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Open Access
Article
Publication date: 7 September 2021

Wenwen Jiang and Hwa-Sung Kim

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firm overinvestment using Korean data from 2007 to 2016. Since Jensen…

Abstract

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firm overinvestment using Korean data from 2007 to 2016. Since Jensen (1986) shows that a firm's free cash flow is an important factor of overinvestment, the authors examine how free cash flow influences the sensitivity of overinvestment to EPU. The authors find that a high level of free cash flow attenuates the negative effect of EPU on overinvestment. The authors find that there is no significant difference in the effect of EPU on overinvestment between Chaebol (Korean family-run conglomerates) and non-Chaebol firms, which is consistent with the literature that the features of Chaebol are weakening.

Details

Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: 선물연구, vol. 29 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1229-988X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 21 October 2013

Zhong-qin Su, Hung-gay Fung and Jot Yau

Using panel data for the period 2004-2010, this study shows that political connections have a significant positive effect on corporate overinvestment in China while their…

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Abstract

Purpose

Using panel data for the period 2004-2010, this study shows that political connections have a significant positive effect on corporate overinvestment in China while their interaction with related-party transactions has a negative effect. Results also indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the Chinese central government tend to have greater overinvestment than non-SOEs. However, their interaction with related-party transactions has an opposite effect on overinvestment, lending support to the conjecture that firm ownership structure plays a significant role in corporate overinvestment decisions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Design/methodology/approach

Panel data analysis and regression.

Findings

This study shows that political connections have a significant positive effect on corporate overinvestment in China while their interaction with related-party transactions has a negative effect. Results also indicate that SOEs controlled by the Chinese central government tend to have greater overinvestment than non-SOEs.

Research limitations/implications

The research shows some Chinese firms' behavior that indicates expropriation of minority stockholders. Policymakers should be aware of this issue as overinvestment is not good for the economy as a while. The limitation of the study is based on six-year data.

Practical implications

Stockholders should monitor the firms to mitigate the overinvestment problems in Chinese firms.

Originality/value

This is the first paper to examine the overinvestment issue along with related-party transactions and political connections.

Details

International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, vol. 21 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1834-7649

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 17 February 2012

Jin‐hui Luo and Di‐fang Wan

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board independence in the context of concentrated ownership.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a five‐year panel data of Chinese non‐financial listed companies between 2001 and 2005, the paper estimates both a fixed‐effects model and a random‐effects model.

Findings

The paper finds evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between large shareholdings and firm level overinvestment. It also finds that state‐owned firms and firms with more independent directors experience lower level of overinvestment. However, firms with more frequent meetings experience a higher level of overinvestment.

Research limitations/implications

The paper's findings indicate that concentrated ownership is not always a bad thing. The crux of the matter is how to induce large shareholders' incentive to monitor managers' opportunistic behaviors and restrict their motivation to expropriate minority shareholders.

Practical implications

In the context of concentrated ownership, the key to improve corporate governance is to strengthen board independence.

Originality/value

The paper provides useful information on non‐monotonic governance effects of large shareholdings in Chinese listed companies and overinvestment.

Details

Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, vol. 12 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 15 February 2016

Hongbin Huang, Guanghui Jin and Jingnan Chen

The purpose of this paper is to expand the investor sentiment’s effect on investment efficiency to the layer of “credit financing,” studying whether investor sentiment can…

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to expand the investor sentiment’s effect on investment efficiency to the layer of “credit financing,” studying whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors obtain firm-level data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and using panel estimation techniques examine whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

Findings

This paper finds that credit financing plays the role of partial media in the process of investor sentiment affecting investment efficiency. Based on the funds increasing effect, with the high-investor sentiment and increasing credit financing, corporations alleviate the financing constraints, but also provide a convenient for the abuse of corporate funds. So, investor sentiment positively associates with enterprises’ overinvestment, while investor sentiment negatively associates with enterprises’ underinvestment. Relying on the particular system background and property right environment in China, this paper finds that investor sentiment has an effect on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises and the underinvestment of private enterprises through credit financing channel, while it does not function in the overinvestment of private enterprises. The reason of the difference is that under the soft budget constraint in the country, the credit preference of state-owned enterprises and the creditor’s rights management of banks are partially absent.

Research limitations/implications

By fusing the special financial environment and institutional background, this thesis further includes in the analysis frame the difference in governance effect by credit financing between state-owned and privately owned listed companies, and further analyzes the difference in impact on investment efficiency in enterprises of different natures after investor sentiment has affected enterprise credit financing.

