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The literature holds few contributions regarding the sensory environment of small, privately‐owned retail stores. Hence, this paper seeks to explore the sensory experience of patrons of a small boutique.

The study uses photo‐elicitation to examine the experience of the sensory retail environment of patrons of a small fashion boutique in the North West of England. Participants were asked to “show me how it feels to shop here” by taking photographs to depict their sensory in‐store experiences. Follow up interviews were carried out to explore the participants’ sensory experiences and then qualitative content analysis was used to identify the typical “likes” and “dislikes” regarding aspects of the sensory environment.

The findings reveal that it is not just tangible things that can affect a shopper's experience, but store traits such as smell, lighting and presence of owner‐manager can also influence a consumer's experience.

By providing an illustration case study, this paper provides a visual method for researching shopping experience from a sensory perspective. This research concerned small fashion boutiques. Other research as well as this study indicates that studies of sensory environments in other kinds of boutiques could produce different findings.

The paper is intended not only to equip small fashion retailers with an understanding of why some customers dwell and return to browse, but also to help them discern what it is that shoppers want to experience while shopping. Managerial implications are offered with the aim of converting patronage into sales to support survival of small fashion retailers.

This paper contributes to the literature on small to medium‐sized enterprise fashion retailing and the sensory experience of fashion shopping. The identification of sensory touch points in small fashion boutiques helps owner‐managers to understand female shoppers and provides a handrail for thinking up new ways of improving shopping experiences.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

As biomedicine becomes increasingly enmeshed in modern life, biomedicalization processes have implications for reproductive policy, including abortion policy. Informed consent provisions have been a prominent trend in state-level abortion lawmaking in the United States in recent years. Modeled on the practice of securing informed consent for medical procedures, informed consent provisions stipulate the information a person must receive before they can consent to an abortion. Informed consent provisions purportedly require that this information be objective, scientifically accurate, and non-judgmental. Through an analysis of informed consent provisions in Texas abortion legislation from 1993 to 2015, this chapter explores how such provisions employ medical and biomedical tropes to frame regulations that restrict access to abortion care as ostensibly protecting women’s health and safety. I find that informed consent legislation in Texas selectively borrows from medical and biomedical lexicons, cites strategic empirical evidence, and co-opts medical techniques and experts in ways that encumber abortion access.

This chapter enquires into the contribution of two British writers, Herbert Somerton Foxwell and Henry Riverdale Grenfell, who elaborated upon the hints provided by Jevons towards a description of long waves in the oscillations of prices. Writing two decades after Jevons, they witnessed the era of high prices turning into the great depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the causes of which they saw in the end of bimetallism. Not only did they take up Jevons’s specific explanation of the long fluctuations, but they also based their discussion upon graphical representation of data and incorporated in their treatment a specific trait (the superposition principle) of the ‘waves’ metaphor emphasized by the Manchester statisticians in the 1850s and 1860s. Their contribution is also interesting for their understanding of crises versus depressions at the time of the emergence of the interpretation of oscillations as a cycle, which they have only partially grasped – as distinct from the approach of later long wave theorists.

The purpose of this paper is to present a case study about how academic librarians can contribute to the interdisciplinary research endeavors of professors and students, especially doctoral candidates, through an intellectualized approach to collection development.

In the wake of protest movements such as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, colleges and universities have begun to develop courses about these events, and it is anticipated that there will be much research conducted about their respective histories. Academic librarians can participate in those research efforts by developing interdisciplinary collections about protest movements and by referring researchers to those collections.

Through a case‐study approach, this paper provides a narrative bibliography about Southern Agrarianism that can help professors and students interested in the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street movements to see their research endeavors from a new interdisciplinary perspective.

The value of this paper lies in presenting a concrete example of the way in which academic librarians can become active research partners through the work of building collections and recommending sources in areas that professors and students may not have previously considered.

