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Why is it that, despite repeated claims that digital-content firms and internet-based businesses can internationalize everywhere almost instantly, many seem unable to profitably expand outside their home markets? Why have emerging market firms (EMNEs) caught up with established developed-country multinationals (DMNEs) so much faster than expected? In this chapter, the author argues that the clue to these two puzzles lies in the realization that, contrary to the dominant view in the international business (IB) literature that focuses only on the intangibles exploited by DMNEs and assumes that these firms are free to unilaterally decide on their mode of entry and operation, doing business in a foreign country is only possible if intangibles are bundled with complementary local resources, usually held by local firms. Taking into account these complementary local resources and their owners makes it clear that DMNEs are not always free to choose their entry mode but must enlist the cooperation of local resource owners. The need of digital-content and internet-based firms for local complementary resources also explains why they sometimes experience problems when expanding abroad. Lastly, control of complementary local resources provides EMNEs with a home advantage against DMNEs competing with them in their home market. The author shows how EMNEs can capitalize on this advantage to obtain the intangibles they lack and need. The fact that these advantages are available on efficient global markets, while complementary local resources are not, explains the surprising speed of EMNE catch-up.

The changing roles of the United Nations (UN) and national institutions have made addressing climate change a critical concern for many multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) survival and growth. This chapter discusses how such institutions, which vary in their nature and characteristics, shape firm strategies for climate change adaptation. Exploring different versions of institutional theory, the chapter demonstrates how and why institutional characteristics affect typical patterns of firm ownership, governance, and capabilities. These, in turn, influence companies’ internationalisation and climate-change strategies. Climate change poses challenges to how we understand firms’ strategic decisions from both an international business (IB) (HQ–subsidiary relations) and global value chains (GVC) (buyer–supplier relations) perspective. However, climate change also provides opportunities for companies to gain competitive advantages – if firms can reconfigure and adapt faster than their competitors. Existing IB and GVC research tends to downplay the importance of climate change strategies and the ways in which coherent or dysfunctional institutions affect firms’ reconfiguration and adaptation strategies in a globally dispersed network of value creation. This chapter presents a perspective on the institutional conditions that affect firms’ climate change strategies regarding ownership, location, and internalisation (OLI), and GVCs, with ‘investment’ and ‘emerging standards’ playing a significant role. The authors illustrate the discussion using several examples from the Global South (i.e. Bangladesh) and the Global North (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, and Germany) with a special emphasis on the garment industry. The aim is to encourage future research to examine how a ‘business systems’, or varieties of capitalism, institutional perspective can complement the analysis of sustainability and climate change strategies in IB and GVC studies.

This study investigates the efficiency of value relevance and faithful representation when stock market price derivates from its firm value to the investigated IT companies listed in FTSE Taiwan 50. The empirical investigation reveals one financial indicators: Return on equity (ROE) has explanatory ability among seven financial indicators, earnings per share (EPS), book value (BV), dividend yield (Div.), price–earnings ratio (P/E), ROE, return on assets (ROA), and return on operating asset (ROOA) to both sampled companies, United Microelectronics Corporation, UMC, (2303) and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, TSMC, (2330). Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that the higher order moments, skewness and kurtosis, of price deviation do not provide a reliable prediction or explanatory power for stock price trends.

As a financial policy, dividend policy significantly affects firm value. This chapter analyzes how stock prices react to dividend decisions. First, a dividend payment is an extraction of value; therefore, stock price theoretically drops by the dividend amount on the ex-dividend day. In practice, the price drop and the dividend magnitude are not equal because of tax clientele, short-term trading, and market microstructure. Investors are indifferent in trading stocks before and after stocks go ex-dividend if they obtain equal marginal benefits from the two trading times. The difference in tax rates on dividends and capital gains leads to the gap between the price drop and the dividend amount. Moreover, if transaction costs are considerable, investors have high incentives to short-sell stocks until they cannot obtain more profits. The final outcome of this short-term trading is the difference between the price drop and the dividend amount. Furthermore, market microstructure factors such as limit orders, bid-ask spread, and price discreteness also create this gap. Second, dividend announcements convey valuable information to outsiders. When firms announce increases (decreases) in dividends, their stock prices tend to increase (decrease). Third, dividend policy is negatively related to stock price volatility. This negative relationship is explained by duration effect, rate of return effect, arbitrage realization effect, and information effect. Empirical evidence for this relationship is found in many countries. Finally, dividend smoothing is also considered as a signal about firms' future earnings. Consequently, firms with stable dividends have higher market value. In other words, dividend stability has a positive effect on stock prices.