Practical implications

This paper has verified the constraint assumption and deepened the research work on bank credit supply and answered practical questions such as whether the banks in the country exercise supervision function over the listed companies and on which kind of listed companies the supervision function plays a more effective role.

Social implications

As an unofficial substitution mechanism, bank-enterprise relationship can elevate the investment efficiency by private owned enterprises. Based on the timely research results on credit financing, reference is provided for private listed companies to utilize investor sentiment to improve its investment efficiency.

Originality/value

This paper has proved the specific path which creates the dual effects on resources allocation by investor sentiment, that is, the intermediary transmission in credit financing, clarifying the mechanism of action by which investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment and making incremental contribution to the research of how investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment.

Details

China Finance Review International, vol. 6 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2044-1398

Keywords

Open Access
Article
Publication date: 4 June 2020

Nghia Nguyen Trong and Cong Thanh Nguyen

Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of…

4726

Abstract

Purpose

Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of overinvestment, a phenomenon that worsens firm operation. Furthermore, it clarifies the moderation role of debt and dividend policy in mitigating the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance in the case of Vietnamese listed companies.

Design/methodology/approach

The research uses all financial statement of non-financial Vietnamese listed companies on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the period of 2008–2018. The data are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The final data set is comprised of 669 listed companies. The study measures overinvestment though investment demand function and HP filter. Moreover, the research employs the dynamic model, so it has to apply the SGMM method to deal with the problem of endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable.

Findings

The research finds that overinvestment is negatively associated with firm performance. Debt or dividend policy separately can moderate the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance. However, when these two policies are combined, they lessen the positive interaction impact of each policy due to the substitution between debt and dividend policy.

Research limitations/implications

The research may have two limitations. Firstly, the research measures overinvestment indirectly through investment demand function and HP filter. These two measures only help identify the sign that companies may have the problem of overinvestment because we cannot determine whether they overinvest or not in reality. Secondly, when using interaction variables, the problem of multicollinearity may be higher, and this may adjust the signs and significance level of variables in the models.

Practical implications

Practically, the research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, a company can exploit debt or dividend policy to limit excessive free cash flow in order to constrain the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, a company should enhance its corporate governance to resolve agency problems. Thirdly, the government should make the financial sector more transparent and effective to improve monitoring functions of various parties in the capital market.

Social implications

Overinvestment sometimes can cause social issues. Overinvestment means that companies make ineffective investment. If they continue this situation over a long time, companies may have financial distress or even go bankruptcy. As a result, it will slow down economic growth and increase unemployment in the economy.

Originality/value

The research is supposed to make two great contributions to the existing empirical studies in two aspects. Firstly, it is the first attempt to take into consideration the interaction between overinvestment and financial policies. Secondly, it helps enhance the fundamental stance of the agency theory, which supports the interdependence of debt, dividend and investment policy.

Details

Journal of Asian Business and Economic Studies, vol. 28 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2515-964X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 2 May 2017

Wenxia Ge, Tony Kang, Gerald J. Lobo and Byron Y. Song

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting.

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity.

Findings

The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity.

Research limitations/implications

The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured by G-index and institutional ownership.

Practical implications

The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies.

Originality/value

First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

Details

Asian Review of Accounting, vol. 25 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1321-7348

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 6 March 2017

Jinyu Yang, Bin Liu and Lihua Yuan

This paper comes to the point from the tax competition of local government in investment promotion and capital introduction. This paper aims to empirically examine the…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper comes to the point from the tax competition of local government in investment promotion and capital introduction. This paper aims to empirically examine the internal mechanism of enterprises obtaining land resources from local government and its resulting equity investment increase and economic consequences of overinvestment.

Design/methodology/approach

The data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 were used to test the relationship between the increase in enterprise equity investment and the acquisition of land resources and overinvestment. The descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and least squares linear regression were used to solve the above question.

Findings

One of the reasons for the enterprise equity increase is to obtain scarce land resources. The enterprise acquisition for land resources leads to overinvestment. The equity investment increase from obtaining land resources will further stimulate enterprise group to overinvest.

Research limitations/implications

The authors could not get the actual data of land that subsidiaries have obtained directly. In this research, the authors get the data using consolidated statements and subsidiary statements indirectly.

