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The current paper contributes to the vigorous debate about policies and regulations that would shield financial markets' participants from future events of the financial turmoil. In doing so, the paper aims to broaden the picture of the financial crisis contagion and set it against the background of contemporary European markets. The main purpose of this paper is to present novel aspects of the financial crisis contagion, hence clarifying the contagion theory that still remains confusing and ambiguous for both the academics and financial markets' practitioners.

The paper builds on a simulation model for the financial crisis contagion that is rooted in the qualitative query and backed by semi‐structured interviews with financial markets' participants who possess extensive knowledge about the functioning of European markets and their interconnectedness. With this in mind, the current paper adopts an international investor's perspective on implications that stem from the linkages between European financial markets, flawed regulations and the absence of cross‐border monitoring of the financial crisis contagion.

The findings constitute practical insights into the issues of the financial crisis contagion, hence providing useful advice on policies and regulations that could manage the cross‐market transmission of the financial turmoil and shield financial markets' participants from the episodes of financial crises in the future. The findings reported in this paper also present novel aspects of the contagion processes across the contemporary and systemically important financial markets in Europe.

The practical implications of the current paper gain in significance as the nascent financial crisis sparked off vigorous debate about the need for implementing regulations that would prevent financial markets' participants from the future episodes of global financial crises. At this point, the findings reported in the current paper might be of interest for policy makers and markets' authorities. In addition, the paper attempts to deliver findings that practitioners associated with the contemporary European financial markets would benefit from by understanding the linkages between these markets and ways the financial contagion spreads. Previously, little knowledge of ways financial crises spread across markets caused substantial losses that were incurred by investors.

The current paper addresses the issues of the financial crisis contagion that belong to the group of the most commonly referenced yet least understood notions in finance. Furthermore, the paper focuses on addressing the recently exposed fragility of financial markets' surveillance and regulations. In doing so, the paper employs a pioneering approach to a simulation of the financial crisis contagion by embarking on a qualitative query rather than empirical data. Henceforth, the limitations of the empirical simulations – experienced in the past studies devoted to investigation of the financial crisis contagion – were ameliorated and the findings presented in the paper became of practical use for the markets' practitioners and policymakers.

The purpose of this study is to explain rationale for regulatory change in Australia and New Zealand after the global financial crisis.

Outline regulatory changes and relate to crisis experience and regulatory shortcomings exposed.

Regulatory change was driven primarily by need, as capital importing nations, to comply with emerging global standards, and the different approaches in both nations are also related to domestic political considerations.

The process of regulatory change in response to the crisis is ongoing.

A number of areas for further improvement in financial regulation are identified.

Costs of poor regulation and financial crises are identified.

A comparison of regulatory approaches in two countries dominated by the same four large banks helps understand the challenges of cross-border financial regulation cooperation.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

This study aims to examine the impact of regulation and other micro- and macro-economic factors on banks’ productivity growth. It investigates the impact of different regulatory reforms on banks’ performance of total factor productivity (TFP) and its component efficiencies, along with their association with bank-specific variables of profitability and equity, and with macro-level variables of economy and freedom. That is, through analysing the influence of regulatory and supervisory policies related to Basel accords pillars of capital and market discipline through private monitoring; restrictions on bank activities; and economic and financial freedoms on TFP growth and year-end performance in banking.

The authors examine TFP for commercial banks in response to regulatory reforms on an international scale. To estimate the TFP, the authors use a non-parametric frontier technique by calculating the Malmquist output-oriented index, following Delis et al. (2011) and Worthington (1999). The components of the Malmquist index are ratios of distance functions making its estimation a straightforward technique using activity analysis or data envelopment analysis methods. This allows controlling for efficiency changes depending on the reallocation of production frontiers signalling the technical change and the technical efficiency at once.

Results show that high capital requirements enhance productivity growth in North and Latin American banks, but not in European African or Asian banks. Supervisory powers drive bank productivity growth in all regions except Europe and Central Asia. Restrictions on real estate, insurance and securities activities impede productivity change in all income level groups but not in high-income economies. The results also show that market volatility and Z-score drive technological change and scale efficiency growth, but negatively impact pure technical efficiency.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between the implementation of regulatory standards and the performance of the banking sector following a structural model of the banking firm and the concept of optimisation. An additional contribution of this study is that it examines economies with different levels of income based on the gross national income per capita. The study summarises bank-specific data used to synthesise the banks’ productivity (inputs and outputs) and country-specific economic and regulatory compliance data over 19 years (1999-2017). The extent of this data set coverage makes it most recent and most conclusive of variables to provide a significant contribution to the literature on bank regulation and efficiency effect.

