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This study aims to analyze the influence of taxes and corporate governance on the dividend policy of Brazilian companies.

The authors identify the changes of the tax legislation in Brazil in the period 1986-2011 and check their effect on corporate dividend policies for preferred and common shares. The authors use panel data Probit and Tobit estimation to verify the probability of companies to pay dividends under different tax regimes. The final sample comprises 672 companies, 1,159 traded stocks and 30,134 observations

The authors’ results suggest that changes in the tax legislation have a significant influence on dividend payments. Also, firms do not follow target payout ratios, but dividends are moderately dependent on past payments. Dividend payouts are affected by stock voting rights, privatization and dividend deductibility. Changes in regulation that reduce the agency problems among shareholders affect positively payout ratios.

For managers, maximizing shareholders’ value requires taking into account the consequences of the taxation when designing financial policies for the firm. For investors, stock portfolio selection should take into account payout behavior and how changes in dividend taxation affect stocks’ value. For policymakers, the effects of changes in the tax code on corporate behavior are of utmost importance to stimulate private investment and economic growth.

There are several tax law changes in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a good opportunity to study the effect of taxation on dividend policy and its dynamics over time.

This paper aims to examine the effect of dividend regulation on cost stickiness (i.e. the asymmetric change in firm expense between sales increase and sales decrease) and explore the underlying mechanism.

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the Guideline for Dividend Policy of Listed Companies issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2013, the authors employ a difference-in-difference model to investigate the impact of dividend regulation on cost stickiness.

The authors find that the cost stickiness of treatment group firms has decreased significantly when compared with control group firms after the dividend regulation. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced among firms in lower marketization regions, in lower competition industries and those with less analyst coverage and lower cash flow levels. Further analyses show that dividend regulation reduces the cost stickiness of firms by mitigating agency problems. Finally, the conclusion holds after several robust tests, including controlling for firm fixed effect, propensity score matching (PSM), placebo test and reconstruction of expense variable.

This paper confirms that dividend regulation serves an important role in corporate governance, which reduces firms' agency costs and thereby decreases cost stickiness. The conclusions shed light on the dividend policies of listed companies and capital market regulation in the future.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate dividend policy on the capital structure in the Korean stock market. To distinctly discern the voluntariness of changes in corporate dividend policy, we analyze companies that, following a substantial increase, do not reduce dividends for the subsequent two years or, after a significant decrease, do not raise dividends for the following two years. Our empirical findings indicate that companies that increase dividends experience a significant decrease in both book and market leverage, even after controlling for variables such as target leverage ratios. This result suggests that a large increase in dividends can effectively reduce information asymmetry, leading to a lower cost of equity. On the contrary, after a decrease in dividends, both book leverage and market leverage significantly increase, revealing a symmetric relationship between dividend policy and capital structure. In conclusion, large dividend increases in Korean companies not only reduce information asymmetry but also lower the cost of equity capital, resulting in observable changes in the leverage ratio.

Using the residual dividend theory, this study examines the impact of capital expenditures and working capital on the dividend policies of publicly listed companies in Indonesia.

Using data on public companies (other than those in the financial sector) listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2020, this study collected 870 observations (firm-years). This study employs a regression analysis technique using the STATA application program. The main variables in this study are capital expenditure and working capital, and the control variables are sales growth, firm size, leverage, profitability, liquidity and dummy variables for state-owned enterprises. The dependent variable of dividend policy is proxied by the dividend payout ratio.

This study’s results support the residual dividend theory’s hypothesis, in which capital expenditure negatively affects a company’s dividend policy. This study also analyzes this effect on companies that pay cash dividends at quantile positions of 25, 30, 50 and 60. The results show that the effect of capital expenditure on cash dividend payments is more pronounced in the case of companies whose cash dividends are in the 50th quantile. This result holds across different specification and endogeneity tests.

This study analyzes the residual dividend theory in Indonesian companies, focusing on localized factors and investment priorities. It challenges traditional Western dividend policies and provides empirical data that enhances the theory’s robustness. The findings have practical implications for investors, policymakers and corporate decision-makers in the Indonesian market.

Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of overinvestment, a phenomenon that worsens firm operation. Furthermore, it clarifies the moderation role of debt and dividend policy in mitigating the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance in the case of Vietnamese listed companies.

The research uses all financial statement of non-financial Vietnamese listed companies on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the period of 2008–2018. The data are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The final data set is comprised of 669 listed companies. The study measures overinvestment though investment demand function and HP filter. Moreover, the research employs the dynamic model, so it has to apply the SGMM method to deal with the problem of endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable.

The research finds that overinvestment is negatively associated with firm performance. Debt or dividend policy separately can moderate the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance. However, when these two policies are combined, they lessen the positive interaction impact of each policy due to the substitution between debt and dividend policy.

The research may have two limitations. Firstly, the research measures overinvestment indirectly through investment demand function and HP filter. These two measures only help identify the sign that companies may have the problem of overinvestment because we cannot determine whether they overinvest or not in reality. Secondly, when using interaction variables, the problem of multicollinearity may be higher, and this may adjust the signs and significance level of variables in the models.

