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Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance mechanisms exist. This review of agency theory (AT), across four distinct fields, explains the connection between governance mechanisms and supply chain relationship types.

The study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) of articles using AT in a supply chain context from the operations and supply chain management, general management, marketing, and economics fields.

The authors categorize the governance mechanisms identified to create a typology of agency relationships in supply chains.

The developed typology provides parsimonious theory on different forms of supply chain agency relationships and takes a step towards a “supply chain-oriented agency theory” explaining and predicting relationship types and governance in supply chains. Furthermore, a future research agenda calls for more accurate measuring of agency costs, to examine residual gains alongside residual losses, to take a dual-sided perspective of agency relations and to adopt AT to examine more complex supply networks.

The review provides a menu of governance mechanisms and describes situations under which these mechanisms could be deployed to guide managers when developing their supply chain relationships.

The first review to combine and elaborate views from four major disciplines using AT as a lens to supply chain relationships. Expanding the traditional set of governance mechanisms provides academics and practitioners with a bigger “menu” of options to consider.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss in depth the factors that lead to misalignment between the project management (PM) and the business strategy by investigating four case studies in the telecommunications industry in Saudi Arabia.

Due to the limited research on the subject of the alignment of PM and business strategy, the methodology used in this research was a case study in depth interview.

The paper highlights the important factors that affect the process of aligning the PM to the business strategy. The companies that have strong alignment between the business strategy and the PM show successful projects outcome while the companies that have mismatch alignment show less successful projects outcome.

The paper has investigated four telecommunications companies only. However, more companies will be better to compare the finding. Due to time constrains, the research has studied one project in each company. Each project was supporting one of the company's business strategies. More projects and business strategies will lead to clear picture of the alignment. Access to executives’ managers and CIO's was difficult. Several meetings were cancelled without short notice.

This paper helps the companies to implement their business strategies with embedding their projects in the overall strategy. Also, helps the PM team to execute the projects in a strategic way.

This paper contributes to the literature with a clear explanation of the concept of the alignment and provides a framework to ensure the alignment between the large PM process and the business strategy is achieved.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of free cash flow (FCF) on the agency costs and how these FCF and agency costs affect the performance of REITs in Asia. Unlike previous studies that focus on conventional public listed companies and non-regulated industry, the Asian REIT industry being a highly regulated industry provides a new context for further research.

The samples for this study comprise REIT data from four major Asian REIT countries, namely, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. These countries are the leaders in Asian REITs which account for 94 percent of the total market capitalization of REITs in Asia. The study period is from 2002 to 2012 using panel data. This study employs GMM method which is more robust compared to previous studies that used pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and other panel data methods.

The results indicate that FCF and agency costs persist over time in Asian REITs even though REITs are in a highly regulated industry. The findings also imply that REIT managers face substantial costs when they wish to adjust to the equilibrium level of agency costs, whereby the optimum level is always dynamic and not constant over time and moves with the changes in the determinants of agency costs. These agency costs persist over time and have significant impacts on the performance of REITs in Asia.

There are limited data in selling, general and administrative expenses in Asian REITs which render only limited use of selling, general and administrative expenses ratio in this empirical study on Asian REITs. For future research, researchers can embark on research studies on issues that might determine the speed of adjustment toward the equilibrium level of agency costs in Asian REITs.

For REIT regulators in Asia, this empirical study helps to provide useful information for policy planning and formulation in REIT corporate governance; and to transform the inherent satellite structure of the externally managed REIT structure into internally managed REIT structure. For REIT managers and practitioners, this empirical study serves as a reflection for them which helps them to be more aware of the dynamism of FCF and agency costs in REITs; and alert them that these FCF and agency costs persist over time which can have significant impacts on the REIT performance, return on assets and return on equity, REIT value and REIT return, respectively in Asia. Thus, they could consider internalizing their REIT management structure for better and more efficient management in REITs in order to mitigate the agency costs that are persistent over time. As a whole, this empirical study contributes significant benefits to all level of the REIT industry in Asia.

This implies that the REITs in Asia should consider internally managed REIT structure since the agency costs persist over time and there are always dynamic and not constant over time and moves with the changes in the determinants of agency costs. The findings also imply that the regulators in Asian REITs should enforce absolute stringent corporate governance rules and regulations in order to govern the existing inherent satellite structure of the externally managed REITs in Asia.

