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The financial crisis that hit countries worldwide in 2007 tested and tried deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to protect consumers’ bank deposits. The crisis also served as a reality check for regulators, institutions and the general public alike. Against this backdrop, there was a significant rationale by governments and regulators to protect consumers and at the same time maintain financial stability through expansion of coverage offered in existing DGS arrangements or setting up such a scheme where this was not already in place.

Consumers need other possible safety net in addition to the already set-up lender-of-last resort facilities provided by central banks, banking supervision regulations, assistance granted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank and also the recently enacted EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

In this chapter the authors evaluated whether the launch of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a single deposit guarantee in Europe which is now being recognised as one of the three main pillars, together with the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms, would enhance depositors’ protection in times of banking crisis and also reinforce financial stability in the EU as part of the proposed Banking Union.

The chapter made reference to academic literature and also recent EDIS political dossier to outline the developments. Apart from political insensitivity to the proposed EDIS, the chapter also concluded that the introduction of EDIS raises questions about moral hazard amongst banks in the EU, issues on bank’s contributions during the transition period and difficulty in comparing banks across EU countries through banks’ deposits and risk profiles.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the complexities of reorganizing and/or liquidating troubled banks under the European Union's (EU) current institutional framework as it is defined by its directives and by national supervisory, remedial, and insolvency practices.

The paper compares provisions of different EU directives that impact financial institutions and summarizes national remedial practices.

The paper documents the diversity that currently exists among national supervisory, remedial and failure resolution practices for banks. It also assesses the economic efficiency of the institutional framework for resolving problem banks that is defined by the Reorganization and Winding‐up Directive and identifies components of the directive that can hamper efficient cross‐border resolutions.

There is a deficiency in publicly available information on EU member countries' practices for disciplining and resolving troubled banks.

The paper assesses issues/conditions that can hamper efficient cross‐border resolutions – issues on which policymakers should focus when they reform the current framework. It also explores areas of coordination with other EU directives that deal with financial crisis management that are relevant in the current financial crisis.

The paper makes policy recommendations for reforming the EU's current institutional framework for resolving troubled banks.

Late in 2001, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduced a new set of arrangements for deposit protection in the UK. While the changes involve a welcome improvement on previous arrangements, much more could be done to enhance their overall cost‐effectiveness. This paper explains the flaws in previous and current arrangements and, using a relatively crude but nevertheless objective measure of the extent of their compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) best practice ‘rules’, compares their degree of ‘incentive‐compatibility’ (or economic efficiency ‐ ie the extent to which they minimise the problems created by adverse selection, moral hazard and principal/agency conflict) with the counterpart schemes operating elsewhere in the European Union and beyond. In this way, areas for future improvements are identified, which will ideally require accommodating changes in the guiding Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, trying to show solutions for strengthening it.

This paper aims to investigate the deposit and investment guarantee fund in Greece by identifying new problems and developing solutions.

The main finding is that the deposit and investment guarantee fund contributes to the stability of the Greek banking sector and also offers practical solutions to strengthen it. Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund has an important feature, which is the speed of a decision about a bank failure resolution (in five working days), but needs immediately strengthening and increasing its funds to cope with the resolution of non-viable banks and undertaking for costs. There should be an appropriate ratio between the size of total assets (especially cash and cash equivalents) of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and the amount of total guaranteed deposits, which is now below 2 per cent. Regulatory framework needs revising and fees must be increased if its funds fall below a certain level of coverage of guaranteed deposits. Also, a guarantee premium, not only a flat rate premium, should be implemented for all banks. An additional risk-adjusted premium varying according to Greek banks’ risks of their portfolios would be better to increase funds of deposit guarantee fund and reduce moral hazard of bank manager by increasing costs. They must ensure an adequate diversification of re-deposits of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund funds and must limit and avoid a conflict of interest of its board membership for individuals who are actively involved in Greek commercial banks by implementing framework and rules about it. Also, as a consequence of obeying the regulatory framework, it is necessary to include as board members of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund only those banks that are subject to strong prudential supervision and regulation.

As a result of research, changes are necessary to immediately be made to cope with current financial crises and problems of Greek banking sector.

