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The global financial turmoil of 2008 spilled over into the British Isles offshore jurisdictions of Guernsey and the Isle of Man resulting in the collapse of two local subsidiaries of major Icelandic banking groups and consequent depositors' losses. The purpose of this paper is to contrast the sharply differing reactions of the insular authorities and critically evaluate Guernsey's recently enacted deposit protection scheme.

The paper outlines the nature of the Guernsey jurisdiction, its offshore development and policy issues in deposit protection. Legislation establishing Guernsey's deposit protection scheme is described and critically evaluated.

Guernsey's scheme is a rushed legislative reaction dominated by finance centre reputational concerns. The legislation is clear and comprehensive but the long‐term robustness of its funding model is unclear.

The analysis contained in this paper highlights the ramifications of international bank instability in small offshore jurisdictions and the regulatory problems this poses. Discussion of the legislative basis of the deposit protection scheme clarifies its nature and limitations as an investor protection technique, which is timely given the status of deposit protection as a key theme in the UK Government's initiated Foot Review of nine offshore jurisdictions.

Late in 2001, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduced a new set of arrangements for deposit protection in the UK. While the changes involve a welcome improvement on previous arrangements, much more could be done to enhance their overall cost‐effectiveness. This paper explains the flaws in previous and current arrangements and, using a relatively crude but nevertheless objective measure of the extent of their compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) best practice ‘rules’, compares their degree of ‘incentive‐compatibility’ (or economic efficiency ‐ ie the extent to which they minimise the problems created by adverse selection, moral hazard and principal/agency conflict) with the counterpart schemes operating elsewhere in the European Union and beyond. In this way, areas for future improvements are identified, which will ideally require accommodating changes in the guiding Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.

This paper aims to make a first attempt to highlight the Sharīʿah-compliance challenges of existing Sharīʿah-compliant deposit insurance schemes (SCDIS), particularly the issue of subrogation to contributing parties in takāful-based SCDIS and the issue of receiving a fee for guarantee in kafālah-based SCDIS. The paper also aims to propose an additional cash waqf SCDIS structure that mitigates these challenges.

The proposed cash waqf scheme is assessed for compliance against classical works of Islamic jurisprudence and the contemporary regulations and standards of best practices for deposit insurance schemes.

The proposed cash waqf SCDIS structure is able to overcome the Sharīʿah and legal challenges in the existing SCDIS modalities, including subrogation and payment of fees for guarantee. Moreover, it is designed to comply with the International Association of Deposit Insurers’ Core Principles for effective deposit insurance schemes. Hence, a cash waqf structure is a viable alternative for jurisdictions to introduce SCDIS.

This paper introduces an additional cash waqf SCDIS modality and sets the foundation for future research in studying viable Sharīʿah-compliant deposit insurance modalities supporting a stable and resilient Islamic banking industry.

The Isle of Man, a British Isles offshore jurisdiction located in the middle of the Irish Sea, has experienced three separate bank collapses during a relatively brief 26 year period. These collapses have affected in excess of 20,000 depositors and inflicted significant damage on investor confidence in the Isle of Man as an offshore finance centre. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of deposit protection during this time frame, teasing out the delicate balance required in small offshore jurisdictions between rigorous standards of investor protection on the one hand and the vital importance of remaining competitive with rival offshore finance centres on the other. It critically evaluates the recently enacted Isle of Man deposit compensation scheme (DCS) by reference to this organising principle.

The paper outlines the nature of the Manx jurisdiction and its offshore development. Focussing on the period 1982‐2010, it discusses the three separate bank collapses and insular regulatory and legislative responses. The focal point of the paper is a critical evaluation of the new Isle of Man DCS including comparisons where appropriate with deposit protection schemes in the Channel Islands offshore jurisdictions of Jersey and Guernsey and discussion of the extent to which the new Isle of Man DCS complies with specific features of recently formulated international best practice standards.

