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The purpose of this paper is to answer a specific research question: How have EU and US regulators translated the idea of central clearing into law?

A meticulous legal research is carried out. First, the pre‐crisis regulatory regime for credit default swap (CDS) is reviewed, from a securities law angle as well as from a comparative Euro‐American perspective. Next, the regulatory processes leading to the adoption of the central clearing regulations are discussed. Thereafter, a material comparative analysis is made of the provisions related to central clearing in the EU and US regulatory initiatives. Finally, the paper is concluded with an evaluation of both legislations in the light of all previous analyses.

The research first shows that central clearing regulations rely on a series of presumptions, both concerning the gravity of counterparty risk threats and the necessity of central clearing. Additionally, the EU and US clearing regulations are similar with regard to the broad innovations they introduce, i.e. the mandatory central clearing of a variety of over‐the‐counter derivatives and counterparty risk management requirements for central clearing institutions and for non‐cleared swaps. However, the specific content of the provisions often differs. Furthermore, both legislations are limited to enouncing broad principles. This is also the case for the crucial provisions related to counterparty risk management. Therefore, these provisions in se do not guarantee the proper regulation of counterparty risk management practices. Consequently, much is to be expected from the implementing measures adopted by regulatory institutions.

The paper provides an overview of those provisions in the European and US regulations that specifically concern central clearing for CDS. It is one of the first papers which does this in a very well‐structured and clearly written manner. Also it is one of the first to provide a clear comparison between the provisions in the EU and the US regulations.

This paper aims to apply blockchains (BCs) for trade clearing and settlement in a realistic clearinghouse. The purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of this approach.

The study uses account BCs and trading BCs as building blocks for trade clearing and settlement. Careful design is made to ensure that this approach is feasible and scalable.

A design has been proposed that can process hundreds of thousands of trades for a clearinghouse and it addresses performance, privacy and scalability of realistic trade clearing and settlement. The design has been implemented and experimented in a clearinghouse for over two months and processes over 3B real transactions from an exchange. The first month was to experiment with the system with historical data, the second month was to experiment with real-time data during market trading hours. The system performed as designed and intended.

This is the first large research paper that applied BCs for clearing in the world. The authors applied the system to a clearinghouse and processed over 3 billion transactions, equivalent to 13 years of London Stock Exchange transaction volume, demonstrating that BCs can handle a large number of transactions.

The design can be duplicated to many clearinghouses in the world, and this also paves the way BCs can be used in large financial institutions.

An implication is that other trading firms, clearinghouses and banks can apply the same technology for trade clearing, ushering the way BCs can be used in institutions. As clearing is a core function in business transactions, this has significant implications. The design can be discussed and improved in various communities.

As this is the first application of BCs to large clearinghouses that uses unique BC designs. This has significant value. Many studies have been performed but few have been reported in the scientific community. The system has been implemented, experimented and demonstrated in public for months.

The past decade, with its unprecedented surge in financial activity and financial crises, has been one of increased awareness on the part of both regulatory authorities and market participants of the potential of payment systems for propagating and amplifying financial shocks, especially in a cross‐border context. This has led the European Commission to propose, on 30th May 1996, a Directive aimed at reducing systemic risk. (This has been the subject of an earlier contribution by the same author, pub‐lished in Vol 5, No 1 of the Journal.) In the meanwhile, the European Parliament has delivered its opinion and the Council has adopted a common position. This paper examines the contents of this common position.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce blockchains and distributed ledgers and describe their potential applications to money and banking.

The analysis compares public and private ledgers and outlines the suitability of various types of ledgers for different purposes. Furthermore, a few historical prototypes of blockchains and distributed ledgers are presented, and results of their hard forking are illustrated. Next, some potential applications of distributed ledgers to trading, clearing and settlement, payments, trade finance, etc. are outlined.

Monetary circuits are argued to be natural applications for blockchains. Finally, the role of digital currencies in modern society is articulated and various forms of digital cash, such as central bank issued electronic cash, bank money, Bitcoin and P2P money, are compared and contrasted.