Food and Drug cases are notorious for their capacity for providing Courts of Justice with knotty points. An interesting specimen of such a point is disclosed in Query No. 8341 in the issue of “The Sanitary Record” of January 23rd. Section 17 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1875, provides that if an Inspector applies to purchase an article of food exposed for sale, “and shall tender the price for the quantity which he shall require for the purpose of analysis,” and the person exposing the article for sale refuses to sell to the Inspector, such person is liable to a penalty. According to the full and first‐rate report of the case in question in the “Middleton Guardian” of December 18th last, the following appears to have happened:—The defendant was delivering milk at customers' houses from a horse‐drawn cart. The Inspector went up to him and told him that he was an Inspector under the Act, and that he wanted two pints of milk as samples, one from the can in the cart and the other from the can in the defendant's hand. The defendant said, “I refuse to supply you.” The Inspector then offered him a shilling, and said, “I want two pints of milk.” The defendant again refused to supply the samples, giving no reason for his refusal, and at once drove away. On proceedings being taken for the penalty imposed by the above section, the defendant's solicitor took the point that there had been no “legal tender” under the section, the price of the milk being 9d. and the tender being that of a coin of greater value, thus necessitating the giving of change. The Justices dismissed the summons on this ground. Apparently the only answers which occurred to the Clerk to the prosecuting Local Authority were that the Inspector “might not have known what the milk would cost,” and that the case cited by the defendant's solicitor was decided as long ago as 1815. As the Clerk to the Justices observed, people have only too good a reason for bearing in mind the present price of milk, and it is absurd to suggest that an Inspector of Food dues not know the current price of two pints of this commodity. The mere age of a case is also a feeble retort. We are therefore not surprised at the result of the proceedings. The querist also raises an equally untenable argument in support of his prosecution. He says that it is “the custom of ordinary purchasers to tender larger amounts than cover the value of the article purchased,” and that Inspectors “as far as possible act as ordinary purchasers.” The obvious reply to this is that such a custom cannot override the law, and here the law requires “legal tender.” Now a tender, to be legally valid, must be either “for the specific amount,” or “for more than the precise amount without a demand for change,” or “if the creditor; can select his portion without giving change” (Lord Halsbury's “Laws of England,” Vol. 6, at page 462). One of the authorities cited for this proposition is Wade's Case (5 Co. Rep. 114 a). This decision was given in 1601, and is therefore more than 200 years older than the authority to the antiquity of which the Clerk objected. This authority was no doubt that of Robinson v. Cook (1815, 6 Taunt. 336), where the Court held that tender of a larger amount with a demand for change was bad. It appears to us that the Clerk's answer to this technical defence should, in ordinary times, have been that, though there was a tender of more than the 9d., there was no “demand for change,” for the Inspector did not ask for his 3d. Moreover, the defendant drove away without giving the Inspector any opportunity of saying that he might keep the 3d. It does not appear to be necessary, however, for the purchaser to state expressly that he does not demand any change, and if he has no reasonable opportunity for considering whether such a demand shall be made or not, we are of opinion that the tender of more than the sum due is valid. It certainly is not usual for Inspectors to give money away when making their purchases, but if an Inspector does not happen to have upon him the exact sum required, and he has reason to suspect the quality of milk that is in course of delivery, we regard it as his duty to sacrifice any small sum like 3d. in order that he may perform his duty to consumers. But for D.O.R.A., the querist would, in our opinion, have been perfectly justified, in the circumstances of the case to which he has called our attention, in foregoing his change, and there was nothing to show that this may not have been his intention if the defendant had not been in such a hurry to escape from his clutches. The meaning of our reference to “ordinary times” and to D.O.R.A. is this: At the time in question it was illegal for the milkman to sell, and for the Inspector to purchase, milk at a price higher than the maximum fixed by the Regulations. Courts will not presume that persons intend to commit a breach of the law. In this case, therefore, if our point had been taken in, the Justices would have been justified, as there was no direct evidence of any such intention, in refusing to presume that the Inspector intended to pay more than 9d. for the two samples. Furthermore, if in fact the Inspector had said definitely “I do not want any change,” we think that the tender would still not have been legal, because the milkman would have been entitled to reply “D.O.R.A. won't let me sell you two pints for more than 9d., and therefore change is necessary.” We, like the Justices, regret the result of their ruling, and hope that this article may serve as a hint to officers who may find themselves placed in a similar situation when D.O.R.A. has disappeared.— The Sanitary Record.