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Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

In 2011, Dutch municipalities requested supplementary legal enforcement instruments to tackle rogue landlords and substandard housing. The national government implemented new legislation granting municipalities’ local authorities more legal instruments in 2015. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the application and effectiveness of these instruments.

Using both quantitative and qualitative (legal) empirical research methods, this study establishes the frequency these instruments are used and the manner they are applied in practice to determine their role in limiting abusive practices of rogue landlords.

By comparing legislation and policies with their enforcement, the authors pinpoint differences between the law in the books and the law in practice and argue that the legal instruments have a stronger effect on the informal power than on formal power of local authorities. Moreover, the paper shows that the shift of responsibility from the Public Prosecutions Office to local authorities has left the Public Prosecutions Office disinterested, feeling that it no longer has to deal with substandard housing violations at all, therefore leaving the repeat offenders free to continue their activities with minor consequences.

The paper presents original data on the ways governments address substandard housing and rogue landlords. This is the first study that analyses the fight against substandard housing in the Dutch context. Although centred on legislation and procedures in The Netherland, the paper’s findings are relevant in other jurisdictions facing similar issues.

This article aims to consider the role of the European Union (EU) in the prevention of money laundering and to show that the EU has a lot more to win in this field of policy.

This article is based on a literature study and a thorough analysis of the EU Directives on the prevention of money laundering.

Whereas, the material norms for entities subject to regulation have been harmonised and adjusted to the risk‐based approach at European level, the norms regarding the enforcement instruments have mostly been left to the Member States' legislation. As a result, there exists a “patchwork” of enforcement mechanisms throughout the EU.

This article focuses on the prevention of money laundering on the level of the EU only; no connection is made to the international or to the national level.

This article does not provide a value judgment on the preventive rules at European level as such, but rather it offers an academic perspective on the role of the EU in the prevention of money laundering.

This paper aims to present a comparative analysis of noncompliance with planning laws in advanced-economy countries. Most research to date has focused on the widespread phenomenon of “informal” construction in developing countries. However, advanced-economy countries also encounter illegal development, though at different scales and attributes. Because planning law is at the foundation of land-use and urban policies, it is time that the “orphan” issue of noncompliance be adopted by more researchers to enable cross-national learning. The two OECD countries selected for in-depth analysis – Portugal and Israel – probably fall mid-way in the extent of noncompliance compared with the range among advanced-economy countries. Like most OECD countries, the selected countries have generally viable planning-law systems. Their experiences can thus offer lessons for many more countries. Recognizing the limitations of enforcement mechanisms as prevention, the paper focuses on how each of these countries responds to illegal development.

The method relies on two main sources: analysis of official documents – laws, policies and court decisions in both countries – and field interviews about practice. In both Portugal and Israel, the authors held face-to-face open interviews with lawyers and other professional staff at various government levels. The interviews focused on four issues: the effectiveness of the existing enforcement instruments, the urban consequences of illegal development, the law and policy regarding legalization and the existence of additional deterrent measures.

In both countries, there is a significant phenomenon of illegal development though it is somewhat less in Israel than in Portugal. In both countries, efforts to reduce the phenomenon have been partially effective even though in both, extensive demolition is not exercised. Neither country has adopted a general amnesty policy for existing noncompliance, so both resort to reliance on ex-post revision of statutory plans of granting of variances as a way of legalization. The shared tension between local authorities and national bodies indicates that not enough thought has gone into designing the compliance and enforcement systems. In Israel, a recent legislative amendment enables planning authorities, for the first time, to set their own priorities for enforcement and to distinguish between minor and major infringements. This approach is preferable to the Portuguese law, where there is still no distinction between minor and major infringements. By contrast, Portuguese law and policy are more effective in adopting financial or real-estate based deterrence measures which restrict sale or mortgaging of illegal properties.

There is very little research on noncompliance with planning controls in advanced-economy countries. There is even less research on the legal and institutional responses to this phenomenon. This paper pioneers in creating a framework for looking at alternative types of government responses to illegal construction. The paper is, to the authors’ best knowledge, the first to present a systematic cross-national comparative analysis and critique of such responses. The authors thus hope to expand the view of the possible legal and policy response strategies available to planning authorities in other advanced-economy countries. The comparative perspective will hopefully encourage, expansion of the research to more countries and contribute to the exchange of experiences between jurisdictions.

Drawing on the international business and IHRM literature, this study investigated the effects that employment regulation and its nature of enforcement have on foreign investment in emerging markets.

Panel regressions with time fixed effects were conducted for the period 2002–2017 using regulatory, human capital, and economic data for 34 developing nations. Robustness checks also were performed by varying the measures for key predictors along with the modes of analysis (i.e., Pooled OLS with clustered standard errors, generalized estimating equations (GEE), and instrumental variable (IV) regression with the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach).

Although the totality of restrictions did not have an impact, FDI inflows were negatively related to the process strength of enforcement. This suggests investors place greater emphasis on de facto exposure than on de jure enactments, favoring nations less willing or able to push for compliance. In addition, while GDP growth had a positive impact on inward investment, the opposite was found for licensing restrictions and labor productivity. The remaining controls failed to display consistent relationships with foreign investment.

Data constraints precluded the inclusion of additional economies and years before 2001. It also was not possible to directly evaluate the influence of labor costs without a standardized measure for developing nations. This entered at best indirectly in GDP per capita, which was tested.

These findings have important implications for social responsibility, suggesting more aggressive monitoring is needed of investment criteria and government relations. At a minimum, social auditing and reporting should better document overt commitments to rights-adherence and compliance-partnering. CSR stakeholders can work in tandem, tracking enforcement more closely and lobbying governments to discourage policies of lax enforcement.

This is the first study to assess how legal stock and its manner of enforcement influence FDI inflows. Improving on earlier studies, employment law was measured with a broad legal scale that was annually adjusted. Enforcement was evaluated in two different forms, both as process strength and administrative capacity – the former drawing investors' attention.

As computer and Internet‐related crimes continue to increase in prevalence and scope, some law enforcement agencies have developed specialized task forces to address the issue. Because of the relative newness of high‐tech deviance, however, it is not clear how to best proceed with the efficient, productive, and strategic allocation of resources, the provision of assistance to other departments, and the general development of policy. Research on a national level has provided some insight as to the requirements of law enforcement in dealing with computer crime, and has suggested deeper inquiry on a state and local level. Accordingly, survey research was conducted across Michigan to empirically assess the needs of state and local law enforcement resulting from the commission of these offenses. Some questions addressed the types of computer crimes most frequently encountered, the extent of training received, and the specific types of formal instruction desired by personnel to increase proficiency in investigations. It is hoped that the results will provide a basis of comparison to the national findings, and serve as an instructional tool for other agencies in other states and even other countries in their efforts to shape and direct fruitful computer crime control initiatives.

This exploratory study tests one of the key assumptions of community policing: that there is a relatively high level of consensus both within and between community groups, or stakeholders, about community problems and potential solutions. Results show that in the target community there is some consensus about social problems and their solutions. However, the study also reveals that the consensus may not be community‐wide, but may exist only among a relatively small group of “active” stakeholders who differ significantly about the seriousness of most of the problems and the utility of some solutions. Implications for community policing are discussed.