The paper reports that insular regulatory and government responses to bank collapses have tended to be distinctly short‐term and reactive. Despite being the first small offshore jurisdiction in the world to embrace the principle of deposit protection in 1991, there has been a conspicuous failure in the Isle of Man to develop related financial safety net policies, and the overriding motive for the introduction and indeed continuation of deposit protection has been to repair enduring reputational damage inflicted on its offshore finance centre by successive bank failures. The new Isle of Man DCS conforms to this model, reflecting insular anxieties regarding risks of lost banking business to rival offshore jurisdictions as opposed to rigorous standards of investor protection.

Analysis contained in this paper sheds light on the problem of effective deposit protection in small offshore jurisdictions, including tensions in policy terms between principled investor protection and finance centre reputational and competitiveness concerns. It also highlights, more broadly, the endemic problem of delivering optimum investor protection at (small) jurisdictional level in the context of international banking groups operating on a multi‐jurisdictional basis and deploying entrenched business models which operationalise offshore banking arms as essentially vehicles for the onward transmission of liquid funds to treasury functions located in parent groups' home jurisdictions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the full potential of an effective deposit insurance system. The current financial crisis in Europe has arguably casted fresh doubt on the role and need for deposit insurance. In this regard, the deposit insurance system’s rationale is a key starting issue in order to fully understand its design and role within a financial safety net system.

Using the UK regulatory regime as the main reference point, the deposit insurance system’s objectives are divided into two broad categories: depositor protection and financial stability.

It is argued that a deposit insurance system could only be effective if designed to perform key regulatory objectives. Otherwise, authorities will keep resorting to other rescue measures, as this system will never be well equipped to respond to a bank failure.

Notwithstanding recent regulatory reforms, there is still a lack of clear objectives and, thus, a clear profile for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, as the UK deposit compensation scheme. In light of systemic risk and increased demands on prudential banking regulation, the UK deposit insurance system should be reformed to perform significant regulatory objectives.

The further reform of the UK deposit insurance will enhance depositor protection and financial stability, especially amid the euro-crisis.

An effective reform of deposit insurance requires a clear role-setting for deposit insurance. To this end, this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of all regulatory objectives that the post-crisis UK deposit insurance system should serve.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the arrangements that have been used in the present crisis and their relative success and to look to the post‐crisis situation.

The paper examines and explains the crisis and the roles of deposit insurance and government guarantees. It deals with coverage, funding, institutional structure, speed of payout, incentives, accountability and, in particular, considers how such systems should function in a world of cross‐border institutions.

The paper suggests how such principles and standards should be set either through International Association of Deposit Insurers or some more efficient means to complement an international approach to financial stability being addressed by the Basel institutions.

There is no widely accepted standard over what the reformed financial system safety net should look like with respect to the protection of deposits and the wider guaranteeing of creditors and other stakeholders. This paper, therefore, makes an attempt to fill that gap.

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the operation of tenancy deposit protection within England and Wales. The paper consciously focuses solely on the views and perspectives of letting agents operating in the various schemes.

The paper is based on a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with lettings agents in two distinct geographical urban areas, Birmingham and South Wales. Participants were selected for their market presence within a given area and the fact that they were all members of approved regulatory schemes.

Overall, most agents were broadly happy with the process and considered adjudication to be an appropriate form of resolution for tenancy deposit disputes given the often small monetary value of the disputes and the large volume of cases. Concerns were raised, however, regarding the heavy bureaucratic burden placed on agents and on the perceived evidential burden on the landlord. There being a widely held view that a landlord could rarely “win” outright.

The qualitative data are based on a relatively small although representative sample of lettings agents’ active within the UK residential property sector.

The paper provides original data on the attitudes and perspectives of agents who manage deposit disputes. This is an area of current interest that has yet to receive sustained attention. Although concerned with legislation in England and Wales, its findings and discussion are relevant in other jurisdictions facing similar issues.

This paper aims to explain the importance of the international cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities of different countries in event of banking crises. It also suggests that the harmonious relationship has to be attained in the adoption of ex ante financial regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes. In other words, the paper highlights the linkage between ex ante preventive regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes, on the one hand, and cooperation among national regulatory and supervisory authorities in globalized financial markets. Although the paper is relevant to most developed and emerging financial markets, it chooses Hong Kong as a context to examine this proposal. In the current literature, there are no similar approach linking these two paradigms and examining them in an integrated context.