Practically, the research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, a company can exploit debt or dividend policy to limit excessive free cash flow in order to constrain the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, a company should enhance its corporate governance to resolve agency problems. Thirdly, the government should make the financial sector more transparent and effective to improve monitoring functions of various parties in the capital market.

Overinvestment sometimes can cause social issues. Overinvestment means that companies make ineffective investment. If they continue this situation over a long time, companies may have financial distress or even go bankruptcy. As a result, it will slow down economic growth and increase unemployment in the economy.

The research is supposed to make two great contributions to the existing empirical studies in two aspects. Firstly, it is the first attempt to take into consideration the interaction between overinvestment and financial policies. Secondly, it helps enhance the fundamental stance of the agency theory, which supports the interdependence of debt, dividend and investment policy.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.

Considering that the heterogeneity in the composition of deliberation and management bodies can promote a differentiated impact on earnings distribution policies of companies, the purpose of this paper is to examine the marginal influence of female participation on the board of directors and executive board regarding decisions associated with dividend policy in companies operating in Brazil.

The sample is composed of non-financial companies listed on the B3 Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2015, which encompasses 261 companies (1,084 observations per year). The tests aim at explaining the probability of earnings distribution and the payout level of companies through variables that measure the female presence – considering that the explanatory economic attributes of decisions over dividends are kept under control. The econometric analysis was carried out through the descriptive analysis of the variables and LOGIT and TOBIT tests of inference estimated with fixed effects and meeting all econometric requirements.

The proportion of women in both deliberative and executive bodies affects marginally the dividend policy of Brazilian companies. The female presence in management bodies contributes to a higher probability of earnings distribution and increase in the payout level; such tendency is moderated when women are in the board of directors; so, we do not reject the hypothesis of female influence on dividend policy decisions in Brazil.

One can find such investigations in foreign environments, but such tests had not been accomplished in Brazil so far. We discuss, therefore, in an unprecedented way, the heterogeneity in deliberative (governance) and executive (management) bodies and its outcomes in strategic decisions made in Brazilian companies, focusing on the female insertion and on fundamental decisions that are related to the relationship among stakeholders, which is the dividend policy per se.

The authors measure the cost of equity to earnings yield differential for a sample of 2,035 non-financial firms. In a series of Logit and Tobit regressions, the authors examine if the cost of equity to earnings yield differential is related to dividend policy in the manner predicted by agency theory.

Agency theory says a firm's optimal dividend policy is partially determined by the relationship between the earnings yield and the cost of equity capital. When the cost of equity is higher (lower) than the earnings yield, firms are motivated to (not) pay dividends as this reduces the cost of capital and holding other things constant, increases corporate valuations. The authors test whether managers set dividend policies to maximize the value of the firm.

The study’s findings show that when the cost of equity is higher (lower) than earnings yield, firms are more (less) likely to be dividend payers and the payouts are higher (lower). The results are robust to the inclusion of share repurchases as an alternative to cash distributions. The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories.

The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper testing the cost of equity hypothesis.

Although it has often been studied in finance research, the relationship between dividend yields and stock returns remains an unresolved issue, especially in the Korean stock market. When firms continue to pay non-decreasing dividends for three or five years, they may establish a dividend reputation, which could affect this relationship. The author found firms that pay more dividends, larger firms, older firms, more profitable firms, less leveraged firms, firms with less volatile returns, firms with foreign holdings of more than 5%, and firms with more concentrated ownership build dividend reputations. The author also found that the relationship between dividend yields and future stock returns depends on a firm’s dividend reputation. The evidence shows that when firms with higher yields have dividend reputations, they produce higher future returns, whereas there is no significant relationship between yields and returns for firms with no reputation. These results are inconsistent with the findings of studies that use developed market data. In addition, when larger firms with higher growth potential and firms with less concentrated ownership have dividend reputations, future returns are higher.

The purpose of this paper is to observe whether the entrenchment of managers can affect firms’ dividend disbursement decisions and investor sentiment in the Tunisia context.

The sample includes all non-financial listed stocks in the Tunisia stock exchange during the years 2004–2017. Moreover, the entrenchment of managers is measured by five proxy explained the managers rooting from all listed firms. The propensity to pay dividends is measured by the dividend yield.

The findings yield qualitatively consistent with the previous research. After controlling for the effect of a manager’s behavior and different entrenchment phase, the result shows that entrepreneurial the firm’s decision to pay dividends could be influenced by the managers’ entrenchment.

The result is limited at the level of the non-financial companies listed in the BVMT, but in future studies, the investigation with other countries can be compared.

Moreover, investors in Tunisia show their preference for a dividend to self-control and satisfaction and increase their profit, especially in an abnormal economic situation explained by the Tunisian political crisis.

The originality of this paper is to investigate both the important role of the entrenchment and cycle life of the manager on the decision to distribute dividends and the investor sentiment. Moreover, the author’s problem may be a reference for future investigation talking about the managers’ psychology like opportunism.