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This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the presumption in favour of the State when criminal sanctions are applied to an offending taxpayer (section 104(2) of the Act) and the mechanics for imposing administrative sanctions in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the reverse onus presumption, as provided for in terms of section 104(2) of the Act, is unconstitutional. It is penal in nature and offends against the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial (sections 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 [the “Constitution”]). The section 36 limitation of rights clause of the Constitution does not save it. Section 76(1)(b) of the Act read in conjunction with the deeming provision of section 76(5) of the Act, is inextricably linked to the section 82 general reverse onus provision of the Act. Hence, when these three sections are applied together, they create a reverse onus that, prima facie, violates the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution). Regarding the general reverse onus burden as provided for in terms of section 82 of the Act, the conclusion reached is that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and can therefore be regarded as constitutional.

‘It is incorrect to view the recovery of the profits of unlawful activity as a part of the criminal justice process and, as such, justifiable only on the basis of a prior finding of guilt according to the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.’

Years ago, the Katz Commission questioned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1962. The purpose of this article is to investigate the general principles of human rights litigation and the progress made to date in respect of rectifying the unconstitutional provisions of the Income Tax Act that were identified by the Katz Commission. It has been established that, although some unconstitutional provisions have been amended, others still prevail, and that, in the light of the factors identified, they will probably not be challenged successfully by taxpayers.

In 1994, after the 1993 Constitution had been adopted, the Katz Commission questioned the constitutionality of some provisions of the Income Tax Act. The purpose of this article is, firstly, to follow up on the progress made in amending the provisions concerned and, secondly, to establish reasons for the lack of success achieved by taxpayers who attack the constitutionality of certain provisions. Some progress has been made, but in this article, the author argues that SARS should amend section 104(2) of the Act. The establishment of a specialist ombudsman’s office is also proposed. Such an office that could assist taxpayers to enforce their constitutional rights against the Commissioner is the essential missing element.

A nostrum much quoted in traditional contract law courses is ‘caveat emptor’ (let the buyer beware). Buyers had to look after themselves and protect their own interests. The laissez‐faire philosophy which lay behind this maxim took the view that the operation of unrestrained market forces was the best method for protecting consumers as a whole. Emphasis was placed on free competition providing alternative choices as the best way of satisfying consumer wants. In reality, even in the mid‐19th century when this philosophy was dominant, the consumer was not left without the protection of the law. Freedom of contract notionally existed and much judicial rhetoric was expended on justifying it but in reality the courts were quite astute in protecting consumers in situations where they were the victims of fraud, trading malpractice or unequal contracts.

This paper aims to focus on the use of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in South Africa as a civil method to act upon lifestyle audit results that have indicated wealth from unknown, possibly unlawful, sources.

This paper applied a comparative methodology. Legislation and the application of UWOs in Ireland, the UK and Australia were compared with the situation in South Africa.

It is proposed that South Africa includes UWO legislation within its Prevention of Organised Crime Act or be established as a separate piece of legislation. Also, South Africa should follow both the civil and criminal route to target the proceeds of crime.

Corruption in South Africa is rampant and, without the necessary legislation, impossible to fight. For these purposes, this paper proposes measures to be used from a civil forfeiture perspective.

The purpose of the paper is to examine and contrast director duties in health and safety in the UK and Australian jurisdictions, the former influencing the latter's health and safety regime until Australia introduced a new more progressive regime.

The authors are practitioners who have combined desk based research with professional knowledge of how the law in both jurisdictions is applied. The approach was a comparative study of the underlying principles behind the enforcement regimes.

The paper found that the UK position could be strengthened but whilst the new Australian position could be a preferable development, it is too early to tell whether or not the Australian model would be more effective.

Research was desk‐based only.

Practitioners in both jurisdictions should consider potential developments in the area of director duties, particularly in the UK where Section 37 could arguably be strengthened.

This is the first comparison of the UK and Australian jurisdictions in respect of health and safety and examines an alternative to the consent, connivance and neglect model used in the UK to attach culpability to directors and officers. It also examines the possibility of introducing due diligence in the UK.

Over the last two decades in particular, national legislatures have passed legislation aimed at ensuring that criminals do not profit from crime. This has been in response to the rise of organised crime and to the massive amounts of money being generated, in particular, by drug trafficking. It has been an attempt to destroy ‘the heart of the monster, its financial base’. This paper seeks to demonstrate that the proceeds of crime response by national governments can be perceived as evolving through a series of different models, thus allowing a comparative approach amongst different jurisdictions. Each model is composed of elements from three different strands: money‐laundering legislation, confiscation legislation and organisational structures and arrangements. These strands have each gone through their own evolution, which will now be examined.

High‐taxing European treasuries face grave problems as they try to finance redistributive welfare states having low birth rates and declining labour tax bases in an age of globalising investment. Their problem is not much different to the problem faced by the Roman Emperors (though Constantine humanely disclaimed the previous use of the scourge and the rack and contented himself with incarceration of insolvent taxpayers). In those days wealth was buried as gold in the grounds of the villa; in our day it may be buried in overseas parent or subsidiary companies. The reality remains that capital and business income can be made less visible to the tax collector than landed property. The solution of the late Roman Empire was to visit corporal punishment on the taxpayer. The solution now being urged by the OECD in Paris is that small or developing countries with offshore financial centres be pressed into service as subsidiary tax enforcers to boost OECD coffers. The OECD approach is multifarious, involving the criminalisation of tax avoidance and the elimination of various forms of tax competition from these centres in all geographically mobile service industries, including financial, but also distribution services, shipping, service industries and company headquartering. The OECD initiative is already drafting similar action on competition in e‐commerce, with manufacturing industry having been flagged in the 1998 OECD report.