Practical implications

The results make contributions to the influencing factors and economic consequence of the enterprise investment structural deviation.

Social implications

It provides reference to optimize the “interaction” relationship between government and enterprises.

Originality/value

It identified the “dual-channel” conduction mechanism between land resource acquisition and enterprise overinvestment.

Details

Nankai Business Review International, vol. 8 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2040-8749

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 2 January 2018

Muhammad Ansar Majeed, Xianzhi Zhang and Muhammad Umar

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of investment efficiency on cost of equity capital.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of investment efficiency on cost of equity capital.

Design/methodology/approach

Prior research indicated that any governance mechanism which reduces the agency conflict reduces the cost of equity capital. This study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency represents such governance mechanism which reduces agency conflict and hence cost of equity. The authors use price earning growth ratio (Easton, 2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model for the measurement of cost of equity while investment efficiency measure of Biddle et al. (2009) have been employed to examine the association. We also use Chen et al. (2013) measure of investment efficiency for robustness.

Findings

The results show that investment efficiency is negatively associated with cost of equity. It was also found that there is a strong relationship of investment efficiency with cost of equity for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), while no significant relationship is found for state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, overinvestment is significantly associated with cost of equity capital. However, no significant relationship was found between underinvestment and cost of equity.

Originality/value

The results provide empirical support to the argument that investment efficiency acts as a mechanism which represents lower agency conflict. Moreover, the findings provide evidence that government act as “deep pocket” while NSOEs are punished by investors for inefficient resource allocation. This study also proposes that there is a positive relationship between overinvestment and cost of equity.

Details

Journal of Asia Business Studies, vol. 12 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1558-7894

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 4 December 2017

Pi-Hsun Tseng, Xuan-Qi Su and Hsiu-Jung Tsai

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of managerial education levels on the wealth effect at the time of investment announcements, by testing two competitive…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of managerial education levels on the wealth effect at the time of investment announcements, by testing two competitive hypotheses: the agency theory-based overinvestment hypothesis vs the Q-theory-based organizational legitimacy hypothesis.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors construct the sample by hand-collecting the announcement dates of capital investments from major newspapers published in Taiwan from 2006 to 2014. The authors then use the event study methodology to estimate cumulative abnormal returns at the time of investments announcements to measure the wealth effect. Finally, the authors examine the wealth effect for capital-investing firms with higher managerial education vs those with lower managerial education. The authors also conduct a cross-sectional regression to test the relation between the wealth effect of capital investment and managerial education.

Findings

The empirical results indicate that the wealth effect at the time of investment announcements is less favorable for firms with better-educated managers; this negative relation is mitigated for firms with higher institutional ownership and is aggravated for family-controlled firms; and the overall findings are supported by the agency theory-based overinvestment hypothesis, suggesting that higher managerial education lead to greater managerial optimism/overconfidence, which in turn increases the likelihood of overinvestment and implies a less favorable wealth effect associated with capital investment.

Originality/value

This study contributes to the literature by proposing a new, unexplored stock market’s reaction channel through which managerial education signals adverse information about potential overinvestment behavior, even though many studies suggests that managerial education serves as an indication of knowledge/capability and improves firm performance.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 43 no. 12
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 14 August 2017

Weiju Young and Ching-Chih Wu

The purpose of this paper is to investigate that how firms’ pre-issue investment levels and changes in institutional ownership (IO) affect their long-run performance after…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate that how firms’ pre-issue investment levels and changes in institutional ownership (IO) affect their long-run performance after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use Richardson’s (2006) method to measure firms’ pre-issue investment levels and then divide the SEO firms into the under-, normal-, and overinvesting groups. The study examines the relation between the pre-issue abnormal investment and long-run post-issue performance. In addition, the authors examine whether changes in IO around SEOs affects SEO firms’ performance.

Findings

The authors find a quadratic relation between the pre-issue abnormal investment and the long-run post-issue performance. In other words, the underinvesting and overinvesting groups tend to underperform. The authors also find that changes in IO around SEOs positively associate with firms’ long-run performance.

Research limitations/implications

The authors ascribe the underperformance of underinvesting firms to the deficiency of good growth opportunities; for overinvesting firms, the authors link to the misalignment problem of managerial incentive (i.e. empire building).

Originality/value

The results suggest that long-run investors should be cautious of buying new-issue shares of underinvesting and overinvesting firms, especially those with insignificant increases in IO.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 43 no. 8
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

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