This empirical study contributes significant benefits to all levels of the REIT industry in Asia and the current limited literature on Asian REITs by examining the impact of FCF and agency costs on the performance of REITs in Asia. This is the first research to embark on FCF and agency costs on REITs in Asia. Furthermore, this study employs GMM method which is more robust compared to previous studies that used pooled OLS and other panel data methods.

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces the asset substitution problem – the agency cost of debt. Thus, there is a recognized need for models that can resolve the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, leading to optimal capital structure choice, and enhanced firm value. The purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a dynamic game, resolve the conflicts of interests and determine the optimal capital structure.

As there is no satisfactory model for dealing with the above issues, this paper uses a differential game framework to analyze the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a non-cooperative dynamic game and further resolves the conflicts of interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome.

The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by providing a lower and stable cost of debt and a greater debt facility in the overtime framework.

The study develops a new dynamic contract theory model based on the integrated issues of capital structure, corporate governance and agency problems and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how customer engagement technologies impact service innovation in a network of travel agencies, analyzing the effects on sales channels, customer relationships and retail marketing policies.

Using a qualitative single case study approach and triangulating the data from different sources (documents, semi-structured interviews and in-store observations), this paper investigates the Robintur Group, a large Italian network of travel agencies operating in the leisure travel, business travel and organized tourism segments.

This study highlights three core areas of service innovation that have interrelated effects on travel agency management in coherence with the omni-channel strategy: synergetic channel integration, dynamic customer relationships and dynamic retail marketing.

This study is based on a single case study in Italy. Future research could extend the framework to other travel agencies and foreign markets where the diversification process of large grocery retailers is more diffused, and investigate the omni-channel approach in relation to other information and communication technologies and the implications on travel agency management.

Presenting a conceptual framework to exploit new technologies and revitalize the scope and functions of travel agencies, the case study offers insights contributing to the literature on service innovation in travel agencies. The data highlight the adoption of an omni-channel approach to facilitate the customer experience. This case study is also one of the first to empirically investigate the challenges of a large-scale retail group when diversifying to the travel industry and adopting an omni-channel strategy.

本论文旨在探究顾客参与技术（CETs）如何在旅游社网络中影响服务创新, 并分析其对于销售渠道、顾客关系、以及零售营销政策的影响。

本论文采用定性分析方法, 单一案例样本源, 并合多种采样渠道（文本、半结构化访问、和店内观察）来丰富样本数据。本论文研究了Robintur集团, 一家意大利大型旅行社网路, 主要经营休闲旅游、商务旅行、以及组织型旅游产品模块。

本论文结果强调了服务创新的三大核心：协同渠道整合、多样化顾客关系、和多样化零售营销, 其三大核心对旅行社管理有着紧密联系, 符合全渠道战略的主体思想。

本案例分析展示了一个探索新科技和复兴旅行社范围和功能的理论模型, 对旅行社服务创新有着重大理论贡献。样本数据强调了采取全渠道战略以增强顾客体验。同时, 本论文也是首个实际检测了大型零售集团在面对旅行市场多样化和全渠道战略的挑战。

本论文仅取样了意大利的单一案例。未来研究应该拓宽模型到其他旅行产业以及国际市场, 其对大型零售厂商的多样化进程更加深入, 同时, 未来研究应该讲全渠道战略与其他信息与通信技术结合来研究, 对旅行社管理有深入的启示。

关键词 旅行社 服务创新 全渠道 CET ICT 意大利

研究型论文

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the compatibility of actor network theory (ANT) and new institutional sociology (NIS) in analysing a case study of accounting change.

This is an interpretive case study.

The Finnish case city experienced several path‐dependent changes concerning performance measurement (PM), financial reporting and the adoption of enterprise resource planning system (ERP). New tools such as the ERP have a potential to transform the actors and to change the agency of the actors. Furthermore, the concepts drawing on both ANT and NIS can together enrich analyses of accounting changes.

The case analysis suggests guidelines for using ANT and/or NIS in accounting studies.

Understanding accounting developments as an intentional and path‐dependent process affected and constrained by complex networks, pressures and actors should contribute to better management of accounting changes.

