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1 – 10 of over 23000Hamdan Amer Al-Jaifi, Ahmed Hussein Al-rassas and Adel Ali AL-Qadasi
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance strength on stock market liquidity in an emerging country, namely, Malaysia, by constructing a corporate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance strength on stock market liquidity in an emerging country, namely, Malaysia, by constructing a corporate governance score that captures both internal monitoring mechanisms (board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee’s characteristics and internal audit function) and external monitoring mechanism (audit quality).
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses a sample of 2,020 yearly firm observations in Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2012. The ordinary least square regression and several estimation methods such as two-stage least squares using instrumental variables (IV-2SLS) and dynamic GMM are employed.
Findings
This study finds a significant positive association between corporate governance effectiveness and stock market liquidity. The finding is robust to alternative liquidity measurements, to alternative estimation methods, and to endogeneity bias.
Research limitations/implications
This result implies that the firms with effective monitoring mechanisms mitigate information asymmetry which leads to less adverse selection problems among traders.
Practical implications
This study provides implications for regulators to help design regulations that enhance stock market liquidity. This study could also help investors and traders to formulate their trading decisions, and enables firms to know the importance of strengthening the corporate governance monitoring mechanisms.
Originality/value
This study constructs a corporate governance effectiveness measure by combining both internal and external monitoring mechanisms. These mechanisms have not been constructed together in one score in the corporate governance literature and the impact of internal audit function, as an internal monitoring mechanism on liquidity, has yet to be examined.
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Adel AlQadasi and Shamharir Abidin
This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by…
Abstract
Purpose
This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by ownership concentration. The complementary view predicts that good internal governance mechanisms are related to high-quality audit. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms may be substituted for each other, so more investment in governance mechanisms leads to less investment in external auditing. Therefore, this study aims to examine the association between internal governance mechanisms and the demand for audit quality.
Design/methodology/approach
Data from Malaysian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2012 are used. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied to analyse the data.
Findings
Companies with a higher concentration of ownership are less likely to demand extensive auditing. In addition, the study provides supporting evidence for the complementary association between a company’s governance and audit fees. However, the ownership concentration plays a minor role in the positive association between internal corporate governance and audit quality. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings.
Practical implications
Significant implications are provided for the audit profession in emerging economies, where concentrated ownership is common, to help policymakers and regulators in determining the power of controlling shareholders on audit quality and firm’s governance. The study’s findings open up avenues for further research.
Originality/value
This is the first work to address the role of ownership concentration in the association between corporate governance and audit quality; it suggests that the ownership structure must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. The study also provides a comprehensive combination of internal governance mechanisms.
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Adam Yahya Jafeel, Ei Yet Chu and Yousif Abdelbagi Abdalla
This study aims to empirically examine the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms (ICGM) related to the size of the board, board composition, CEO duality and audit…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to empirically examine the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms (ICGM) related to the size of the board, board composition, CEO duality and audit committee independence as a single metric on a firm’s investment decisions.
Design/methodology/approach
This study attempts to develop an internal corporate governance quality index comprising 10 items under four main ICGMs – size and independence of the board, CEO duality and audit committee independence – employing panel data analysis to investigate its impact on the investment decisions in 301 nonfinancial firms listed in six emerging capital markets in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries for the years 2015–2020. Data were extracted from sample companies' websites, stock markets, annual reports and Refinitiv database.
Findings
This study provides convincing evidence that effective ICGMs minimize inefficient investment and ultimately boost investment efficiency. The findings remain consistent even after considering the potential endogeneity bias.
Originality/value
This study provides empirical evidence on investment efficiency in the GCC region and emphasizes the importance of high-quality ICGMs in reducing inefficient investment. By examining the impact of ICGMs on investment inefficiencies, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature. The GCC region's unique economic and social contexts, with its growing economies, are considered to shed light on this issue.
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Hamdan Amer Al-Jaifi, Ahmed Hussien Al-Rassas and Adel Al-Qadasi
This study aims to examine the institutional investors’ preferences for internal governance mechanisms (internal audit function and audit committee effectiveness) in an emerging…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the institutional investors’ preferences for internal governance mechanisms (internal audit function and audit committee effectiveness) in an emerging country like Malaysia.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of 2,020 yearly firm observations in Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2012 is used. The two-stage least squares using instrumental variables (IV-2SLS) analysis is used to examine the relationships. To corroborate the findings of this study, a regression based on a one-year lag of the independent variables is used. Furthermore, ordinary least square regression and Generalized Method of Moments using instrumental variables (IV-GMM) are used.
Findings
Positive associations are found between the internal audit function and audit committee effectiveness and the institutional ownership.
Research limitations/implications
These findings imply that institutional investors gravitate to firms that have high investment in internal audit function and effective audit committee. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that institutional investors try to minimize monitoring and exit costs and meet their fiduciary responsibility by investing in better internal audit firms.
Practical implications
This study offers insights to policymakers interested in enhancing internal governance mechanisms to attract institutional investors.
Originality/value
Limited empirical studies have examined the relation between internal governance mechanisms (internal audit function and audit committee effectiveness) and institutional ownership. This study adds to the existing literature on the importance of internal governance mechanisms by documenting an association between internal audit function and audit committee effectiveness and institutional ownership in an emerging country like Malaysia.
