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It is over 25 years since the Hancock Report recommended that Australian enterprises implement workplace level procedures for the resolution of disputes and grievances. Legislation now requires that all enterprise agreements contain dispute settlement procedures (DSPs). While most large organisations have enterprise agreements – and therefore DSPs – there is very little empirical research into how and whether Australian organisations use these DSPs – let alone what broader role they may play in regulating the employer–employee relationship. This chapter seeks to provide answers to these questions.

This chapter presents the results of three case studies of large organisations: a bank, a retailer and a state government agency. These organisations have been chosen from a larger group of case studies to illustrate three approaches to the management of workplace disputes. The organisations share certain features such as: the effective use of workplace procedures to resolve the great majority of workplace disputes; and the adoption of a ‘dual system’ with internal grievance procedures playing a role alongside DSPs. However they vary considerably in their approach to dispute resolution. The Bank's ‘strategic’ approach involves a comprehensive conflict management system. The State government agency's ‘reactive’ approach to workplace conflict resolution gives a much greater role for third parties, while the Retailer's ‘pragmatic’ approach incorporates elements from both the other two approaches.

The chapter discusses the implications of this diversity of approach for human resource management, organisational justice and workplace relations.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

There has been considerable research into different approaches to workplace dispute resolution in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and to a lesser extent other English-speaking countries. This chapter considers what guidance this research can provide into the practical implications of these different approaches.

One frame of reference for evaluating different approaches to workplace dispute resolution is provided by Budd’s three objectives of the employment relationship: equity, voice and efficiency.

While dispute resolution procedures can contribute to all three objectives, there can be negative consequences for employees who make use of formal workplace dispute resolution procedures. It is desirable that workplace disputes be resolved quickly and informally.

Such an approach places considerable weight on the skills of line managers. Unfortunately, there is evidence of a preference among line managers to replace pragmatic approaches to conflict resolution with a rigid adherence to process and procedure. This is partly due to a lack of skills, but is often compounded by inadequate support from senior management.

While it is important for organisations to have formal workplace dispute resolution procedures, the focus should be on line managers. The role of human resources staff and senior management should primarily be to monitor the dispute resolution system, ensure that it is operating effectively and deal with any emerging issues. They should ensure appropriate training is in place and provide appropriate support to line managers. Only when line managers have failed to resolve disputes should they become directly involved.

This chapter provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, given two-sided asymmetric information regarding panel judgement.

Examines the history of the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) 1969‐74 ‐ its origins, organization and policies ‐ and then evaluates its contribution as an agent of reform in the context of the perceived problems of the 1960s and 1970s. Considers whether there are any lessons to be learnt for the future given the possibility of a Labour Government, developments in Europe and the 1995 TUC policy document Your Voice at Work. Despite the drastic changes in industrial relations and in the economic, political and social environment, the answer is in the affirmative. In particular, the importance of a new third‐party agency having an independent governing body like the CIR and not a representative body like the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS); in its workflow not being controlled by government; and in its decisions on recognition being legally enforceable.

Outlines the present system of labour and social disputes settlement in Slovenia. Looks at the construction of the courts, precedural aspects and the areas which they govern. Provides some suggestions for improvement and change. Considers alternative methods of dispute settlement and the impact of the European convention on Human Rights.

This research concerned preference and choice among six procedures commonly used to resolve disputes. Two experiments revealed that, compared to complainants, respondents liked inaction and disliked arbitration. However, the most striking findings concerned general preferences among the procedures: consensual procedures (negotiation, mediation, and advisory‐arbitration) were best liked, followed by arbitration, with inaction and struggle least liked. Further analysis suggested that perceptions of self‐interest and societal norms underlie these procedural preferences, with the latter perceptions apparently more important. An examination of choices among the procedures revealed that negotiation was by far the most common first choice of action. If negotiation failed to resolve the conflict, the following escalative sequence of actions was typically endorsed: mediation, then advisory arbitration, then arbitration, and finally struggle.

A somewhat underappreciated aspect of the burgeoning rush to regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a discrepancy between the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) embodied in the original World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and that found in the language of many RTAs. This chapter explores the issue in the context of a dynamic repeated game of trade agreements. As is well known, the institutional alternatives available in negotiating multilateral freer trade agreements – regional agreements, side agreements, trade dispute settlement punishments, and so on – can proscribe the limits and shape the nature of self-enforcing trade agreements. Here, we suggest the extent to which deviations from the WTO DSP embodied in RTAs – for example, “private interest access,” “third party procedures,” and “choice of forum” – can not only work against the interests of “weaker parties” but furthermore undermine multilateral agreements closer to free trade.

This paper aims to determine whether a connection can be formed between corruption, plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution.

Academic articles and textbooks are examined as are relevant reports by various academic institutions.

Despite the similarities between plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution, the differences between the two overwhelmingly supersede their similarities. As such, there is unlikely to be an interplay between corruption, criminal plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution.

There are limited data available in relation to the prevalence of corruption activities by Chinese officials within the Belt and Road Initiative. Any discussions within this study is based on the impressionistic observations of the author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs in China.

Those who are interested in examining the relationship between the criminal plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution will have an interest in this topic.

The value of the paper is to demonstrate the difficulties in cross-fertilizing criminal law procedures with civil dispute resolution.