The paper adopts a conceptual framework after the 2008 global financial crisis and takes Hong Kong, an international financial centre in which numerous branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions locate, as an example to examine how the coordination with foreign supervisory authorities are being conducted and to analyse whether the present regulatory framework in Hong Kong is effective and sufficient against banking crises. Through the review of the literature, the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes is found to be significant in adopting proper solutions.

Through analysing the Hong Kong financial regulators’ reports on the collapse of Lehman Brother, the paper finds out that even though there is some weakness in the cooperation and coordination between regulators after the 2008 financial crisis, Hong Kong is still in the progress of proposing bank special resolution regime. Although there has been some awareness on the issue of coordination between home and host states regulatory measures, there is still a lack of awareness of the connection between regulatory measures and compensation schemes.

Conflict of interests could hardly be prevented in the course of cooperation and coordination among home and host regulatory authorities, and the coordination of the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation scheme which involves legal and economic analyses is a challenging task.

The paper’s findings show that there are practical implications for the recent rapid development of special resolution regime for global systematically important financial institutions against future banking crises and for managing the balance between the adoption of financial supervisory laws and special resolution measures.

This paper suggests that the harmonious coordination between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes has to be achieved through international context to avoid the absurd situations. This conceptual integrated framework presented in the current paper is not touched upon by the existing literature. This important concept is valuable for future research, and it is significant to financial regulators, legislators and the government in adjusting policy against banking crises in both developed and developing countries.

The purpose of the paper is to explain how UK bank failure resolution policy has evolved since the nationalisation of Northern Rock in February 2008 in the light of the fallout from the sub‐prime crisis and the subsequent credit crunch.

The evolution of the UK authorities' approach, from a piecemeal approach to a comprehensive, system‐wide approach, is traced through analysis of the treatment accorded the troubled entities Alliance and Leicester, HBOS (both the subject of separate officially brokered takeover‐rescues) and Bradford and Bingley (eventually nationalised, like Northern Rock) prior to consideration of the two industry‐wide bailout schemes introduced in October 2008 and January 2009.

Confounding initial hopes, Northern Rock proves to be just the first of a series of major institutional casualties of the fallout from the sub‐prime crisis, eventually necessitating a comprehensive and system‐wide solution. While this successfully prevents the system from literally collapsing in the Autumn of 2008, in the wake of the decision not to rescue Lehman Brothers in the USA, it fails to stimulate lending, as intended. Accordingly, a second industry bailout package was introduced in January 2009, but even this may fail to secure the main goals of intervention‐financial stability and a resuscitation of bank lending to support the ailing economy‐heralding possible further state inroads into domestic bank ownership.

The paper clearly identifies the need for, and nature of, both the ad hoc and system‐wide solutions adopts to deal with individual cases of institutional “failure” and the wider stability concerns, respectively. The authorities' actions are subject to critical analysis, while a personal assessment of both the House of Commons Treasury Committee's report on Northern Rock and the tripartite authorities' reform proposals, which culminate in the Banking Act of 2009, is also provided.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate a deposit insurance program for household deposits, which is designed to act as safety net in order to minimize or eliminate the risk of loss of depositors' funds with banks represents a primary element of this reform.

This research paper is scientific investigation aimed at discovering and interpreting facts related to deposit insurance system in Azeri context. The goal of the research process is to produce new knowledge, through the exploratory research, which structures and identifies new problems, and the constructive research, which develops solutions to a problem.

The main finding is that the deposit insurance system in Azeri context as well everywhere provides for the security of funds in the event of bank failure and, thus, contributes substantially to the stability of the financial system in Azerbaijan. The deposit insurance system supports the smooth functioning of the payment system and the credit mechanisms and facilitates the exit of problem banks.

As a result of this research paper some changes may be made in local legislation in order to defend the depositor's rights in the most effective way in the case of bank failures.

The originality of this paper is that it for the first time describes the deposit insurance system of the Republic of Azerbaijan, its advantages and disadvantages. The paper is addressed to the international business community, particularly those involved in all aspects of banking and deposit insurance law.