on issues of social class, ethnicity and gender, it is also important to consider geographical representativeness. This is particularly important when region (in this case of the EU nations) is relevant. As the authors point out, this question is all the more relevant given the assumption that individuals who join the Commission will identify with Europe more than their home country. Yet, at a time of ongoing discussions about a crisis of the EU and in the midst of populist governments, such an assumption is at least questionable. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which decision-making may be influenced by nationality, at least understanding patterns of representation can be important for understanding how passive – if not active – representation functions. The formal emphasis on representative bureaucracy within the EU raises several potential conflicts with other important principles of public management. It also creates a conflict with the fundamental commitment to creating transnational personnel who eschew strong attachments to nation states.

European air transport policy, emerged through the confluence of case law and legislation, in four broad areas: liberalization, safety and security, greening, and the external policy. Following the implementation of the single market for air transport, policy shifted to liberalizing and regulating associated services and in recent years to greening, the external aviation policy, and safety and security. Inclusion of air transport in the Environmental Trading Scheme of the European Union exemplifies the European Commission’s proactive stand on bringing the industry in line with emission reduction trajectories of other industries. However, the bid to include flights to third countries in the trading scheme pushed the EU into a controversial position, causing the Commission to halt implementation and to give ICAO time to seek a global multilateral agreement. The chapter also discusses how the nationality clauses in air services agreements breached the Treaty of Rome, and a court ruling to that effect enabled the EC to extend EU liberalization policies beyond the European Union, resulting in the Common Aviation Area with EU fringe countries and the Open Aviation Area with the USA. Another important area of progress was aviation safety, where the EU region is unsurpassed in the world, yet the Commission has pushed the boundary even further, by establishing the European Safety Agency to oversee the European Aviation Safety Management System. Another important area of regulatory development was aviation security, a major focus after the woeful events in 2001, but increasingly under industry scrutiny on costs and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by arguing that in the coming decade, the EU will strive to strengthen its position as a global countervailing power, symbolized in air transport by a leadership position in environmental policy and international market liberalization, exemplified in the EU’s external aviation policy.

The aim of the chapter is to examine whether the challenges to administering the EU outlined by Les Metcalfe in his famous article, ‘After 1992, can the Commission manage Europe?’ have now been met. Metcalfe not only identified a ‘management deficit’ in the implementation of the single market programme arising from an oversight among policy makers, but highlighted a neglect of the administrative dimension of European integration among scholars.

The chapter draws on primary and secondary literature to track developments in respect of the three elements identified by Metcalfe: the small size of the European Commission, its poor internal coordination and weak leadership; the responsiveness of administrative bodies in the member states to the need for inter-organizational coordination; and the network-building and management capacity of the Commission.

Despite changes, such as further enlargement, agencification at national and EU levels, and the expansion of EU competencies that have exacerbated the management challenge confronting the EU, there have been significant developments that have closed the deficit. First, the Commission has become far better integrated, coordination upgraded, and leadership strengthened. Second, through networking, cooptation and other strategies the Commission has sought to assure the effective implementation and enforcement of the single market rules. Third, member state governments, ministries and agencies have sought to cultivate networked relations that have increased the manageability of EU administration.

To the knowledge of this author, this is the first attempt to revisit Metcalfe’s diagnosis and to review the extent to which the management deficit he identified has been addressed subsequently.

The chapter has implications for how inter-organizational coordination within the EU administrative system could be improved.

The chapter bears on the administrative capacity of the EU to deliver the policies decided by EU policy makers.

As well as offering an assessment of the extent to which progress has been made in addressing the management deficit identified by Les Metcalfe in his classic article, this chapter conceptualizes the EU administration as an entity that encompasses both EU institutions and administrative bodies in the member states. It advances the concept of the EU as a multi-level administration.

This chapter provides a framework for organisational analysis of the newly created position of ‘independent’ Commissioner, especially whether it is sufficiently backed by administrative capacities.

In the many variables that determine organisational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this approach follows Olsen (2005) in its analysis through communication structures and strategic directions, and adds procedures (networks) and personnel to this. The chapter is primarily based on interview data in addition to literature and document analysis.

