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1 – 10 of over 3000Zeina Ahmad and Bashar H. Malkawi
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the best dispute settlement mechanisms in the world. Under WTO rules, aggrieved parties must establish a “prima facie” case before the…
Abstract
Purpose
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the best dispute settlement mechanisms in the world. Under WTO rules, aggrieved parties must establish a “prima facie” case before the panel can call on the offending party to respond to the claims. The objective of the present study is to critically evaluate the application of the concept of burden of proof under WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper examines the rule of “prima facie” in WTO jurisprudence. To do so, the first part will focus on the development of dispute settlement within WTO. The second part is divided into several subsections that will focus on the burden of proof concept, burden of proof in common law, burden of proof in civil law and the prima facie standard.
Findings
The DSU does not explicitly regulate how to allocate the burden of proof, but panels and the AB needed to address that issue early in their history. Despite this, all aggrieved parties to establish a prima facie case before the case can become the subject of a panel hearing. There is a need to adopt a burden of proof standard that assesses evidence on the basis of preponderance of the available evidence rather than on the basis of a party’s failure to adduce evidence to back up or dispute a claim.
Originality/value
The paper is an attempt to address an important issue on the presentation of evidence and proof in international litigation, i.e. WTO.
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The purpose of this article is to determine the burden of proof that is applicable in the range of activities covered by the civil offence of market abuse. It also considers the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this article is to determine the burden of proof that is applicable in the range of activities covered by the civil offence of market abuse. It also considers the approach adopted in the USA and discusses the extent to which that approach may be worth applying in this country.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology adopted is a mixture of black letter law in analysing the nature of the burden of proof and the relevant market abuse issues, historical research in examining how the modern law relating to the burden of proof has evolved and comparative research through the consideration given to the US approach.
Findings
The findings are that the burden of proof in market abuse cases is unclear, that the burden may well not be the same in all cases, that clarification is needed on the point and that the approach adopted in the USA offers the advantage of clarity. Therefore, its adoption should be considered.
Practical implications
The main practical implication is that cases are currently being brought without this key issue being properly considered and clarified.
Originality/value
The author can find no other research that has been published in this specific area.
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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act…
Abstract
The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:
This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the…
Abstract
This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the presumption in favour of the State when criminal sanctions are applied to an offending taxpayer (section 104(2) of the Act) and the mechanics for imposing administrative sanctions in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the reverse onus presumption, as provided for in terms of section 104(2) of the Act, is unconstitutional. It is penal in nature and offends against the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial (sections 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 [the “Constitution”]). The section 36 limitation of rights clause of the Constitution does not save it. Section 76(1)(b) of the Act read in conjunction with the deeming provision of section 76(5) of the Act, is inextricably linked to the section 82 general reverse onus provision of the Act. Hence, when these three sections are applied together, they create a reverse onus that, prima facie, violates the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution). Regarding the general reverse onus burden as provided for in terms of section 82 of the Act, the conclusion reached is that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and can therefore be regarded as constitutional.
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James Keyte, Paul Eckles and Karen Lent
In 2009, the Third Circuit decided Hydrogen Peroxide, which announced a more rigorous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for assessing whether a putative…
Abstract
In 2009, the Third Circuit decided Hydrogen Peroxide, which announced a more rigorous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for assessing whether a putative class could establish antitrust injury. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided Comcast v. Behrend, a case that carries potentially broad implications for both antitrust cases and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions generally. A review of the case law starting with Hydrogen Peroxide and continuing through Comcast and its progeny reveals the new rigor in antitrust class action decisions and suggests what the future may hold, including the type of arguments that may provide defendants the most likely chance of defeating class certification. After Comcast, rigor under 23(b)(3) can no longer be avoided in assessing all class actions questions, and courts should now apply Daubert fully in the class setting concerning both impact and damages. Courts should also closely evaluate plaintiffs’ proposed methodologies for proving impact to determine if they apply to each class member. Finally, courts will inevitably have to determine how rigorously to scrutinize experts’ damages methodologies and whether Comcast requires or suggests more scrutiny in assessing common evidence for measuring damages.
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Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis…
Abstract
Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.
Fabio Ramazzini Bechara and Gabriel Monti Manzano
This paper aims to answer three questions: Is the presumption of innocence principle in risk? How to balance it with the burden and standard of proof? Does the asset civil…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to answer three questions: Is the presumption of innocence principle in risk? How to balance it with the burden and standard of proof? Does the asset civil forfeiture procedure imply a criminal charge? These are the main constitutional issues that have hampered the processing of, and consensus regarding, the regulation of the asset civil forfeiture in Brazil, the subject of bill 5681/2013 of the Chamber of Deputies and bill 255/2015 of the Federal Senate. The hypothesis is that the property or the possession of illegal assets implies a violation of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, which presumes good faith and non-abused use to be legitimated. This study intends to enrich this discussion with the current American debate, its main lessons and concerns to individual procedural safeguards.
Design/methodology/approach
There are some questions that should be addressed: Is the presumption of innocence principle in risk? How to balance it with the burden and standard of proof? Does the asset civil forfeiture procedure imply a criminal charge? Thus, this paper aims to discuss these questions, which are the main constitutional issues that have hampered the processing of, and consensus regarding, the regulation of the asset civil forfeiture in Brazil, the subject of bill 5681/2013 of the Chamber of Deputies and bill 255/2015 of the Federal Senate. The hypothesis is that the property or the possession of illegal assets implies a violation of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, which presumes good faith and non-abused use to be legitimated. This study intends to enrich this analysis with the current American debate about asset civil forfeiture provisions, its main lessons and concerns to individual procedural safeguards.
Findings
This paper focused on answering three questions: Is the presumption of innocence principle in risk? How to balance it with the burden and standard of proof? Does the asset civil forfeiture procedure imply a criminal charge? The authors sustained the constitutionality of the asset civil forfeiture from a Brazilian perspective, based on three main arguments: First, asset civil forfeiture is based on the non-abused use of property rights constitutional provision. Second, asset civil forfeiture does not imply on or presume a criminal charge. Finally, asset civil forfeiture is not based on the same standard of proof as a criminal proceeding.
Originality/value
The value of this paper is based on its current debate, the regulation of the asset civil forfeiture in Brazil, which is subject of bill 5681/2013 of the Chamber of Deputies and bill 255/2015 of the Federal Senate. The hypothesis is that the property or the possession of illegal assets implies a violation of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, which presumes good faith and non-abused use to be legitimated.
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Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant…
Abstract
Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant environmental harm. This decision rule is conceptually unsound and would diminish social welfare. Uncertainty as such does not justify regulatory precaution. While they should reject PP, regulators should take appropriate account of societal aversion to risks of large harm and the value of obtaining additional information before allowing environmentally risky activities to proceed.
There are several agreements within the framework of the World Trade Organization that have an impact on the issue of food safety. These include the prohibition against…
Abstract
There are several agreements within the framework of the World Trade Organization that have an impact on the issue of food safety. These include the prohibition against quantitative restrictions of GATT 94, the general exceptions of Article XX, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights. This chapter analyzes the primary disputes pertaining directly or tangentially to matters of food safety and representation under each of these agreements that were impaneled under the dispute settlement understanding. Particular attention is given to the EC/Hormones and the EC/genetically modified organisms (GMO) cases.
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The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal…
Abstract
The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.