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The purpose of this paper is to chart the chronology of insurance regulation in Ireland and evaluate the integration within European Union directives.

The approach used was to chart the development of insurance regulation in Ireland and establish the stakeholders in the insurance industry that are affected by regulation. The various aspects of the EU involvement in regulation were also listed.

Ireland is one of the few countries that has a single financial regulator that is the Central (Reserve) Bank. The Central Bank is recognised as the Irish national regulator for all insurance activities in the EU and with that carries responsibility for implementing EU directives. In comparing other regulatory systems, there is a mixture of direct government involvement, sector specific regulation, financial services regulation and Central Bank acting as regulator.

Research is based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators. It does not set a standard of regulation or compare different regulators but establishes the different forms of regulation in Ireland and the EU.

The paper establishes Ireland's insurance regulatory environment amongst its European peers. It also charts the development of insurance regulation from solvency to the current model of solvency and consumer protection with the other offices of Financial Services Ombudsman.

The paper is based on research based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators.

The purpose of this paper is to examine insurance regulation theories, regulatory agency structures and measures.

This study investigates significance of regulatory agency structure, key regulatory measures, political stability and cultural dimension in insurance markets of 56 developed and developing countries for 2005‐2009.

It was found that insurance consumption is lower in countries with an authority exclusively for insurance regulation but life insurance consumption is higher when the agency is part of government or when another agency is jointly responsible for insurance regulation. Market entry regulation leads to lower consumption whereas market exit regulation has the opposite effect. Solvency regulation and required use of standard forms for insurer financials lead to greater consumption of insurance. A positive impact on the nonlife market is observed for accounting regulation and regulator's intervention power.

Price control regulation may lower consumption of insurance whereas tariff rating brings about a rise in the consumption. Regulation of insurance intermediaries or corporate governance may lower insurance consumption whereas the requirement that insurers employ an actuary or actuaries gives rise to the consumption.

The author found no difference between OECD and non‐OECD countries. However, corruption‐freeness and inflation impact insurance consumption. Using OECD country data only, a negative impact was found of the single agency structure and tariff regulation in the life insurance market and a positive impact of regulation by two or more agencies in the life insurance market and of price control regulation in the nonlife insurance market. Corruption‐freeness positively affects the loss ratio in the life insurance market and the combined ratio in the nonlife insurance market.

From 1979 to 2023, the takaful structure has been adopted in many jurisdictions, making the documenting of its early days of establishment relatively difficult and somewhat unreliable. This is unlike conventional insurance, where the history and legislation are well documented and archived in various research (Hellwege, 2016; Marano and Siri, 2017). The purpose of this paper is to provide a chronology for the establishment and development of takaful via the takaful establishment in each jurisdiction, documenting its first takaful operator and first takaful regulation.

This paper has used a qualitative method in the form of reviewing literature and available data such as journals, books and official resources. The data is thoroughly analysed in order to build the chronology for takaful. It adopted an exploratory research design, which is deemed suitable in situations where few works of literature have examined the subject (Neuman, 2014). The paper explores the establishment and non-establishment of takaful in 57 countries. The paper categorises the countries into seven regions starting with the GCC, Levant, Asia, Central Asia, Africa, Europe and Others.

The takaful chronology presented in this paper shows that takaful operations exist in 47 jurisdictions, starting from Sudan and the UAE in 1979, with the most recent adopters being Morocco and Iran in December 2021. It is found that 22 jurisdictions do not have takaful regulations, and the Takaful Act 1984, issued in Malaysia, is considered the first takaful regulation that sets the basis for other regulations that follow.

The paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive chronology of takaful, especially as the few existing timelines have been found to be incomplete and consist of contradictory information.

This paper aims to investigate the interaction between capital requirements and pricing constraints as measures for insurance regulation.

In a theoretical model framework, the author derives the insurer’s shareholder-value-maximizing response to capital regulation, price regulation and the unregulated strategy as a benchmark; all three strategies are presented in an analytical form.

The paper demonstrates that risk-based capital requirements exhibit an efficiency advantage over price regulation and allow for lower premiums. Moreover, the analysis identifies situations in which price floors make insurance more expensive, but have no positive impact on the safety level.

