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Drawing from the institutional logics and organizational disaster literature, this paper aims to illustrate that the replacement of logics can be problematic in a high-risk industry such as coal mining by adding an institutional perspective to the understanding of disasters.

This paper investigated the field of coal mining in Turkey historically from archival data resources. A comprehensive, qualitative inquiry of a single-case study was then conducted.

The findings suggest that a shift from social welfare logic to business logic in the coal-mining industry can lead to coal-mining disasters, resulting from changing practices through an increase in the number of private enterprises through royalty contracts, the use of an increased labor force instead of mechanical methods and systems and the maximization of profit by underestimating the effects of taking almost no occupational safety measures.

The connection between institutional logics and organizational disasters could lead institutional actors to question their understanding of institutional logics.

This paper provides original research evidence for the relationship between industrial disasters and institutional logics.

Evaluates the effects of shipwrecks and peoples’ reactions following them, with regard to their feelings of preventability on someone’s part. In particular to the Erika in 1989, and the Prestige in 2002. The European Union (EU), which theretofore seemed to be neglecting maritime safety appears to have developed a maritime culture. The EU seems to have adopted the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) attitude regarding safety protocols, which must be a right and proper thing to do. Concludes that shipping has needed, and is now receiving, a proactive approach with regard to safety from the EU which should limit, as far as possible, disasters of both a human and ecological kind for the maritime world.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a case of companies cooperating with the State to prevent a public controversy over nuclear power following the Fukushima disaster and achieve mutually beneficial policy outcomes. It analyses the private and public communication of pro-nuclear corporate, political and regulatory actors.

Drawing on the political economy theory, the study examines how actors mobilised power by accessing an existing social network to agree a joint public communication strategy in order to ensure public support for the continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK. It traces discursive frames from their inception in private communication to their reproduction in public communication and their dissemination via the media.

The study provides evidence of pro-nuclear actors cooperating behind the scenes to achieve consistent public pro-nuclear messaging. It finds evidence of four discursive frames: avoiding knee-jerk reactions, lessons learned, safety and nuclear renaissance. In combination, they guide audiences’ evaluation of the consequences of the Fukushima disaster for the UK in favour of continuing the commercial use of nuclear energy.

The private e-mail exchange between pro-nuclear actors presents a unique opportunity to examine the mobilisation of less visible forms of power in the form of agenda setting (manipulation) and discursive framing (domination) in order to influence policy outcomes and shape public opinion on nuclear energy. This is problematic because it constitutes a lack of transparency and accountability on part of the State with respect to policy outcomes and restricts the civic space by curtailing the articulation of alternative interests and voices.

So much attention is devoted to the cost of industrial disasters in financial terms and to the technologies that fail at times, that it is possible to lose sight of the fact that disasters involve people, individually and in societal groups. Although awareness and concern about the human factor in industrial disaster has grown considerably over the last 15‐20 years, many continue to see human error in a very narrow perspective. People, however, play a key role in causing disasters, must cope with them when they occur, and bear the consequences in their aftermath. Consideration of the human factor in industrial disaster has focused primarily on input in causing disasters. Two additional phases of human involvement in industrial disaster, their coping and their reaction to the outcome, must be included. At every stage of its occurrence, industrial disaster is truly about people and their behaviour.

This paper aims to investigate the major causes of the nuclear power plant (NPP) disasters since 1950, elucidates the commonalities between them and recommends strategies to minimize the risk of NPP disasters.

This paper analyzes facts from five case studies: Chernobyl disaster, USSR 1986; Fukushima Daiichi disaster, Japan 2011; Three Mile Island incident, USA 1979; Chalk River Accident, Canada 1952; and SL-1 Accident, USA 1961. A qualitative approach is adopted to compare and contrast the major reasons that led to the accidents, and consequent social and technological impacts of the disasters on environment, society, economy and nuclear industry are analyzed.

Although each of the nuclear accidents is unique in terms of its occurrence and impacts, this research study found some common causes behind the accidents. Faulty system design, equipment failure, inadequate safety and warning systems, violation of safety regulations, lack of training of the nuclear operators and ignorance from the operators and regulators side were found to be the major common causes behind the accidents.

This paper recommends some of the nuclear disaster risk reduction strategies in terms of “lessons learned from the past accidents”. The findings of the research paper would serve as an information tool for the nuclear professionals for informed decision-making and planning for proper preventive measures well in advance so that the mistakes which led to the occurrence of accidents in the past are not repeated in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to explore contemporary attitudes amongst UK construction professionals regards fire safety post the Grenfell Tower disaster. Specifically, the research examines practitioner’s perceptions of fire safety design, material specification, construction and maintenance of high-rise blocks throughout a building’s whole life cycle.

A multi-methodology approach was adopted that utilises a mix of research methods. Extant literature and media content is used as a secondary data source, providing a more insightful interpretivist analysis – the results of which guided the development of the survey’s main question set. Primary survey data are sourced from structured interviews and questionnaires completed by participating industry professionals and built environment undergraduate students using non-representative sampling methods. In addition, a Grenfell Tower special advisory panel member was interviewed to add further validity to the overall findings.

The quantitative findings present evidence to suggest that the Grenfell disaster (and media storm that has surrounded this event) has raised the general level of fire safety knowledge and competency amongst construction professionals. However, qualitative feedback from the special advisory panel member suggests specific fire prevention knowledge remains elusive within both industry and taught programmes at Higher Education Institutes. As a consequence, changes in the taught curriculum are proposed together with an extension of the role of facilities managers in practice to cover fire safety in greater depth.

This paper provides thoughtful insights into the contemporary discourse on fire safety within the UK construction industry. The research also provides critical suggestions to both industry and policy makers which seek to prevent a repeat tragedy occurring again.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a summary of how disasters, natural and human induced disasters, terrorist attacks, civil and political unrest and other crises affect tourism positively and negatively.

This paper briefly analyzes case studies to establish the underpinnings of tourism disruption in the midst of disasters and crises.

This paper outlines how various crises and disasters affect the tourism industry and what processes can be used to enhance or restructure the industry through communication plans, the media and stakeholder collaborative efforts.

While disasters and crises are not new, this paper offers a series of recommendations and insights to help quickly restore a normal state of tourism and hospitality functioning and build a more resilient path for tourism for generations to come.

By juxtaposing fatal colliery explosions in early twentieth-century Britain and in 2010 at Pike River, New Zealand, this paper aims to investigate the generalizability of the mock bureaucracy concept to underground coal mining disasters.

The main source is published official accident inquiries; a methodological reflection justifies the use of these materials.

Mock bureaucracies existed in the British underground coal mining milieu from the time when safety rules were first formulated in that industry context. As for Pike River, it is an exemplary case. The development in 1970s Britain of a new approach to safety management (the Robens system), and its subsequent export to New Zealand, means that a contemporary coal mine under financial duress, such as Pike River, is a prime site for mock bureaucracy to flourish.

Although the concept of mock bureaucracy has been applied to an explosion in an underground coal mine before, this is the first paper to explore the concept’s historical usage and generalizability in explaining the environing context of such explosions.