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In this chapter, we provide the first empirical study of the effects of differing types of majority ownership, including employee ownership, on executive compensation. By investigating the case of Estonia, we also extend the range of geographical coverage of studies of the determinants of executive compensations to the case of Estonia.

Although previous research finds that the type of ownership affects CEO pay, our new panel data, and the exceptional configurations of ownership that prevailed in Estonia during early transition, enable us to construct unusual measures of majority ownership.

Findings indicate that an economically significant determinant of CEO pay is ownership both in state versus privatized firms and in different types of private firms. In firms with majority ownership by employees, pay is about 15% less than in state-owned firms, other things equal. CEO pay is also positively related to size and seldom related to performance although size elasticities are much smaller than those estimated in other studies, mainly for advanced western countries.

Findings provide more general support than previously for the varying importance of principal–agency relationships across firm types and the views that privatization and employee ownership have imposed strong discipline on the level of CEO compensation.

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.

We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.

Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.

This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the crucial question of whether gender diversity in boardroom is associated with CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link.

The authors used the data of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for a sample consisting of KSE-100 index companies for the period of five years. The authors used the ordinary least square regression technique to test the developed hypotheses. The authors also used the two-step Heckman selection model, two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching method to control the problem of endogeneity.

The authors find reliable evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and CEO pay and of board gender diversity’s strengthening the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. The authors also find that women director are more effective in setting the optimal contract in non-family-owned firms and firms with dispersed ownership structure as compared to family-owned firms and firms with concentrated ownership structure. Moreover, results also reflect that the influence of board diversity on both CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link is stronger when gender diversity goes beyond tokenism.

The findings have implications in terms of providing the basis for policy makers to accord the same level of importance to gender diversity in the boardroom as well as contributing to the current debate on the desirability of mandating or recommending gender diversity on boardrooms.

This study is among the few studies which investigate the moderating role of boardroom gender diversity on the CEO pay-performance link. In addition, this study contributes to the institutional theory by providing the empirical evidence that the effect boardroom gender diversity on CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link varies by type of ownership.

This study aims to explore the moderating impact of narcissism overload on the relation between founder CEO and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in registered private schools of Pakistan.

Data were collected through a stratified random sampling method with the help of previously validated questionnaires. A sample of 121 replies was gathered for analysis. SPSS has been used to find the results.

Results depict that CEO narcissism moderates the relation between founder CEO and EO and does not moderate the relationship between and CEO ownership and EO.

Many studies focused on the founder personality characteristics (such as generalized self-efficacy or locus of control) are not directly observed, but rather inferred their effect indirectly. The study contributes to examine how the founder CEO variable interacts with CEO personality to influence EO. This study will propose a practical approach to investigate whether and how the narcissism constructs moderate the founder CEO–EO relationship. Direct association between stock ownership and EO will also be examined.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

This study aims to investigate the relations between CEO gender, power and bank performance. First, this study examines the relation between CEO gender and power. Do female CEOs possess less power than male CEOs? As women reach the top, do they hold similar or even higher levels of power as men? Second, this study investigates the relation between the CEO gender and bank performance. How do female CEOs perform? Is the relation between gender and performance subject to CEO power?

This study uses the following three performance measures: ROA, pre-tax ROA and pre-provision profit over assets. This study follows Finkelstein’s (1992) classifications and adopt five variables to measure the four dimensions of CEO power: duality and compensation share measure structural power; ownership captures ownership power; number of functional areas measures the power of expertise; and elite education captures prestige power. Logit model, ordinary least squares regression and quantile regression methods are used in the analysis.

In a sample of Chinese banks, female CEOs are found to have similar power and performance as male CEOs. As women reach the top, they hold higher ownership and greater prestige power than men. Female CEOs even outperform male CEOs in non-state dominated banks. Female CEOs show their impact through their power: those with higher compensation shares or greater power are positively related to bank performance.

Overall, the results show that as women reach the top, they hold a higher level of power than men. As females break through the glass ceiling, they perform better than males. Moreover, female CEOs show their impact through their power. Female CEOs who overcome the barriers are less traditional and more self-directed than their peers.

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance and the moderating effects of ownership structure and board structure with respect to listed non‐financial companies in Thailand.

Logit model is employed to analyze the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance.

The paper finds that both ownership and board structure have effects on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The probability of CEO turnover is lower when the firm is controlled by family, the CEO is part of the controlling family, and board size is larger. Contrary to previous studies, sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is higher with the presence of CEO duality and lower degree of board independence. When a CEO continues to work beyond retirement age, the probability of turnover is not associated with firm performance.

This study provides evidence that CEO duality and low independent board is not necessarily bad corporate governance practice for Thai companies and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, practitioners, and academic researchers.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) on chief executive officer compensation (CEO COMP) and pay–performance relationship (PPR) in Indian listed firms.

A sample of 196 companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 (Standard and Poor's Bombay Stock Exchange 500) Index has been analyzed using the panel (random effects) regression technique over the period 2010–2019. In addition, the system GMM technique was used to deal with the endogeneity issue.

The study found that block ownership and ownership concentration negatively impact COMP measures and PPR. Board size also had a negative direct and moderating impact on CEO COMP; however, the linkages were generally insignificant, especially for total pay. Similarly, outsider blockholders were found to be playing an insignificant role. Further, board independence positively influences COMP levels and PPR, though the results were mixed with respect to significance. Finally, CEO duality positively and significantly influences CEO COMP and PPR. A comparison before and after the new Indian Companies Act 2013 also revealed similar results, particularly in the after period. It suggests that the new legislative initiative was not effective enough in improving the CG and, hence, the alignment of pay with performance.

This study investigates the direct and moderating impact of CG on CEO COMP in the context of emerging economy India. Further, it makes a comparison before and after the introduction of the new governance reform, that is, the Indian Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, providing support to the entrenchment effect, the study reveals that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by not aligning CEO pay with performance, making agency problems graver in emerging economies like India.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.

Incentive‐based executive compensation is regarded as a mechanism for alleviating agency problems between executives and shareholders. Seventy‐three New Zealand (NZ) listed companies are used to examine the relationship between executive incentive compensation schemes (ICS) and firm performance. The results suggest that neither compensation level nor adoption of an ICS are significantly related to returns to shareholders or ROA. However, there is a statistically significant relationship between Tobin's q and both CEO compensation and executive share ownership. Further, the evidence suggests the recent compensation disclosure requirements in NZ are not yet stringent enough to allow adequate analysis of the link between ICSs and corporate performance.