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This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999–2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board.

This study aims to examine the impact of agency cost, Islamic board characteristics and corporate governance on the performance of Islamic institutions.

Based on the selected criteria, 92 Islamic banks (IBs) from 20 countries were selected for further research. The authors used generalized method moments (GMM) estimation method. The agency cost and Shariah board characteristics are the explanatory variables. The author uses the age of the bank and the size of the bank for variable control.

Empirical results indicate that first, agency costs represented by cast/total assets negatively affect IBs’ return on equity and net income. As agency costs rise, IBs’ financial performance declines. Second, Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and board independence affect IB performance. The study found that SSB size positively affects IB performance.

This research contributes to the literature on IBs in different countries, which policymakers and practitioners can use to improve agency cost functions and Shariah board characteristics. Second, this analysis shows that IBs require specific attention for agency charges, given their operations and business structures. This study contributes to agency theory, which requires Islamic banking information and practices. Finally, the author has aided regulators and IBs by identifying the sources of agency cost practices that can be resolved. The other bank governance contribution is twofold. First, the author studied dual board governance in IBs (SSB and ordinary boards of directors). Second, the author examines how SSB and traditional board governance affect IB performance. This research focuses on banks listed on stock exchanges in the 20 countries analysed.

The research has policy and practical implications for central banks and IBs. By outlining appropriate regulatory guidelines and reporting systems, regulatory authorities can ensure Sharia compliance and protect the independence of IB Shariah department officers. Regulators and relevant stakeholders must ensure Sharia compliance, audits, inspections, reporting and accurate disclosure for IBs.

This paper offers original contributions to professionals in the field of IBs and stakeholders investigating the relationship between agency costs, governance of IBs, characteristics of Islamic supervisory boards and the performance of IBs.

The readability of annual reports is an important feature that determines the quality of communication between a firm and its stakeholders. Extant literature has demonstrated that readability characteristics of annual reports are crucial in facilitating the investor's ability to process and analyze information, resulting in higher firm performance and lower agency costs. This study examines the relationship between annual report readability, agency costs and the firm performance of listed financial sector companies in Oman.

Using a sample of 150 firm-year observations of listed financial sector companies on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) over the period 2014 to 2018, a panel regression analysis is used, along with the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to address endogeneity concerns. The readability of annual reports is proxied by the length of the annual report, the Flesch reading ease and the Flesch–Kincaid index.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) results suggest that readability proxied by the length of the annual report has no significant relationship with agency cost, return on assets (ROA) or stock returns. The OLS results are confirmed through the system GMM estimation model for agency costs, Tobin's Q and stock returns. Easier-to-read annual reports measured by the Flesch reading ease demonstrate high asset utilization ratio and Tobin's Q. These results emphasize Flesch reading ease measure in explaining the economic significance of agency cost and Tobin's Q. In contrast, difficult-to-read annual reports are observed for firms with high ROA.

The study is limited to the financial sector. Its generalizability could be extended to a similar sector or countries with features similar to Oman. Future studies on readability could be extended to other sectors of Oman, and financial firms with easier-to-read annual reports show a high Tobin's Q, which reflects the confidence of investors in the stock market. These findings may encourage policymakers to regulate the readability features of annual reports and influence the reporting quality of financials and disclosures also including cross-country comparisons.

Financial firms with easier-to-read annual reports show a high Tobin's Q, which reflects the confidence of investors in the stock market. These findings may encourage policymakers to regulate the readability features of annual reports and influence the reporting quality of financials and disclosures.

While the study extends prior literature on readability, agency costs and firm performance, it is also one of the first to examine the financial sector of an emerging country, namely, Oman. The study supports the obfuscation hypothesis through the association of readability measure with agency cost. Unlike prior research that has focused on common computational linguistic literature, this study uses three proxies for readability to assess information quality.

The purpose of this research is to examine whether board gender diversity reduces the agency costs of firms in the context of Chinese listed firms.

