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Corporate governance, CEO compensation, and corporate performance: evidence from India

Chhavi Jatana (University Business School, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India)

Corporate Governance

ISSN: 1472-0701

Article publication date: 19 August 2022

Issue publication date: 26 January 2023

703

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) on chief executive officer compensation (CEO COMP) and pay–performance relationship (PPR) in Indian listed firms.

Design/methodology/approach

A sample of 196 companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 (Standard and Poor's Bombay Stock Exchange 500) Index has been analyzed using the panel (random effects) regression technique over the period 2010–2019. In addition, the system GMM technique was used to deal with the endogeneity issue.

Findings

The study found that block ownership and ownership concentration negatively impact COMP measures and PPR. Board size also had a negative direct and moderating impact on CEO COMP; however, the linkages were generally insignificant, especially for total pay. Similarly, outsider blockholders were found to be playing an insignificant role. Further, board independence positively influences COMP levels and PPR, though the results were mixed with respect to significance. Finally, CEO duality positively and significantly influences CEO COMP and PPR. A comparison before and after the new Indian Companies Act 2013 also revealed similar results, particularly in the after period. It suggests that the new legislative initiative was not effective enough in improving the CG and, hence, the alignment of pay with performance.

Originality/value

This study investigates the direct and moderating impact of CG on CEO COMP in the context of emerging economy India. Further, it makes a comparison before and after the introduction of the new governance reform, that is, the Indian Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, providing support to the entrenchment effect, the study reveals that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by not aligning CEO pay with performance, making agency problems graver in emerging economies like India.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Prof. Gabriel Eweje (Editor-in-Chief), Dr Gagan Deep Sharma (Associate Editor) and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments.

Citation

Jatana, C. (2023), "Corporate governance, CEO compensation, and corporate performance: evidence from India", Corporate Governance, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 132-168. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-08-2021-0282

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited

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