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This paper aims to make a first attempt to highlight the Sharīʿah-compliance challenges of existing Sharīʿah-compliant deposit insurance schemes (SCDIS), particularly the issue of subrogation to contributing parties in takāful-based SCDIS and the issue of receiving a fee for guarantee in kafālah-based SCDIS. The paper also aims to propose an additional cash waqf SCDIS structure that mitigates these challenges.

The proposed cash waqf scheme is assessed for compliance against classical works of Islamic jurisprudence and the contemporary regulations and standards of best practices for deposit insurance schemes.

The proposed cash waqf SCDIS structure is able to overcome the Sharīʿah and legal challenges in the existing SCDIS modalities, including subrogation and payment of fees for guarantee. Moreover, it is designed to comply with the International Association of Deposit Insurers’ Core Principles for effective deposit insurance schemes. Hence, a cash waqf structure is a viable alternative for jurisdictions to introduce SCDIS.

This paper introduces an additional cash waqf SCDIS modality and sets the foundation for future research in studying viable Sharīʿah-compliant deposit insurance modalities supporting a stable and resilient Islamic banking industry.

Late in 2001, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduced a new set of arrangements for deposit protection in the UK. While the changes involve a welcome improvement on previous arrangements, much more could be done to enhance their overall cost‐effectiveness. This paper explains the flaws in previous and current arrangements and, using a relatively crude but nevertheless objective measure of the extent of their compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) best practice ‘rules’, compares their degree of ‘incentive‐compatibility’ (or economic efficiency ‐ ie the extent to which they minimise the problems created by adverse selection, moral hazard and principal/agency conflict) with the counterpart schemes operating elsewhere in the European Union and beyond. In this way, areas for future improvements are identified, which will ideally require accommodating changes in the guiding Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.

The financial crisis that hit countries worldwide in 2007 tested and tried deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to protect consumers’ bank deposits. The crisis also served as a reality check for regulators, institutions and the general public alike. Against this backdrop, there was a significant rationale by governments and regulators to protect consumers and at the same time maintain financial stability through expansion of coverage offered in existing DGS arrangements or setting up such a scheme where this was not already in place.

Consumers need other possible safety net in addition to the already set-up lender-of-last resort facilities provided by central banks, banking supervision regulations, assistance granted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank and also the recently enacted EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

In this chapter the authors evaluated whether the launch of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a single deposit guarantee in Europe which is now being recognised as one of the three main pillars, together with the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms, would enhance depositors’ protection in times of banking crisis and also reinforce financial stability in the EU as part of the proposed Banking Union.

The chapter made reference to academic literature and also recent EDIS political dossier to outline the developments. Apart from political insensitivity to the proposed EDIS, the chapter also concluded that the introduction of EDIS raises questions about moral hazard amongst banks in the EU, issues on bank’s contributions during the transition period and difficulty in comparing banks across EU countries through banks’ deposits and risk profiles.

The purpose of this paper is to explore why credit unions might need deposit insurance, how they might respond to its introduction and how this protection mechanism should be designed. The objective is to determine how successful the deposit insurance scheme has been in the context of Northern Ireland and whether it offers an alternative to the public provision of deposit insurance which appears to have been the model adopted by credit union movements elsewhere.

As part of this analysis the paper considers the Northern Ireland experience where a subset of credit unions has been members of a private insurance arrangement since 1989.

The deposit insurance mechanism did not cause a propensity for member credit unions to engage in risk shifting behaviour. The analysis suggests that at present a universal blueprint in deposit insurance design may well be unnecessary in combating risk shifting behaviour.

This paper helps to fill a gap in the banking and finance literature where the study of deposit insurance in the context of credit unions has been given little attention.

Having been hailed as the most important contribution to stabilising the US financial system after the 1929—33 crash, deposit insurance is now being blamed for financial destabilisation, particularly in emerging markets. This paper focuses on the relationship between deposit insurance and systemic stability in the banking system, drawing on recent experience in the USA, Europe and Japan. The conclusion is that if there is an embedded perception that in the last resort depositors will be protected beyond insurance limits then market‐orientated solution to the problems of ‘moral hazard’ and excessive risk taking cannot work.

This paper aims to provide an essential framework for establishing Shariah-compliant deposit insurance scheme, by reviewing the Shariah provisions concerning the available approaches for deposit guarantee, types of deposits in Islamic financial institutions and the permissible party to incur the cost of this guarantee.

This paper reviews the Fiqh rules and principles approved by the well-known Islamic Fiqh references, as well as the resolutions of International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) and Shariah standards issued by Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), and presents these resolutions and judgments in a modern applicable way.

This paper recommends that the Islamic scheme for deposit insurance should be established based on Takaful insurance principle, and this scheme must adopt fund segregation principle to comply with Shariah provisions for guarantee permissibility.

The paper bridges the gap between theory and practice by highlighting how the proposed model can be initiated in practice, thus, it can influence public policy in countries with Islamic banking system.

This paper represents a significant contribution toward the establishment of a consensual Shariah-compliant Islamic deposit insurance model.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the full potential of an effective deposit insurance system. The current financial crisis in Europe has arguably casted fresh doubt on the role and need for deposit insurance. In this regard, the deposit insurance system’s rationale is a key starting issue in order to fully understand its design and role within a financial safety net system.

Using the UK regulatory regime as the main reference point, the deposit insurance system’s objectives are divided into two broad categories: depositor protection and financial stability.

It is argued that a deposit insurance system could only be effective if designed to perform key regulatory objectives. Otherwise, authorities will keep resorting to other rescue measures, as this system will never be well equipped to respond to a bank failure.

Notwithstanding recent regulatory reforms, there is still a lack of clear objectives and, thus, a clear profile for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, as the UK deposit compensation scheme. In light of systemic risk and increased demands on prudential banking regulation, the UK deposit insurance system should be reformed to perform significant regulatory objectives.

The further reform of the UK deposit insurance will enhance depositor protection and financial stability, especially amid the euro-crisis.

An effective reform of deposit insurance requires a clear role-setting for deposit insurance. To this end, this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of all regulatory objectives that the post-crisis UK deposit insurance system should serve.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.

This paper examines the structure of the financial system in the Eastern Caribbean with a view to determining whether deposit insurance is a feasible alternative. It is argued that as the financial system deepens within the context of a liberalised environment the probability of systemic risk increases considerably. Against this backdrop, we find that deposit insurance may have a role to play in the Eastern Caribbean.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate a deposit insurance program for household deposits, which is designed to act as safety net in order to minimize or eliminate the risk of loss of depositors' funds with banks represents a primary element of this reform.

This research paper is scientific investigation aimed at discovering and interpreting facts related to deposit insurance system in Azeri context. The goal of the research process is to produce new knowledge, through the exploratory research, which structures and identifies new problems, and the constructive research, which develops solutions to a problem.

The main finding is that the deposit insurance system in Azeri context as well everywhere provides for the security of funds in the event of bank failure and, thus, contributes substantially to the stability of the financial system in Azerbaijan. The deposit insurance system supports the smooth functioning of the payment system and the credit mechanisms and facilitates the exit of problem banks.

As a result of this research paper some changes may be made in local legislation in order to defend the depositor's rights in the most effective way in the case of bank failures.

The originality of this paper is that it for the first time describes the deposit insurance system of the Republic of Azerbaijan, its advantages and disadvantages. The paper is addressed to the international business community, particularly those involved in all aspects of banking and deposit insurance law.