Incentive structure of CEO stock option pay and stock ownership: the moderating effects of firm risk

Abstract

Outlines previous research on the role of executive compensation contracts in reducing conflicts of interest between ownership and control; and develops hypotheses on the effects of chief executive officer stock options and share ownership on subsequent firm performance. Suggests that since options do not create losses when share prices decline, they encourage more risk taking than share ownership. Explains the methodology used to test these ideas on 1994‐1996 data for a sample of large US firms and presents the results, which suggest that both stock options and share ownership are positively linked to later firm performance but that the link is stronger for ownership in high risk situations, but lower performance where risk is high. Considers the implications for corporate governance and consistency with other research; and calls for further research.

Citation

Gerard Sanders, W. (1999), "Incentive structure of CEO stock option pay and stock ownership: the moderating effects of firm risk", Managerial Finance, Vol. 25 No. 10, pp. 61-75. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074359910766235