The purpose of this summary is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued from April to June 2009 and a sample of disciplinary actions during that period.

The paper provides excerpts from Regulatory Notice 09‐22, Personal Securities Transactions; 09‐25, Suitability and “Know Your Customer”; 09‐27, Member Public Offerings; 09‐30, Credit Default Swaps; 09‐34, Investment Company Securities; 09‐35, Municipal Securities.

Notice 09‐22: Sound supervisory practices require that a member firm monitor personal securities transactions outside of the firm by or for its associated persons. Notice 09‐25: Suitability obligations and know‐your customer obligations are critical to protecting investors. Notice 09‐27: The offering of securities by a member firm or a control entity of the firm in a private placement raises conflicts of interest and has been an area of regulatory concern in recent years. Notice 09‐30: Regulatory authorities are adopting measures to address system risk arising from credit default swaps (CDS), including risks to the financial system arising from the lack of a central clearing counterparty to clear and settle CDS; the SEC has approved a rule establishing an interim pilot program on margin requirements for CDS transactions. Notice 09‐34: As part of the process to develop a new consolidated rulebook, FINRA is requesting comment on a proposed rule regarding the distribution and sale of investment company securities. Notice 09‐35: FINRA recommends that firms engaged in municipal securities business review and, if necessary, modify their policies and procedures in light of changes to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's (MSRB) Electronic Municipal Market Access system (EMMA) that take effect July 1, 2009, and changes to MSRB rules that went into effect June 1, 2009. FINRA also encourages firms to review the overall adequacy and effectiveness of their current policies and procedures for municipal securities activities generally, particularly those relating to the disclosure of material information, the suitability of recommendations to retail customers, and the general supervision of their municipal securities activities.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org

The purpose of this paper is to explain and analyze recent US Congressional, Obama Administration, and financial services industry initiatives to reform and regulate the market for OTC derivatives.

The paper outlines Congressional committee bills, other Obama Administration initiatives, and industry self‐regulatory initiatives and discusses underlying current issues such as which derivatives would and would not have to be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs); how standardized and customized derivatives would be distinguished from each other; potential margin, business conduct, reporting, and recordkeeping standards for OTC derivatives dealers; how fraud, market manipulation, and other market abuses would be policed; possible limitations on the types of parties that may participate in unregulated derivatives; possible resolution of the sometimes confusing and overlapping authority of the SEC and CFTC over OTC derivatives; how and by which federal or state authority credit default swaps (CDS) might be regulated; the potential for regulatory arbitrage; and the danger that stringent regulation in the USA will drive OTC derivatives business offshore.

Unlike markets for other financial instruments, derivatives market participants, largely through ISDA, have for some time cooperated closely with the New York Fed and engaged in a myriad self‐policing activities. Time will tell whether this existing framework, combined with the redoubled self‐policing efforts of market participants, will cause policymakers to seek appropriate legislation that will not threaten the preservation of the OTC derivatives market in the USA.

The paper presents a clear and detailed guide and explanation of recent regulatory initiatives and underlying issues.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that certain rules, implemented as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) of 2010, should be harmonized between economically equivalent products in swap and futures markets to prevent regulatory arbitrage.

The paper focuses on rules surrounding margin requirements and block size thresholds. As such, a background of clearing and exchange systems is presented to familiarize the reader with the risk management objectives of the regulation. Viewpoints of several leading commentators taken from a Commodity Futures Trading Commission roundtable and comment letters are then analysed to support the argument that margin requirements and block size thresholds should be the same for similar financial products.

Based on the review and analysis of several commentators and industry participants, harmonization of rules for swaps and economically equivalent futures contract should be achieved to prevent regulatory arbitrage.

To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no articles that address the swap futurization debate in this detail. This paper will be of interest to readers who would like to learn more about how the DFA has impacted the derivatives market leading to the recent trend of swap “futurization”. It is also ideal for those who are unfamiliar with current clearing and exchange systems, as it presents background detail of this framework to supplement the debate on swap rules.