The originality of this paper is that it is the first description of the Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and its results are important for economists, politicians and international community, who evaluate the regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, especially at the current time when the Greek economy and the Greek banking sector are in a very weak fiscal position.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the full potential of an effective deposit insurance system. The current financial crisis in Europe has arguably casted fresh doubt on the role and need for deposit insurance. In this regard, the deposit insurance system’s rationale is a key starting issue in order to fully understand its design and role within a financial safety net system.

Using the UK regulatory regime as the main reference point, the deposit insurance system’s objectives are divided into two broad categories: depositor protection and financial stability.

It is argued that a deposit insurance system could only be effective if designed to perform key regulatory objectives. Otherwise, authorities will keep resorting to other rescue measures, as this system will never be well equipped to respond to a bank failure.

Notwithstanding recent regulatory reforms, there is still a lack of clear objectives and, thus, a clear profile for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, as the UK deposit compensation scheme. In light of systemic risk and increased demands on prudential banking regulation, the UK deposit insurance system should be reformed to perform significant regulatory objectives.

The further reform of the UK deposit insurance will enhance depositor protection and financial stability, especially amid the euro-crisis.

An effective reform of deposit insurance requires a clear role-setting for deposit insurance. To this end, this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of all regulatory objectives that the post-crisis UK deposit insurance system should serve.

This paper aims to analyze the development of European Deposit Insurance (DI) and assess the recent development at the EU level to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in the context of a more integrated financial framework: the Banking Union (BU).

The author uses literature review and empirical evidence to analyze the dynamic interaction among European governments in an effort to attract aggressive deposits with severe repercussion for financial stability.

The paper argues that a liquidity providing EDIS would render regulatory subsidy and rent-seeking behavior persisting by allowing national policies to be pursued with considerable discretionary power and in the context of increasing competition for deposits. This would run contrary to the BU objectives and constitute a major failure of the program.

The findings of the study can be helpful in understanding the DI policies pursued by European governments and their implications.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the interactions among European governments in pursuing DI policies and assesses the implications of EDIS.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the rationale for Bank Recovery and Resolution Funds (BRRFs) in the context of the present European Union's (EU) decentralized safety net.

The paper makes some reflections on the governance aspects of BRRFs that would require minimum harmonization in the EU, emphasizing that BRRFs are only one institutional component of financial institutions' effective and credible resolution regime. This paper focuses on depository institutions, but the rationale of BRRFs could be extended to other credit institutions.

BRRFs contribute to shifting the government's trade‐off between bailing out and restructuring in favour of restructuring, to the extent that there is also an effective bank resolution legal framework. In turn, banks' contributions to BRRFs aim at discouraging their excess systemic risk creation, particularly through financial system leverage.

The paper provides input in the current regulatory debate to develop new measures for the reform of the regulatory framework of financial services in the EU.

On 14 September 2007, after failing to find a “White Knight” to take over its business, Northern Rock bank turned to the Bank of England (the Bank) for a liquidity lifeline. This was duly provided but failed to quell the financial panic, which manifested itself in the first fully‐blown nation‐wide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years. The purpose of this paper is to analyse why these events unfolded and what can be done to prevent a repetition.

This paper briefly explains the background to these extraordinary events before setting out, in some detail, the tensions and flaws in UK arrangements which allowed the Northern Rock spectacle to occur.

None of the interested parties – the Bank, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury – emerges with their reputation intact, and the policy areas requiring immediate attention, at both the domestic and international level, are highlighted. Some reform recommendations are also provided for good measure, particularly in the area of formal deposit protection.

The analysis and recommendations contained in this paper are offered up as a contribution towards and stimulant of this wider debate which is urgently needed, given the continuing threats faced by the domestic and international financial system.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the incentive effects of existing compensation mechanisms in case of the bankruptcy of a financial institution.

The paper uses insights of law and economics to predict the effects of compensation mechanisms on the incentives of depositors, financial institutions, financial regulators and government.

The paper shows that the current compensation system in The Netherlands will not provide sufficient incentives for all stakeholders to prevent the failure of a financial institution. Adjustments to this system are necessary to improve these incentives.

The paper examines for the first time the impact of different compensation mechanisms on the incentives of multiple stakeholders. It also shows how these mechanisms influence each other regarding their incentive generating capability. These findings offer important insights for policy makers.