The comparison between capital regulation and price floors provides policymakers with a methodology to evaluate which regulatory tool is more appropriate. Also, the article discusses that maximum discount rates for European life insurers could be ineffective when the new regulatory framework Solvency II is in place.

In all, the article obtains analytical and informative results with relevant implications for insurance regulation.

With the development of the Chinese economy and its gradually opened market, there are more and more chances for foreign business entities who want to expand their businesses in China. The insurance market is one the most attractive. However, getting the authorization for their insurance business is one problem they encounter. The purpose of this paper is to provide some different views about Chinese insurance license regulations for those who want to start their business in China.

Different from the office papers or Regulations of China, this paper is based on research interviews carried out in China (mainly in Beijing and Shanghai). The empirical methodology reveals the actual ideas and attitudes about Chinese insurance license regulations. Except that, the comparative about some issues have been carried on between Chinese insurance companies and foreign insurance companies.

The research interview reveals that it is not difficult for foreign insurers to meet the requirements of clauses of regulations. However, the attitude of Chinese insurance regulators and the culture background, and even the political opinions of the official leaders, have played a very important role in the decision of the regulatory body.

Owing to the limitation of funds and time for this interview research, the interviews were carried out mainly in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzheng. Even most of head offices of insurance companies located in these cities, however, it cannot be said these views represented the 100 percent true opinions.

These findings cannot be said in public, while everyone can understand it. That is the value of this paper.

This study aims to examine the hypothesis that the effect of insurer risks on profitability is conditional on regulation, using two main regulatory directives in the Ghanaian insurance market as a case study.

This study used the robust ordinary least square and random effect techniques in a panel data of 30 insurers from 2009 to 2015 to test the research hypothesis.

The results suggest that regulations on no credit premium and required capital have insignificant effects on profitability of insurers. On the contrary, this study documents evidence that both policies mitigate the effect of underwriting risk on profitability and suggests that regulations significantly mitigate the negative effect of underwriting risk to improve profitability.

The finding suggests that policymakers and regulators must continue to initiate, design and model regulations such that they help tame risk to improve the performance of insurers in Ghana.

This study provides first-time evidence on the role of regulations in controlling risks in a developing insurance market.

The National Insurance Joint Authority in exercise of powers conferred by sections 45, 50 and 99 of the National Insurance Act 1965, and the Minister of Social Security, in exercise of powers conferred by sections 10, 49 and 102 and Schedule 11 paragraphs 17 and 18 of that Act and the National Insurance Act 1967 Schedule 7, in each case in consequence of the last‐mentioned Act and in conjunction with the Treasury so far as relates to matters with regard to which the Treasury have so directed, and in exercise of all other powers enabling them in that behalf, hereby make the following regulations:—

Solvency and market conduct regulations play a crucial role in supporting life insurance development by boosting consumer confidence and securing a stable environment for insurers to write business. The regulation encapsulates not only the legal framework but also its enforcement. This study aims to focus on the latter and investigate the impact of solvency and market conduct examinations on life insurance development within a homogenous legal environment in the USA.

To test the relationship between the regulatory examinations and life insurance development, this study uses annual data for 51 US states over the period 2013–2018 and uses fixed and random effects panel regressions controlling for the possible omitted variables bias and serial correlation. This study constructs two groups of indicators to measure the robustness and ability of regulators to prevent insolvencies and opportunistic market practices and estimate their effects on market development.

The results show that more stringent regulators with respect to solvency examinations deter life insurers from their markets and channel to those markets with lenient examiners, hurting the development of life insurance in the stringent states. Additionally, regulators boost consumer confidence by providing robust market conduct practices, which results in higher life insurance demand.

This study contributes to the debates about the pros and cons of the current state-led regulation in the USA and the general benefits/costs of regulation for insurance market development.

We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems associated with moral hazard. The minimum level of input use that must be required by regulation is determined to be substantially lower than the optimal or actual input level chosen by producers. Because the use of inputs for crop production occurs in many stages over the pre‐planting, planting, and growing seasons, only a minimal input requirement is needed. Thus, the cost of implementing such a regulation can be kept much lower than would be the case for a regulation of complete monitoring of input usage.