This paper uses a large sample of 23,340 firm-year observations of Chinese listed companies during 2004–2017. The authors use ordinary least squares regressions as the primary methodology with a wide range of methods to control for endogeneity and to check robustness, including the fixed-effect method, instrumental variable approach, lagged gender diversity measures, propensity score matching, Blau index, Shannon index and industry-adjusted measures of agency costs.

The evidence reveals that the participation of female directors in corporate board reduces agency costs, which correlates with conflicts of interest. Moreover, gender-diverse boards are more effective in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in which agency issues are more severe. Female directors also provide better monitoring roles in more-developed areas. Finally, corporate boards that have a critical mass of female directors have a greater tendency to reduce agency costs as compared to their token participation. Overall, all findings support the validity of agency theory.

This study shows the economic benefit of female directors in the boardroom by reducing agency costs and by improving firms' governance structure. Regarding the government, which is gradually introducing board gender diversity policies, this study provides valuable pragmatic information for Chinese regulators on this issue.

This study extends the literature by providing evidence that gender diversity in boardroom matters for shareholders' wealth maximization. It provides novel evidence that a critical mass of female directors is more effective in reducing agency costs compared to a single female on the board, and that the effect of gender diversity varies in relation to ownership structure and region.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of accruals-based earnings management (AEM), International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption and stock market integration for firms that belong to Latin-American Integrated Market (MILA).

The GMM estimator was used according to Arellano and Bover (1995) for panel data on a sample of 478 non-financial companies between 2000 and 2016. Multilevel mixed models was used for the robustness analysis.

AEM practices significantly and dynamically reduce agency costs. This result suggests companies use positive discretionary accruals to hide true agency costs and avoid shareholders monitoring, while negative discretionary accruals are ways to expropriate wealth and increase agency costs. This result implies that firms use AEM as a predetermined strategy to weaken corporate governance. The IFRS adoption and MILA implementation reduced agency costs. However, only IFRS adoption had the capability to mitigate the effects of AEM on agency costs.

These results reveal AEM constitutes a practice that managers use to weaken firms’ corporate governance and expropriate wealth from shareholders. These practices have effects at short-run and long-run. However, the IFRS adoption and market integration represented by MILA are mitigating factors for agency costs. These results have relevant implications for firms’ corporate governance because they guide investors and shareholders to strengthen corporate control and monitoring on business decision-making. These results also are relevant to policymakers because they orient the financial policies design to strengthen the benefits of IFRS and MILA.

This study aims to examine the relation between long-term debt and internationalization in the presence of the agency costs of debt and business risk.

Sample firms consist of 517 non-financial listed firms in Malaysia, with 4,197 firm-year observations from the year 2000 to 2014. This study uses panel data regressions and a series of robustness tests to examine the hypotheses.

The results show that multinational corporations (MNCs) are more likely to sustain less long-term debt than domestic corporations (DCs) to mitigate the costs related to agency problem and firm risk. Meanwhile, foreign-based MNCs maintain less long-term debt than local-based firms, and the finding is more significant at a higher degree of internationalization. Robustness tests confirm the negative relations.

The findings indicate that the ongoing debate on the debt financing puzzle can be explained by internationalization. Moreover, the findings suggest that in addition to the systematic differences between MNCs and DCs, studies on the debt financing and internationalization should also account for the systematic differences among MNCs such as the local-based MNCs, foreign-based MNCs and DCs that later expand their business operations abroad.

MNCs have to be responsive to the diverse institutional environments as they diversify their business operations geographically. When the adverse effects of internationalization outweigh the benefits, MNCs could use the long-term debt financing decision to mitigate the costs of doing business abroad. This is because debt financing is also a primary concern in the corporate financial decisions for the maximization of shareholders’ wealth.

This study contributes to the debt financing literature from the international perspective by providing evidence from an emerging market. In addition, this study highlights the importance of recognizing firms by their firm-specific characteristics, such as internationalization, given the systematic differences among firms.