In Chapter 1, we critically reviewed the foundations of the free enterprise capital system (FECS), which has been successful primarily because of its wealth and asset accumulation potentiality and actuality. In this chapter, we critically argue that this capacity has been grounded upon the profit maximization (PM) theories, models, and paradigms of FECS. The intent of this chapter is not anti-PM. The PM models of FECS have worked and performed well for more than 200 years of the economic history of the United States and other developed countries, and this phenomenon is celebrated and featured as “market performativity.” However, market performativity has not truly benefitted the poor and the marginalized; on the contrary, market performativity has wittingly or unwittingly created gaping inequalities of wealth, income, opportunity, and prosperity. Critical thinking does not combat PM but challenges it with alternative models of profit sharing that promote social wealth, social welfare, social progress, and opportunity for all, which we explore here. Economic development without social progress breeds economic inequality and social injustice. Economic development alone is not enough; we should create a new paradigm in which economic development is the servant of social progress, not vice versa. Such a paradigm shift involves integrating the creativity and innovativity of market performativity and the goals and drives of social performativity together with PM, that is, from market performativity to social performativity.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

There is growing empirical evidence that firm heterogeneity is technologically non-neutral. This chapter extends the Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) proxy variable framework for structurally identifying production functions to a more general case when latent firm productivity is multi-dimensional, with both factor-neutral and (biased) factor-augmenting components. Unlike alternative methodologies, the proposed model can be identified under weaker data requirements, notably, without relying on the typically unavailable cross-sectional variation in input prices for instrumentation. When markets are perfectly competitive, point identification is achieved by leveraging the information contained in static optimality conditions, effectively adopting a system-of-equations approach. It is also shown how one can partially identify the non-neutral production technology in the traditional proxy variable framework when firms have market power.

In our studies of daily newspapers and news websites in small and medium-sized cities in Brazil, we view these enterprises as firms endowed with specific strengths and weaknesses reflecting the characteristics of the localities in which they operate. In addition, we use references from urban geography and the industrial economy to investigate their structure, conduct, and performance. This chapter presents our observations about the structure of these firms and the journalistic business in non-metropolitan cities of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The results point to greater consolidation of newspapers, despite their traditional way of operating; the low performance of news websites and their restricted source of revenue; and the existence of a potential regional market little explored by these media.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.

The management of consumer privacy has become a critical concern for organizations in the age of artificial intelligence–powered marketing. The impact of data on the market environment has brought both benefits and challenges, with marketers gaining valuable insights but also raising privacy concerns. As artificial intelligence–powered marketing advances, consumer vulnerability increases due to the sensitivity of collected data. This vulnerability leads some consumers to resort to falsifying information, posing a significant threat to the digital economy. Privacy empowerment and customer control play a vital role in addressing these challenges. This chapter explores the influencing factors and ethical considerations surrounding data falsification. It also discusses strategies to mitigate perceived vulnerability through privacy controls and explores the consequences of data breaches and customer vulnerability. The chapter further emphasizes the need for organizations to balance benefits, risks, and customer trust while harnessing the value of customer data. An ethical framework for data privacy marketing audits is proposed to help organizations assess their data practices responsibly and competitively. By integrating personal data protection strategies within an ethical framework, organizations can protect consumer privacy, enhance customer trust, and maintain their competitive edge in the market.