The purpose of this cross-national study is to evaluate the communality and differences in experiences and policy responses in the run up to the 2007-2009 credit crisis and during its critical early stages in Germany, Ireland and the UK. The importance of shared cognitive illusions regarding the power and stability of financial markets is emphasised.

A multiple case study approach is used which draws on publicly available information to trace developments leading up to bank failures (or near failures) and the evolution of government responses drawing upon alternative paradigms used to justify State intervention.

Findings emphasise the role of state regulatory bodies and their response to the crisis as a primary source of the “rules of the game” in financial markets, here it is the “game of bank bargains” and a potential source of repair. Given the degree of interconnectedness, opacity and complexity of financial markets investors/politicians/regulators will fall victim to cognitive biases which affect their decisions.

This case study method allows identification of patterns in decision-makers’ behaviour and yields richer insights than a quantitative approach but is limited in its generalisability.

This paper offers practical implications in suggesting that a pivotal step in effective crisis management requires directly addressing sources of uncertainty, namely, time pressure, complexity and opacity of underlying cause–effect relationships, empowering decision-makers to act responsibly.

This paper is novel in its illustration of the collective cognitive paradigm for justifying regulatory action across three countries using six case studies.

This paper discusses issues and developments that relate to the teaching of bank regulation in tertiary institutions. It looks at how course content, teaching texts and methodology can become subject to issues like specific historical, and jurisdictional, cultures and contexts for the discipline. It considered how economic and political approaches impact such teaching. How banking regulations are used, and how course structures are built, show that these are matters which impinge on the type of bank personnel who later eventually leave academia and end up working on regulatory or compliance matters.

Purpose – In the recent financial crisis, the risk-taking behavior of banks led to severe financial and economic instability. Many reasons have been attributed to the cause of the financial crisis. This paper attempts to investigate the effect of government ownership, market structure, and regulations on risk-taking behavior in a sample of banks listed on the stock exchanges of the six Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) markets during the period from 1998 until 2010.

Methodology – The paper utilizes the fixed effect regression model to measure the impact of government ownership indicator, and market structure on risk while controlling for bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic indicators in the GCC region.

Findings – We find consistent evidence that private-owned banks are more risky than government-owned banks. The results also show a positive and significant relationship between market concentration and risk. Islamic banks show more stability than conventional banks, while government regulations are insignificantly related to risk.

Originality and value – This research is essential to understand the probability of government ownership entities facing losses associated with distress due to both direct and indirect insurance guarantees provided by the government agencies in case of crisis. The results of the study are crucial for understanding the implications of bank ownership and market structure and its relation to risk for the stability of the financial system in the GCC market.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of regulation on previously unregulated banks’ balance-sheet growth using the 1880 Danish Savings Bank Act as a natural experiment. With the Act, Danish savings banks became, for the first time, subject to regulation and supervision whereas commercial banks continued as unregulated institutions.

The main elements of the Act focussed on supervision and provisions to improve information transparency. The paper estimates the impact of the Act on the balance-sheet growth of Danish savings banks using bank-level panel data and a difference-in-differences approach.

The paper finds no indications that the Act had a negative effect on the balance-sheet growth of savings banks compared to commercial banks in the short run. Furthermore, there are indications of a positive effect after a couple of years. This suggests that regulation is not always a burden for the regulated institutions and might even have a positive impact on their business activity.

This paper is the first study using the introduction of banking supervision and regulation in the 1800s as a natural experiment to evaluate the causal effect of regulation on the balance-sheet growth of previously unregulated financial intermediaries.

The financial crisis that hit countries worldwide in 2007 tested and tried deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to protect consumers’ bank deposits. The crisis also served as a reality check for regulators, institutions and the general public alike. Against this backdrop, there was a significant rationale by governments and regulators to protect consumers and at the same time maintain financial stability through expansion of coverage offered in existing DGS arrangements or setting up such a scheme where this was not already in place.

Consumers need other possible safety net in addition to the already set-up lender-of-last resort facilities provided by central banks, banking supervision regulations, assistance granted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank and also the recently enacted EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

In this chapter the authors evaluated whether the launch of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a single deposit guarantee in Europe which is now being recognised as one of the three main pillars, together with the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms, would enhance depositors’ protection in times of banking crisis and also reinforce financial stability in the EU as part of the proposed Banking Union.

The chapter made reference to academic literature and also recent EDIS political dossier to outline the developments. Apart from political insensitivity to the proposed EDIS, the chapter also concluded that the introduction of EDIS raises questions about moral hazard amongst banks in the EU, issues on bank’s contributions during the transition period and difficulty in comparing banks across EU countries through banks’ deposits and risk profiles.