This chapter acknowledges the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the difficulties in reorganising (formal) institutions. The conclusion shows that there are multiple problems in the current process of institutionalisation of the independent Commissioner. Generalising the findings to the use of an administrative approach, the frugal framework used here indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be proclaimed but also demands attentions for organisation design. Organisational analysis helps to understand the organisation and the organisational weaknesses behind the policy objective.

As is often the case with MLG it gives a perspective on governance, but must be complemented with an approach for analysis, in this case organisational design. In the chapter the approach is limited to organisational values, personnel and communication lines. It provides a basic framework to evaluate one of the key elements of European integration – independence. However, additional work is needed to further develop this framework as well as other components of the organisational behaviour of the Commission.

This chapter comes up with suggestions for organisational redesign of the Commission in order to restore trust in its tasks and responsibilities. With the instalment of the new Juncker Commission these findings might provide useful insights for the ongoing process of reorganisation of the Commission.

The new economic legislation and the role of the independent Commissioner have a direct impact on member state budgets (cuts), with a far reaching societal impact. Therefore, the level of (public) trust is critical in the acceptance of the process. Trust is established inter alia by the organisational implementation of principles of good administrative behaviour such as transparency, capability, independence, etc.

The chapter uses the MLG perspective in order to get a comprehensive picture of the organisational implications to effectively embed the ‘independent’ Commissioner in the organisation. The added value is based on the extensive amount of interviews over a longer period of time (2011–2014) during the operationalisation of the European semester.

Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and regulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).

The chapter analyzes the evolution in the European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization, Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and networks within the institutional framework.

Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.

The dynamic described in this chapter allows us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other. They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are interdependent.

The analysis in this chapter shows a need for further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other rather than separated realities.

The chapter describes and compares the dynamics in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent system with interesting observations for NRAs and the European Commission with respect to coordination and integration.

The original nature of the current chapter relates to the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.

First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.

Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of MLG.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Migrant women face unique difficulties, such as labour discrimination, limited sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services, obstacles to family reunification, gender-based violence (GBV) and human trafficking. ¹ The European Commission's labour integration approach currently fails to account for these difficulties. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) attempt to fill these gaps but lack capacity and funding. The European Commission's current approach does not respect human dignity and impedes the migrant community's integration and inclusion. This chapter discusses sexual assault and gender-based violence, which may be disturbing to some readers.

This issue is relevant and important because migrant women comprise a large portion of the migrant population ² and are a vital part of the migrant community. The methodology used in this chapter is a human security framework with a people-centred approach to policy that empowers those impacted by it. Research for this chapter was conducted using news articles, academic articles, UN reports and publications. Based on this, the European Commission must take a holistic and binding approach that protects the rights and dignity of migrant women.

There are multiple approaches that the European Commission can take to incorporate human dignity into its policies towards women and migration, such as applying international conventions and implementing policies that account for migrant women. All approaches must be realistic and required of all member states.

Soil is a non-renewable and increasingly deteriorating resource, yet it is barely protected by European Union (EU) legislation. This constitutes a puzzling gap within the otherwise encompassing and progressive environmental policy of the EU. To explain the integration resistance of soil protection, I draw on insights from rationalist and sociological institutionalist theory. The institutional rigidity of the community method of environmental decision-making limits policy change to favorable interest constellations, but this constraint is usually compensated by agenda competition among the national environmental pioneers. However, successful agenda-setting depends on the skillful combination of political venues and issue frames. Matters of land politics, such as soil protection, are difficult to frame in terms that make them suitable for European policy venues. The theoretical argument is illustrated using an in-depth case study of the agenda-setting, negotiation, and eventual withdrawal of the ill-fated proposal for an EU soil framework directive, with a focus on the changing role of Germany. Reframing of soil politics as locally bound and as essentially national affair, subnational actors extended the conflict to include the German federal chamber as policy venue. As a result, Germany turned from “pusher by example” and first mover to “defensive front-runner,” successfully pursuing a blocking strategy.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.