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The present study investigates the impact of managerial psychological characteristics on the supply chain management efficiency (SCME) of companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange.

To this aim, information about 215 companies was analyzed during 2014–2021. The sales per inventory ratio was used to calculate SCME. In the present study, the focus is on characteristics such as managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia, managerial overconfidence (MOC) and managerial narcissism, all considered as managerial attributes.

The present findings showed that managerial myopia/managerial entrenchment (MOC/managerial narcissism) have a negative (positive) effect on SCME. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results. Moreover, the findings are presented separately for companies with high business strategy (first quarter) and low business strategy (third quarter). The results show that at low levels of differentiation strategy, managerial entrenchment does not have a significant effect on SCME while other managerial attributes have a significant effect on both high and low business strategy.

The present study contributes to the identification of managerial psychological characteristics influencing SCME to advance future studies and support practical efforts. The present findings can prove the significance of this research and fill the existing gap in research.

Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of executive equity incentives. In contrast, others adopt the entrenchment logic to emphasize the increased agency costs. This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil how executive equity incentives impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

Using the panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2022, this study integrates the convergence of interest and entrenchment logic to examine how executive equity incentives affect CSR performance.

We find that the relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance follows an inverted U-shaped form. According to the convergence of interest logic, executive equity incentives reduce agency costs when allocating resources to engage in CSR activities and enable firms to increase their CSR investments, ultimately realizing increased CSR performance. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive equity incentives causes the entrenchment effect, resulting in declined CSR performance. Our empirical results also shed new light on its contingent perspective – the inverted U-shaped relationship is attenuated when firms’ stock liquidity is high.

This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil the inverted U-shaped relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance. Our study opens promising avenues for further research on corporate governance and CSR strategies.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.

The study investigates how firm-level governance (FL_G) affects the disclosure of voluntary risk information. Likewise, it explores the influence of FL_G on the informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure (VRD). Specifically, it examines how FL_G shapes the nexus between VRD and firm value.

It uses a sample of non-financial firms from the FTSE350 index listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2018. The authors utilise an automated textual analysis technique to code the VRD in the annual reports of these firms. The firm value, adjusted for the industry median, is a proxy for investor response to VRD.

The results suggest that UK firms with significant board independence and larger audit committees disclose more risk information voluntarily. Nevertheless, firms with larger boards of directors and higher managerial ownership disseminate less voluntary risk information. Besides, VRD contains relevant information that enhances investors' valuation of UK firms. These results are more pronounced in firms with higher independent directors, lower managerial ownership and large audit committees.

The study rationalises the ongoing debate on the effect of FL_G on VRD. The findings are helpful to UK policy-setters in reconsidering the guidelines that regulate UK VRD and to the UK investors in considering risk disclosure in their price decisions and thus enhancing their corporate valuations.

It contributes to the risk reporting literature in the UK by presenting the first evidence on the effect of a comprehensive set of FL_G on VRD. Besides, it enriches the existing research by shedding light on the role of FL_G on the informativeness of discretionary risk information in the UK.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on financial constraints (FC). Furthermore, the authors investigate the moderating impact of two key ownership variables, insider and institutional ownership, separately and their interacting effect on the CSR-FC relationship.

The study sample consists of 137 nonfinancial Pakistan Stock Exchange listed firms from 2010 to 2019. Firms’ participation in socially responsible activities is measured using a multidimensional financial approach, whereas FC are determined using the WW index. The findings were observed using the dynamic generalized method of moments model.

According to the findings, CSR has a negative impact on FC. In terms of moderating impact, the interactive variable of CSR and insider ownership does not affect FC, implying that when an insider owns a majority of shares, the negative relationship between CSR and FC is weaker. The findings demonstrate the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. In terms of the moderating effect of institutional ownership, CSR and institutional ownership have a significant but positive relationship with FC, implying that when powerful institutional investors are present, the negative relationship between CSR and FC disappears, demonstrating that higher institutional ownership leads to shareholder conflicts. Finally, the interactive variable of insider and institutional ownership has no statistically significant effect on the CSR-FC relationship. This insignificant relationship does not support the substitution or complementarity effect of corporate governance.