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Francisco Elder Escossio de Barros, Ruan Carlos dos Santos, Lidinei Eder Orso and Antonia Márcia Rodrigues Sousa
From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais…
Abstract
Purpose
From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO).
Design/methodology/approach
A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts.
Findings
The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.
Research limitations/implications
The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.
Practical implications
This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.
Social implications
While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.
Originality/value
This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs.
Design/methodology/approach
The author uses data from German firms that were listed in the regulated market of the Frankfurt Stock exchange during 2006-2011. Agency costs were measured using stochastic frontier analysis, a relatively new approach to estimate agency costs. The regression analysis is applied to test the model.
Findings
The results indicate that an industry specialized audit firm, the presence of a large audit firm, abnormal audit fees, management ownership and variable management compensation are significantly negatively associated with the level of a firms’ agency costs. In contrast, this seems not to be true for the existence of an audit committee for which the results of the paper document a non-significant association.
Originality/value
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the research design is to the best of the authors’ knowledge the first that investigates the influence of different corporate governance mechanisms on the level of agency costs. Second, previous studies are mainly focused on the US audit market. This focus on the US audit market leaves uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude of the empirical relationship in the European and German environmental context. Finally, the paper provides initial empirical evidence for a sample of German IFRS listed companies (IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards).
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Hani El-Chaarani and Zouhour El-Abiad
The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.
Design/methodology/approach
Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).
Findings
This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.
Originality/value
This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.
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Khaled Aljifri and Mohamed Moustafa
The main aim of this study is to investigate empirically the effect of some internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the UAE firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q)…
Abstract
The main aim of this study is to investigate empirically the effect of some internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the UAE firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q). Like many of the developing countries all over the world, the UAE has recently initiated the application of the international standards of corporate governance as a part of its merge with the global economy. This study utilizes a sample of 51 firms using the accounting and market data available for 2004. The sample firms are all listed in either the Dubai Financial Market or the Abu Dubai Securities Market. The cross‐sectional regression analysis is employed to test the hypotheses of the study. The results of this study show that the governmental ownership, the debt ratio (total debt/total assets), and the payout dividends ratio have a significant impact on the firm performance; whereas the institutional investors, the board size, the firm size (sales), and the audit type show a non‐significant impact. This study concludes that three of the corporate governance mechanisms in the UAE used in this study appear to be strong enough to affect the firm performance. However, the other four mechanisms are found to have a weak effect on the firm performance which could be a result of the significant absence of some aspects of corporate governance practices and lack of enforcement of rules.
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Khaled Hussainey and Khaled Aljifri
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate financial decisions in one of the emerging economies, United Arab Emirates…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate financial decisions in one of the emerging economies, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, the paper examines the degree to which internal corporate governance mechanisms and an external corporate governance mechanism affect UAE firms’ capital structure.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses a multiple regression analysis to examine the association between corporate governance and capital structure for a sample of 71 UAE firms listed either in the Dubai financial market or the Abu Dhabi securities market during 2006.
Findings
The paper finds that institutional investors have a negative impact on debt‐to‐equity ratio. This result does not support the “active monitoring hypotheses” where institutional investors are expected to exercise their voting rights effectively in order to prevent managers from reducing their “employment risk” at the expense of the interests of shareholders. It also finds that dividend policy is negatively associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio, while firms’ size is positively associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio.
Research limitations/implications
Empirical analysis suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have important implications for UAE firms’ financial policies. UAE managers should be aware of the benefits of the implementation of effective internal and external corporate governance mechanisms while embracing international corporate governance standards. An effective implementation of the codes of corporate governance should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of UAE firms and the UAE stock markets.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no study that has yet empirically examined the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure in UAE or Middle Eastern countries. This study offers the first evidence of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure in UAE.
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Mohd Hassan Che Haat, Rashidah Abdul Rahman and Sakthi Mahenthiran
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies.
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach
Samples were selected using matched‐sampling method and hierarchical regression was employed to test the relationship between among corporate governance mechanism, transparency and performance.
Findings
Corporate governance factors have a strong predicting power on company performance, mainly due to debt monitoring and foreign ownership. However, there is a significant negative relation between audit quality and performance. The results find that performance is not associated with the level of disclosure and timely reporting. The results indicate that disclosure and timeliness are not significant contributing factors in the relationship between corporate governance and market performance.
Research limitations/implications
The data covers a one‐year period of 2002 only. This paper deals only with “one‐way” causality running from corporate governance mechanisms to performance, even though, there is evidence of “reverse‐way” and “two‐way” causality in governance literature.
Practical implications
This paper indicates that internal governance mechanisms are not important determinants to corporate performance. However, governance in forms of debt monitoring and foreign ownership have significant influence on corporate performance. Transparency (i.e. disclosure and timeliness of reporting) is not a significant mediating variable between corporate governance and performance.
Originality/value
Distinct from previous empirical research as the disclosure level is measured using self‐designed corporate governance index. Apart from a study conducted in an Asian setting of Malaysia, the study also tests transparency as a mediating variable between corporate governance and performance
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