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The results of this study indicate that a likely reason why a negative relation between estimated implicit taxes and pretax returns is empirically observed is the researcher’s election to choose a zero tax rate as the benchmark state and local tax rate. Normally, an observed negative relation between estimated implicit taxes and pretax returns supports the hypothesis generated by implicit tax theory. This conclusion regarding the implicit tax hypothesis may be premature whenever the incidence of state and local income taxes contributes to this empirical finding. First, state income taxes, treated as a negative subsidy when the benchmark state and local tax rate is set at zero, will likely cause implicit taxes to be underestimated. Second, the observed relationship between estimated implicit taxes and pretax returns appears to be reversible depending upon the researcher’s election of a statutory tax rate that incorporates the selected benchmark state and local tax rate.

The present study uses a sample of 848 firms covering the years from 1989 through 1998 to show how the relation between estimated implicit taxes and pretax returns can be manipulated by the selection of the benchmark state and local tax rate. Since choosing an accurate benchmark state and local tax rate can be problematic, the present study suggests adjusting both estimated implicit taxes and pretax income by the amount of state and local income taxes incurred. The results, using the regression model making this adjustment, appear to nullify the negative bias of a zero tax rate as the benchmark state and local tax rate.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the importance of taxes as a determinant of FDI attraction.

Approach – The chapter presents the fundamental elements of the conceptual background that explain how and under which circumstances taxation may be a significant factor underlying FDI decisions. Then it proceeds with an extensive review of the qualitative and quantitative literature on the topic. Finally, it draws several relevant conclusions on the main patterns that can be extracted from the evolution of the literature on this field.

Findings – In this chapter we arrive at three major findings concerning the effect of taxes on FDI, and we uncover one interesting puzzle worthy of further research.

First, from the literature review it becomes clear that both FDI and taxes are concepts covering heterogeneous phenomena, and therefore to compare studies, results or to make judgments on the relationship between taxes and FDI, the working definitions of FDI and taxes that are being used needs to be clearly established and understood.

Second, based on the review of the qualitative literature, it becomes clear that while taxes are an important aspect of FDI decisions among managers, they are probably not the main driver of the decision. Moreover, taxes may only play a ‘marginal’ role compared with other determinants of FDI.

Third, looking carefully at the quantitative literature as a whole, there is not a straight answer that permits to unequivocally say that lower taxes increase FDI attraction.

Finally, a puzzle emerges from the tension between what policy makers believe and what the studies show. The review in this chapter puts in evidence that while policy makers believe lowering taxes increases the attractiveness of their territories vis-à-vis FDI, the facts show that taxes appear only to play a marginal role compared with other determinants of FDI. So, why do policy makers put so much faith on tax policies as an FDI attraction tool?

Value – The value of this chapter is threefold. It presents a very complete and up to date review of the literature concerning the impact of taxation on FDI decisions, it analyses the literature's apparently disparate results and groups them into three clear emerging conclusions, and uncovers an interesting public policy puzzle.

This research addresses the question of whether market competition influences a firm's implicit tax burden. Implicit taxes are defined as the pretax rate of return disadvantage earned on an investment that is taxed preferentially. The Scholes and Wolfson (1992) model predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset any benefit from preferential tax treatment leading to no benefit from lower explicit taxes; however, their theory assumes perfect market competition. This chapter relaxes the assumption of perfect market competition and finds that firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit taxes and firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes. These findings are consistent with monopoly and oligopoly behavior predictions where firms in less competitive industries have greater price setting power and can retain more of their tax savings while market forces in competitive industries force companies to pass along any savings to customers (Mason, 1939). Furthermore, these findings answer the call in the literature for more research on determinants of cross-sectional variation in implicit taxes (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).

This paper produces a comprehensive assessment of income redistribution to the working-age population, covering OECD countries over the last two decades. Redistribution is quantified as the relative reduction in market income inequality achieved by personal income taxes (PIT), employees’ social security contributions, and cash transfers, based on household-level micro-data. A detailed decomposition analysis uncovers the respective roles of size, tax progressivity, and transfer targeting for overall redistribution, the respective role of various categories of transfers for transfer redistribution; as well as redistribution for various income groups. The paper shows a widespread decline in redistribution across the OECD, both on average and in the majority of countries for which data going back to the mid-1990s are available. This was primarily associated with a decline in cash transfer redistribution while PIT played a less important and more heterogeneous role across countries. In turn, the decline in the redistributive effect of cash transfers reflected a decline in their size and in particular by less redistributive insurance transfers. In some countries, this was mitigated by more redistributive assistance transfers but the resulting increase in the targeting of total transfers was not sufficient to prevent transfer redistribution from declining.

I evaluate how the tax reform of 2012 reduced informality in Colombia both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I develop a labor market model and obtain simulations indicating that the reform should reduce informality significantly. Empirically, I obtain difference-in-difference estimates from two household surveys. Estimates from the repeated cross-sections data indicate small, short-term effects and large long-term effects. Estimates from the household survey panel data are in line with these results. I also simulate difference-in-difference estimates with different combinations of changes in payroll taxes and enforcement indicating that large improvements would have been needed to obtain the corresponding econometric estimates.