The authors measure CSR activities using a multidimensional financial approach; however, in the future, CSR should be measured using qualitative aspects such as content analysis to strengthen the findings. Because the research is limited to a single emerging economy, Pakistan, the generalizability of the findings is limited. In the future, this research could be replicated in other emerging economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The findings of the study will assist regulatory authorities, investors, financial analysts and other stakeholders in better understanding CSR practices in Pakistani firms, as well as the role of CSR and two other important aspects of internal governance mechanisms, namely, insider ownership and institutional ownership, in the CSR-FC relationship.

Few studies in the literature investigate the impact of CSR on FC. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in an emerging market to empirically test this relationship and further investigate the role of insider and institutional ownership in this unexplored relationship.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retrenchment strategy on firm performance in the context of Pakistani firms while considering the moderating role of chief executive officer (CEO) power. By examining the influence of CEO duality and CEO share ownership on the relationship, this study contributes to strategic management and corporate governance knowledge within the Pakistani business environment.

A quantitative approach was used to analyze the relationship using data from annual financial statements. The sample consisted of 76 companies from the KSE-100 index from the year 2015 to 2020. Random effects regression models were used, along with hierarchical regression to explore the moderating effect of CEO power.

The findings demonstrate that the implementation of a retrenchment strategy positively impacts firm performance in Pakistani firms. The study also reveals that CEO power plays a crucial role in strengthening the relationship between retrenchment strategy and firm performance. Moreover, the study highlights the importance of considering the temporal sequence, size and age of firms when examining the impact of CEO power and retrenchment strategy on firm performance.

The study enhances the understanding of the contingent nature of retrenchment strategies and the influence of CEO power in the Pakistani business context. Practically, the research contributes to strategic management and corporate governance dynamics, facilitating the development of strategies that enhance firm performance and sustainability in Pakistan.

This research provides original insights by specifically focusing on the Pakistani context and analyzing the interplay between retrenchment strategy, CEO power and firm performance. The study adds to the limited literature on the relationship between retrenchment and performance in the Pakistani business environment. Additionally, it highlights the significance of CEO power as a critical factor in determining the success of retrenchment.

This study analyses the effects of firm efficiency on firm performance and how controlling shareholders moderate the link between the two variables.

This study employs data envelopment analysis to estimate firm efficiency and the panel regression method to assess the hypothesised relationships among 1,295 firm-year observations of publicly listed firms in Malaysia from 2015 to 2019.

The results indicate that firm efficiency (technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency) has mixed relationships with firm performance (return on assets, market-to-book ratio and operating cash flows), all of which are being moderated by controlling shareholdings.

This study highlights the importance of assessing firm efficiency as the key success factor for improving firm performance. Industrial managers should manage efficiently their resources or operating costs in achieving their corporate financial goals. Moreover, this study notes the presence of controlling shareholders, who can be either self-interested or company goal aligned.

This study suggests becoming efficient in transforming inputs into outputs is a prerequisite before investigating accrual-based and cash-based firm performance measures, and the presence of controlling shareholders matters in these regards.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board characteristics (board size, board independence and duality) on the performance of takaful insurance providers with distinguishable muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid) moderated by ownership concentration.

The sample consists of 30 takaful insurances. The authors divided it into two subsamples: 18 insurance companies using wakalah contracts provided by Southeast Asia and 12 insurance companies using hybrid contracts provided by the Gulf Cooperation Council over the period 2010–2020. For data analysis, the authors used the partial least squares path modeling method.

The results show that the larger the board of directors and the higher the number of independent directors, the greater the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. Nondual functions improve the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. The results also reveal that a highly concentrated ownership structure positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between board size and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsamples. Moreover, highly concentrated ownership insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between independent directors and takaful’s performance in the hybrid (wakalah) subsample. Furthermore, a highly concentrated ownership structure insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between the nondual structure and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsample.

This study contributes to the understanding of the moderating role of a highly concentrated ownership structure between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of takaful insurance, which applies wakalah and hybrid contracts. In addition, this study contributes to takaful insurance by determining the appropriate board characteristics that must be adopted to achieve oversight and improve performance. Regulators should appreciate this contribution to the formulation of suitable approaches for efficiently supervising takaful insurance activities.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.