Being informed by both ANT and NIS improves our understanding of accounting change and stability, serendipity, practice variations, changes beyond the minimum required to satisfy external requirements, and of the continued use of some accounting tools despite their limited functionality. Furthermore, we introduce the concepts dynamic agency and constrained transformation for studies of accounting change.

One of the agency conflicts between investors and managers in fund management is reflected by risk‐taking behaviors led by their different goals. The investors may stop their investments in risky assets before the end of the investment horizon to minimize risk, while the managers may do so to entrench their reputation so as to pursue better opportunities in the labor market. This study aims to consider a one principal‐one agent model to investigate this agency conflict.

The paper derives optimal asset allocation strategies for both parties by extending the traditional dynamic mean‐variance model and considering possibilities of optimal early stopping. Doing so illustrates the principal‐agent conflict regarding risk‐taking behaviors and managerial investment myopia in fund management.

This paper not only paves the way for further studies along this line, but also presents results useful for practitioners in the money management industry.

According to the theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, the paper shows that potential early stop can make the agency conflict worsen, and it proposes a way to mitigate this agency problem.

As one of the exploratory studies in investigating agency conflict regarding risk‐taking behaviors in the literature, this study makes multiple contributions to the literature on fund management, asset allocation, portfolio optimization, and risk management.

Smart governance ultimately relates to the ability of political administrations to elicit trust and public confidence. Political administrations normally generate rational policies that arise from their context-sensitive goals. The capability of an administration to develop and implement policies is measured as efficacy, which can influence the value and stability of an administration. However, policy development and implementation is not only an attribute of a political administration but also of its bureaucracy. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of bureaucracies, representing them as complex and dynamic.

A traditional blueprint model of a bureaucracy comes from Weber, seen to be a servicing body for the implementation of political policy decisions resulting from a process of governance. An alternative model arises from the fictional works of Kafka, which is underpinned by a firm conceptual basis of a bureaucracy that confronts that of Weber. Agency theory will be used to model bureaucracies, and comparisons will be made between the Weber and Kafka conceptualisation.

There are broad models of a bureaucracy that arise from different propositions such as a Weber and a Kafka model, the latter being more representative of administrations. Any attempts to measure comparative efficacy across political systems or administrations may well lead to failure due to the distinctions in the nature of the bureaucracies that they maintain. The paper argues that the Weber model is an unattainable boundary representation of a bureaucracy. In contrast, Kafka’s more pragmatic conceptualisation can be modelled as a pathological autonomous system that is both complex and adaptive. Such pathologies can be harmful to the implementation of socially improving policies.

The paper shows that even where a political administration has policy initiatives that can improve society, these can be corrupted and misdirected by its bureaucracy, mistakenly believed (by the administration) to be dedicated to the service of the administration, rather than the bureaucracy’s own self-interests.

No other approach has been able to graphically represent the relative natures of different bureaucracies, or their pathologies.

By theorizing choice as an information and decision problem, behavioral strategy research has not considered fully the agentic capacities of strategists. We argue that agentic capacities are distinct from decision-making and information-processing capacities as they rest on temporally anchored engagements with the world through habit, imagination, and judgment. We propose that understanding agency as temporally anchored action capacities is particularly important for research in behavioral strategy, as strategic phenomena encompass accumulated experience and path-dependencies (the past), ongoing competitive, market, and organizational interactions and exchanges (the present), and plans, visions, and forecasts for the future (the future). We outline how strategic choice and agency involve cognitive engagement in the three time horizons through distinct cognitive capabilities and the organizational processes that support them.

In part 1 of this paper the organisation was modelled as a socio‐cognitive agency with a normative personality, where patterns of behaviour occur through underlying trait control processes, and from which specific behaviours can be predicted. However, prediction is dependent on a stable agency orientation which occurs in normal conditions of homeostatic equilibrium. In post‐normal conditions the immanent dynamics of the agency have the potential to change its orientation leading to a lesser likelihood of predicting behaviour. Using information theory, this paper aims to further develop the model to show how it is possible to predict behaviour in post‐normal conditions. It also aims to consider the nature of agency pathologies.

The information theory approach of Frieden is harnessed to explain the immanent dynamics of the agency, and explore the likelihood of predicting its behaviour.

The outcomes of the research formulate the cognitive processes of normative personality such that its potential behaviour in given situations can be predicted, even potentially where the agency has pathologies.

There are no comparative approaches to explore organisational behaviour and their potential pathologies.