We examine the mode of international expansion as an equilibrium governance contract between home country and host country factor owner. The focus is on agency costs, a form of transactions costs. Two phenomena are shown to be related to the agency costs imposed by factor owners: (i) the choice of different modes of international expansion by one firm in different locations, and (ii) the simultaneous occurrence of several forms of foreign involvement in the same location. We attempt to characterize the dynamic relationship between the mode of an offshore operation and changes in factor market conditions that affect agency costs.

The purpose of this study is to examine the linear and non-linear relationship between capital structure (CS) and firm performance (FP) and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus.

This study used static and quadratic panel data regression models to examine the linear and non-linear relationships and structured equation models to analyze the mediating effect of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus of 38 listed non-financial Mauritian firms from 2009 to 2019.

Leverage has a significant negative effect on FP supporting the pecking order theory. Agency costs are significantly and positively associated with FP. There is a strong non-linear relationship between leverage and FP supporting the trade-off and agency cost theories. Agency costs are an important moderator and mediator in the CS-FP nexus. Overall, the sensitivity analyses showed that the results were robust.

Firms need to carefully consider the levels and types of debt and equity in their CS involving the use of dynamic strategies to adjust CS in response to changing economic conditions and FP. The moderating effect of agency costs may guide firms in optimizing CS and may contribute to corporate governance discussions, emphasizing the importance of aligning interests to foster sustainable business practices.

This study adds to the extant literature by providing new evidence on the non-linear relationship between leverage and FP and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus in emerging capital markets, where such studies are rare.

This chapter applies the Consortium for Advanced Management, International (CAM-I) Activity-Based Cost Management (ABC/M) tool to paratransit. The intent is to enable agencies sponsoring rides to save money through sharing rides and vehicle-time.

Several paratransit cost-allocation models from Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) and other sources are reviewed and one is adapted to the ABC/M methodology, based upon the author’s previous work proportionately allocating ride time among sponsoring agencies at a consolidated human service transportation agency and the price sheets used in contracted operations to minimize financial risk.

Through application of the principles of ABC/M, paratransit providers can properly allocate costs, determine the costs of providing proposed new services, plan for future vehicle acquisitions, and motivate their customers to tailor their transportation needs in a manner that will save them money and boost efficiency.

University-based transportation studies programs may be motivated to apply these strategies to urban and rural paratransit providers that serve several customer agencies.

If agencies sponsoring paratransit rides understand that funds can purchase more rides during off-peak hours or if rides are shared with clients of other agencies, then paratransit resources can be used more efficiently and to the benefit of more individuals.

By enabling the provision of more rides, a greater number of riders will be enabled to reach necessary services and participate in community life.

This is the first application of the ABC/M methodology to paratransit (and transit) and possibly to social services.

Based on agency perspective on temporary agency workers, the purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between firms’ agency problems and agency cost on agency workers; moreover, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are considered in seeking to understand how they moderate this relationship.

Using the Hsinchu Science Park directory of corporate affiliations as a sample frame, the authors adopted a paired questionnaire which included two parts in order to consider the possible problem of common method variances. The first part is completed by the manager of the firms and the second part is completed by his/her temporary agency workers. Finally, 94 firms completed questionnaires, providing a total sample of 94 R&D managers and 458 temporary agency workers. The rate of participation was 31.65 percent.

Using a questionnaire survey of 94 high-tech firms, from which a total of 94 R&D managers and 458 temporary agency workers participated, the results show that firms’ agency problems have a positive influence on the agency cost of monitoring temporary agency workers. In addition, while this relationship is negatively moderated by extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation has a non-significant moderating effect.

The managers of firms should consider not only the short-term flexibility of employing temporary agency workers, but also the long-term cultivation of promoting great agency workers. This could maximize the efficiency of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. Of course, the firms should think about how to reduce the agency problems created by goal conflict, information asymmetry and risk sharing with temporary agency workers, because this could also provide a chance for the firms to decrease agency costs spent on monitoring.